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Abstract 
 
PAINFUL BELONGING: VIOLENCE IN J.M. COETZEE’S FICTION 
 
Olivia Buck  
B.A., Appalachian State University,  
M.A., Appalachian State University  
 
 
Chairperson: Başak Çandar, Ph.D. 
 
 
J.M. Coetzee’s fiction invites its readers to engage with the representation of political 
violence during and after the Apartheid period in South Africa. His work wrestles with a 
consideration of the processes that inform the hierarchization of individuals— whether they 
be human or non-human— and how consequential iterations of physical and psychological 
violence affect victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. In short, his fiction represents the 
consequences of encountering and attempting to represent the Other. 
By comparing ​Waiting for the Barbarians ​and ​Disgrace, ​ I have isolated three distinct 
ethical considerations that inform Coetzee’s representative engagement with violence in both 
texts: first, the infliction of direct physical pain on bodies that are marked as vulnerable due 
to specific ontological categories they possess; second, the violence perpetrated through the 
functioning of sovereign power in both ambiguous and specific spaces; and finally, the 
violence embedded within the criteria of citizenship and statelessness. The core of my 
analysis lies in arguing the fundamental interconnectedness of these three categories. Though 
iv 
 they are distinct and can be examined in isolation, they also simultaneously and necessarily 
inform each other and tend to unfold in a myriad of combinations and settings— for example, 
the infliction of physical violence in a political setting can be understood as an articulation of  
the tenuous relationship between perpetual sovereign power and the precariousness of 
national belonging. This quality of fundamental association between these categories moves 
across the spaces and contexts of these two novels, and as I hope to show, may extend to 
non-fictional political violence. In order to effectively delineate the connection between these 
three considerations, I rely primarily on the theoretical scaffolding provided by the political 
philosophers Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben, as well as the works of Elaine Scarry, 
Susan Sontag, and Idelber Avelar on violence. This project unfolds over four chapters; the 
introduction, which contextualizes Coetzee within debates surrounding global literature, and 
the subsequent three chapters, which conduct examinations of the three modes of political 
violence represented in both novels.  
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An Introduction to Physical Violence, Sovereign Violence, and the Violence of 
Statelessness and Citizenship in J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction 
In his 1986 essay “Into the Dark Chamber: The Novelist and South Africa,” the South 
African novelist J.M. Coetzee writes, “The novelist is a person who, camped before a closed 
door, facing an insufferable ban, creates, in place of the scene he is forbidden to see, a 
representation of that scene and a story of the actors in it and how they come to be 
there” (13). Coetzee writes about the difficulty of writing torture into narrative here—living 
in the midst of South African Apartheid forces him to negotiate with representing violence of 
which he, as a white man, has had no direct experience. When considering Coetzee’s novels, 
further complications arise due to the privileged position of their author and the dominant 
space the English language affords them. Broadly speaking, in this essay and in his oeuvre 
more generally, he touches on the precarious position writers often occupy when finding 
themselves tasked with answering difficult questions. What role can literature play in the 
intersections between the “real worlds” of politics, ethics, and violence? What can literary 
representation do to those realms— how can it critique them, exchange with them, or simply 
attempt to illustrate them? These questions remain, I argue, the most crucial space from 
which to examine Coetzee’s fiction, where the reality and representation of political violence 
interact, transact, or merely do something to one another.   
I am primarily interested in how Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) and 
Disgrace (1999) interact with the specific realities of Apartheid and post-Apartheid South 
Africa and the more general realities of the apparatus of political violence occurring outside 
of that context. When read comparatively, and alongside some of the most relevant 
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contributions to political theory of the past century, I argue these texts open up the possibility 
of uncovering how representations of political violence relate to non-fictional, testimonial, 
and theoretical accounts of political violence. The novels move us closer to understanding the 
process that occurs when some of their creators, though banned from witnessing what occurs 
in the dark chamber of the state’s torture room, still find themselves entrusted with bearing 
witness to the violence they are prohibited from seeing.  I am limiting this inquiry to three 1
primary mechanisms of political violence at work within Coetzee’s fiction: the violence of 
physical pain, the violence of sovereign power, and the violence of citizenship and 
statelessness.  
Before explicating these categories, I would like to consider two primary critical and 
theoretical avenues of Coetzee’s work that will allow me to situate the methodology I use 
when reading these two novels. Even before winning the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2003, 
Coetzee’s work afforded him a vast amount of critical and popular attention. With the 
publication of Waiting for the Barbarians, perhaps his best known novel, Coetzee cemented 
his career as one of the most highly regarded writers in the English language. However, his 
work did receive and continues to receive a particular criticism that touches on the two 
realms of critical engagement I want to examine more closely.  Especially upon the release 
and subsequent praise of Waiting for the Barbarians, many literary critics (both South 
African and not) accused his writing of being “preoccupied with problems of consciousness, 
thus betraying an idealist rather than materialist stance; [...] symptomatic of the forms of 
consciousness that it criticizes; [unable] to escape colonial history (and its Western 
 Of course, it is important to acknowledge that some novelists were themselves the victims and survivors of the 1
violence they represent in their fiction. 
!3
ontology); [and failing] to delineate accurately the economic complexities of 
oppression” (Dovey 16).  This critique seems to rest on two important restrictions facing 2
Coetzee’s fiction even in our current moment: how can a novelist who is both white and 
writing in English communicate the traumatic truth of South Africa’s fraught politico-
historical position? These criticisms hinge on the ethical difficulties Coetzee’s work faces in 
attempting to represent the Other in the very language of their oppressors. 
“More ordinary than I like to think, she may have ways of finding me ordinary too”: 
Approaches to the Representing the Other in Coetzee’s Fiction 
 For decades, critical and theoretical interventions have used Coetzee’s text in order to 
explore the ethics of representing the Other. This stems from Coetzee’s grasp of the intimacy 
between the trauma of Apartheid and the trauma of racially marked bodies who both bear 
witness to it through either the perpetual experience of its violence (black and Coloured 
South Africans)  or the perpetual complicity in its violence (white South Africans). 3
According to a case study on survivors of political trauma during the Apartheid era 
conducted by Ileana Carmen Rogobete in 2015, when examining Apartheid, one must 
account for “the contextual differences with regard to the nature of traumatic events 
experienced by black communitites compared to those of the White victims [...] in the case of 
black communities shattered by continuous oppression, trauma can be better understood 
 Dovey’s article, “Coetzee and His Critics: The Case of Dusklands” (1987), provides a cursory account of the 2
main criticisms leveled against him by the Marxist literary critics writing in South Africa at the time. This 
passage summarizes Peter Kohler’s 1987 paper. 
 The term Coloured here refers to a specific ethnic group in South Africa that “came to be linked with the 3
surviving community of Free Blacks and the ex-slaves [...] who together acquired an identity— at first informal 
but after 1948 forbiddingly formal [...]-- as the Cape Coloured People” (Davenport 33). Certain South African 
individuals self-identify as Coloured to this day, while others refrain from using the term as a means of 
identification. Of course, this term indicates a specifically South African identity-category— it is in no way 
acceptable to use in other contemporary national contexts.  
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within the framework of a traumatic context and not as a result of traumatic events” (186). In 
order to reach the truth of Apartheid’s violence and its residual influences, there must be 
consideration of the many perpsectives involved within South Africa—this assertion comes 
from a collection of testimonies stemming from a multitude of South African perspectives, 
both male and female, young and old, black, white, and Coloured. Yet, this prescription 
becomes difficult when applied to the realm of fiction. Attempting to represent the 
immensely complex conglomeration of experiences involved in the history of Apartheid runs 
the risks of fictional tokenization, over-simplification, exoticization, white-saviorism, and 
worse still, white-apologism. This difficulty, perhaps, touches on what Coetzee laments in his 
1987 Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech: “‘You cannot resign from the [master] caste. You 
can imagine resigning, you can perform a symbolic act of resignation, but short of shaking 
the dust of the country off your feet, there is no way of actually doing it’” (Durrant 18).  
Grasping at the connection between the larger system and the particular participants 
does not necessarily mean Coetzee himself is able to, or even aims to, represent the absolute 
truth of the violated Other. This is the argument Sam Durrant relies on in his critical account 
of Coetzee’s fiction as a work of mourning (2004): “They [his characters] stand in for a base 
level of suffering that resists narrativization not simply because the suffering is in itself 
unspeakable, but because his awareness of his own position of privilege prevents him from 
speaking on behalf of their suffering” (18). Durrant uses this argument to explain the 
unexplainable moments in Coetzee’s descriptions—the apparent unspeakability of 
Apartheid’s violence correlates with Coetzee’s use of ambiguous, allegorical imagery in two 
of his earlier novels, Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) and Life and Times of Michael K 
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(1983). However, this reading relies on a didactically allegorical approach to Coetzee’s 
fiction, and specifically to Waiting for the Barbarians. In his book on Coetzee’s fiction 
(2004), Derek Attridge cautions against interpretations informed by this methodology: “We 
need to ask how allegory is thematized in fiction, and whether this staging of allegory as an 
issue provides any guidance in talking about Coetzee’s use of allegory” (34). Atrridge’s 
argument centers on the necessity in thinking through Coetzee’s use of allegory both 
generally and specifically, and claims that too simple of a one-to-one comparison between his 
historical context and his fiction may obscure the more important aspect of Coetzee’s fiction: 
its ability to communicate aspects of the ethical human condition in a more general capacity, 
apart from the South African context in which he writes. Attridge writes, “Coetzee’s work 
both stage, and are, irruptions of otherness into our familiar worlds, and they pose the 
question: what is our responsibility toward the other?” (12).  
Even between only two critics, we have monograph-length accounts for how to 
understand the relevance and treatment of Coetzee’s representations of the Other. It seems on 
the one hand, Coetzee’s representation of Othered bodies can be interpreted as a retreat from 
presuming to know the truth of the incommunicable trauma of Apartheid’s history, and on the 
other, as an ethically charged event that intentionally displaces the reader precisely through 
using the representation of the Other as an intrusion.  One can even take Peter Singer and 4
Anton Leist’s use of Coetzee’s representation of the Other in their analytical collection about 
the connections between Coetzee’s fiction and ethical philosophy (2010): “Like 
 For shorter accounts of the ethics of Coetzee’s representation of the Other, see citations included for Kelly 4
Adams (2015), Mary LeBlanc (2017), Pavithra Tantrigoda (2016), Liani Lochner (2016), Jonathan Lear (2015), 
Liani Lochner (2016), and Mike Marais (2011). 
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transcendental arguments in philosophy, they [literary characters] must radiate their status of 
being extreme but at the same time must be able to shed some light on the less extreme [...] 
Coetzee’s novels are populated with characters of this kind” (9).  
Though Singer and Leist’s collection provides an example of the interdisciplinarity 
elicited by Coetzee’s fiction, I am disinclined to agree with their application of analytically-
bent ethical theory to his prose, and am even less enthused about their connection between 
his fiction and transcendental philosophical ideals.  When read in this fashion, Coetzee’s 5
novels come dangerously close to fulfilling aspects of the criticism initially laid against them: 
namely, that the texts only serve to regurgitate and reify the ideologies they seek to 
dismantle, or expose. Coetzee’s fiction seems less preoccupied with the implementation of 
transcendental ideals than with the material, psychological, and metaphysical effects of the 
violence he works to represent. In a moment in Disgrace, the text directly rejects the very 
emphasis on ideas purported by Leist and Singer: “The question is not, How can we keep the 
imagination pure, protected from the onslaughts of reality? The question has to be, Can we 
find a way for the two to coexist?’” (22). This question permeates the rest of the novel, and 
any definite conclusion intentionally evades us. For fiction itself, perhaps, works in the space 
between imagination and reality that David Lurie touches on here, and in light of this 
liminality, a clear method with which to read the novels’ treatments of Othered characters 
 Admittedly, Leist and Singer specify that, “To shift the puzzles of philosophical reflection into literature could 5
be at least a first step towards tackling them in a more realistic and practical manner” (14). However, their 
reliance on the formal ethical systems provided in analytic philosophy feels facile in light of the lineage of 
continental philosophy, which houses a whole host of theorists that have been taking the “first step” of linking 
literature to theory for at least a century.  
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must be reached before its representation regarding the violence inflicted on those characters 
can be explicated.  
Durrant and Attridge’s perspectives, which also provide potential methods by which 
to think though the difficulties of Coetzee’s representation of the Other, also rely almost too 
heavily on application of more “literary” ideas to these texts. That is, they place much of 
their emphasis on the formal elements of Coetzee’s prose that apparently give it unique 
qualities. While not inherently incorrect, these readings also may place Coetzee’s fiction too 
close to the critiques levelled against it by its historical materialist critics. The methodology 
with which I conduct my reading of this ethical quandary takes aspects of these perspectives 
into consideration, but relies most heavily on the perspective provided by Gayatri Spivak in 
Death of a Discipline (2003). In her argument about the necessity of cultivating a new 
Comparative Literature built on collaboration with the field of Area Studies, she turns to both 
Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians in order to make the case of her preference for 
qualitative texts that use a logical protocol over a rhetorical protocol.  After quoting a 6
particularly ambiguous description the Magistrate provides of the apparent impenetrability of 
the Barbarian Girl, Spivak writes,  
But the meaning that is sought is the meaning of the Magistrate as subject, as 
perceived by the barbarian as other. This meaning is undecidable in at least two ways. 
First, there is no stable declaration of meaning. And second, the alternative 
possibilities of the meaning of the dominant self in the eyes of the barbarian other are 
 Spivak writes “these logical passages are often accounts of the fruits of imperial experience with some 6
historical generalizability within the loose outlines of the narrative” (22). In her understanding, logical protocol 
in qualitative narratives moves away from the impulse to efface the fact that the proper study of literature gives 
entry to the performativity of cultures, not the reality of them (13). 
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given as questions. It is possible to suggest that two alternatives are standing in for an 
indefinite structure of possibilities here [...] Our own undecidable meaning is in the 
irreducible figure that stands in for the eyes of the other (23). 
In this observation, Spivak argues that Coetzee’s ambiguous account of the Othered 
characters, instead of shrinking away from representation, instead intentionally illustrates the 
fact that when one regards the Other, one can neither completely access them nor ourselves 
in their eyes. In this way, Coetzee’s narratives work to highlight the mutual ambiguity that 
continually effaces any attempt to access the Other. In so doing, his narratives work against 
the more anthropologically-based qualitative fiction Spivak warns against.  
She applies a similar understanding to Disgrace’s representation of gendered 
difference: “That novel [Disgrace] offers a glimpse of what happens when the woman is no 
longer an honorary brother, a figuration of the impossible” (34). In other words, Coetzee’s 
novels embrace the shared impossibility of understanding implicit in the relationship between 
the self and the Other, and in light of this, highlights the agency of the Other often forgotten 
in other representations of alterity. This instance on mutuality can be glimpsed in another 
point in Waiting for the Barbarians when the Magistrate realizes the Girl finds his 
conversation uninteresting: “I would do well to take these thoughts seriously. More ordinary 
than I like to think, she may have ways of finding me ordinary too” (64). Here, for the first 
but not the last time, the protagonist in Coetzee’s novel demonstrates his capacity to 
apprehend the mutual indecipherable quality he and the Girl share when attempting to 
understand each other. Spivak’s text, however, while offering a preferred method to read 
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Coetzee’s representation of the Other, provides another ethical snag often leveled against his 
fiction— the criticism of his use of the English language to write about South Africa. 
 This criticism stems first from the Marxist reading of the shortcomings in his fiction, 
which accuse it of being unable to move outside of its colonial history and thus, its Western 
ontological perspective. Spivak writes, “Literary studies will have to acknowledge that the 
European outlines of its premise [...]— positing the idea of the universality of each of the 
European national languages [...]-- have in globaility and in subaltern U.S. multiculturalism, 
altogether disappeared” (12). In other words, literary studies’ insistence on the absolute 
domination of European languages have resulted in the tendency to regard literature written 
in the languages of the Southern Hemisphere as inanimate objects of cultural study instead of 
active examples of cultural media, a perspective less in line with the movement of global 
dynamics as a whole (9). The insistence on the inherently dominant position of European 
languages ignores the possibility of encountering examples of cultural production written in 
the languages of the colonized populations of the Global South. In light of the fact that 
Coetzee writes in English, a possibility that his literature usurps the position of historically 
erased cultural and linguistic perspectives emerges. This anxiety appears in Disgrace: “The 
language [English] he draws on with such aplomb is, if he only knew it, tired, friable, eaten 
from the inside as if by termites. Only the monosyllables can still be relied on” (129). This 
anxiety allows us to move to an examination of the methodologies and perspectives critics 
have provided about the difficulty of communicating the reality of the violence of colonial 
dynamics in South Africa through the production of Anglophone fictional representations.  
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“More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit medium for the truth of South 
Africa”: Approaching Conversations about Anglophone Literary Production 
 Spivak begins to make her case for the urgency of a newly conceived methodology in 
the field of Comparative Literature by writing: “The literatures in English produced by the 
former British colonies in Africa and Asia should be studied and supported. [...] Yet the 
languages that were historically prevented from having a constituted readership or are now 
losing readership might be allowed to prosper as well” (15). She advocates here for mutual 
consideration of Anglophone literature— and linguistically European literature as a whole—
and literature written in languages that have been historically suppressed. Spivak then 
predicts that if literary studies remains focused on translation into and from primarily 
European languages, the discipline loses the ability to recognize the texts that disappear 
precisely because of that mode of translation (18-19). In regards to Coetzee’s texts, then, the 
ethical questions surrounding his use of the English language become paramount to the role 
of literature in the specific colonial violence he represents.  
 Spivak’s concern about the direction of literary studies echoes in Emily Apter’s The 
Translation Zone (2006). However, Apter’s way of thinking about linguistic exchange may 
provide a way to approach the ethical stakes of Coetzee’s reliance on English. Apter 
introduces the concept of the translation zone, or a way of thinking about the parallels 
between linguistic exchange and war zones. Her book, written immediately after 9/11, when 
the stakes of accurate and effective translators became much higher, broadens the discipline 
of Translation Studies and demonstrates how contemporary political dynamics run parallel to 
contemporary linguistic interplay. She writes, “the translation zone applies to diasporic 
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language communities, print and media public spheres, institutions of governmentality and 
language policy-making, theaters of war, and literary theories with particular relevance to the 
history and future of comparative literature” (6). Translation Studies, and the discipline of 
literary studies by extension, needs to embrace the ways in which it influences and is 
influenced by political realities. When the concept of the translation zone is utilized, the 
possible implications of language and translation carry enormous political weight. Apter’s 
conceptualization of the proximity between global linguistic dynamics and contemporary war 
zones presents a tool with which to read Coetzee’s understanding of the relationship between 
language, fiction, and political realities. Coetzee’s fiction offers an example of what occurs in 
fiction when linguistic exchange is thought of as part of political war zones.  
In a 2011 interview, Coetzee touches on his understanding of the English language in 
the context of South Africa’s political schema: “The chief lesson [...] a lesson whose force 
came home to me only years later, concerned the English language [...] a medium that I 
naively used to think was neutral and could be bracketed and forgotten” (Rainey 848). Here, 
Coetzee directly addresses the fact that English can never be considered a politically neutral 
language. If Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians are read with Apter’s translation zone 
in mind, the texts actually serve to provide ample evidence of the connection between fiction, 
linguistic exchange, and political violence. In Waiting for the Barbarians, a particular point 
works within the framework provided by Apter’s understanding of translation as a war zone. 
The Magistrate, after being accused of sabotaging the Empire in order to aid the supposed 
barbarian uprising, is forced to “translate” a collection of ancient relics he has spent his life 
collecting. Though he has no actual knowledge of the characters embossed on the tablets he 
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has uncovered, he uses them to launch into a diatribe against the Empire that spans several 
pages, accusing them of everything from war-mongering to genocide.  
Finally, he finishes, “‘Sometimes when you have difficulty in falling asleep it is 
because your ears have been reached by the cries of the dead which, like their writings, are 
open to many interpretations. Thank you. I have finished translating’” (129). Though not 
actually based on a one-to-one translation between an ancient dialect and the language 
(presumably English) he uses, this moment indicates the text’s awareness of the powerful 
political stakes involved in linguistic interplay, and therefore acts as a mode of translation 
that moves it from the linguistic realm to the political realm. When the Magistrate 
“translates” in this moment, he actually presents a truth pertaining to the atrocities the 
Empire carries out in order to secure its dominance. This correlates with Apter’s claim that 
“The translation zone defines the epistemological intersections of politics, logic, linguistics, 
media, and environment” (6).  
Disgrace also continually underscores the visceral stakes between the translation of 
linguistic and political realms by highlighting how shifts in the English language double the 
shifts in post-Apartheid racial dynamics : “More and more he is convinced that English is an 
unfit medium for the truth of South Africa. Stretches of English code whole sentences long 
have thickened, lost their articulations, their articulateness. Like a dinosaur expiring and 
settling in the mud, the language has stiffened” (117). Meta-textually, the novel 
acknowledges its own shortcomings elicited by the very language it uses. Just as David Lurie 
finds himself unable to penetrate the truth of the violence occurring around him because he 
only speaks European languages, so to, the reader is jolted into the recognition that 
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attempting to discover the entire truth of South Africa cannot happen through reading a novel 
written in English. In this way, based on its use of the English language, the novel itself 
demonstrates how the possibility or impossibility of adequate linguistic exchange mirrors the 
fluctuating political dynamics surrounding it both internally and externally.   
A last moment in Disgrace cements Coetzee’s commitment to interrogating the 
political stakes of writing about colonial violence in English: “The real truth he suspects, is 
something [...] that would take months to get to the bottom of, months of patient, unhurried 
conversations with dozens of people, and the offices of an interpreter” (118). Here again, the 
text explicitly informs its reader that the truth of South Africa cannot be communicated in 
English. When Apter’s understanding of translation-as-war-zone is considered in conjunction 
with Coetzee’s texts, the criticism he faces pertaining to his choice to write in English are in 
fact criticisms that he himself has already apprehended, recognized, and leveled against his 
own work. The inherent violence attached to English, the impossibility of its neutrality, seeps 
through both novels. In the same interview from 2011, Coetzee remarks, “In practice, 
specific languages make specific ranges of thoughts and feelings easier and other ranges 
more difficult. In that sense every language inclines toward a particular sensibility” (Rainey 
849). If we take him at his word, then we can perhaps understand his choice to use English 
when writing his fiction as an intentional one. English participates in the war zone between 
languages, it carries a distinct legacy of non-neutrality and violence. If written from a 
powerful perspective, as in Coetzee’s case, it makes sense to write in English as a way to 
demonstrate the compulsory participation in the systemic violence of Apartheid. Coetzee 
writes exclusively from the position of the oppressor, and his use of English simultaneously 
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demonstrates the oppressors’ participation in the violence of hegemonic oppression, and the 
oppressors’ inability to completely access the cultural reality of those they dominate. Of 
course, this is not to say that Coetzee’s fiction retains its communicative powers solely 
through its use of the English language, or that texts written in Sotho, Xhosa, or any of South 
Africa’s other official languages would not be more effective in representing the violence of 
Apartheid. However, Coetzee’s awareness of the exchange between language and politics, 
and of his own complicity in the violent dynamics of his nation, is made excruciatingly clear 
in his decision to write in English.  
“‘The crime that is latent in us we must inflict on ourselves,’ I say. ‘Not on others,’”: 
Complicity and Mechanisms of Violence in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
Both Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace continually address and return to the 
complicity the protagonists apprehend in their own behavior and social positions. In 
Disgrace, David Lurie touches on this complicity most directly when he tells Melane Isaac’s 
father, “In my own terms, I am being punished for what happened between myself and your 
daughter. I am sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy to lift 
myself” (172). Here, David indicates that he has begun to view the violence inflicted onto his 
daughter by her rapists as an articulation of the same violence he inflicted on Melanie Isaacs, 
a student he coerced into engaging in sexual relations with him. In Waiting for the 
Barbarians, the Magistrate expresses what complicity has taught him to the would-be 
antagonist of the entire narrative, Colonel Joll: “I mouth the words and watch him read them 
on my lips: ‘The crime that is latent in us we must inflict on ourselves,’ I say. I nod and nod, 
driving the message home. ‘Not on others,’ I say” (170). When considered in terms of 
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complicity with the violence that happens in the novel, this moment indicates the importance 
in acknowledging the violent impulses within all of us. These impulses, which are elicited by 
fear and disgust of the Other, must be directed against the self. If directed against the self, it 
seems, concrete steps can be taken in the direction of critically thinking about and working to 
overcome the differences that engender the infliction of violence. If directed against the 
Other, as the Magistrate has already realized, unchecked, indiscriminate violence occurs and 
ultimately results in atrocity.     
The element of complicity embedded within Coetzee’s decision to use English as the 
vehicle for his fiction extends to all three mechanisms of violence I examine in this inquiry. 
The first chapter, which compares the infliction and experience of physical pain in Waiting 
for the Barbarians and Disgrace, traces the how complicity in physical violence inflicted on 
the disempowered Other extends to the infliction of physical violence on the self. The first 
section compares physical violence inflicted on bodies who are made less powerful, and 
therefore more vulnerable to violation by the powerful, based on gendered differences. The 
second section compares how this dynamic extends to bodies made less powerful because of 
racial differences. The final section argues that the texts’ shared representation of this mode 
of violence extending to both the Magistrate and David Lurie work to demonstrate that once 
the infliction of severe physical violence is tolerated against particular bodies, there is little 
or nothing to stop it from extending to every body. In order to make these claims, I rely on 
the theoretical apparatuses provided by Elaine Scarry and Judith Butler, which are dedicated 
to parsing out the relationship between the infliction of physical pain and hierarchies created 
by hegemonic systems of power.    
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The second chapter begins with an examination of the tension between individual 
complicity and sovereign violence. How much can be expected of a single individual when 
they are faced with the simultaneously omnipresent and invisible behemoth of sovereign 
violence? The chapter then moves to explicate how each novel illustrates the paradoxical 
structure of sovereign power, but crucially, illustrate that structure at different points in its 
eternal cycle. In Waiting for the Barbarians, the sovereign violence of the Empire is 
articulated through the apparatus of torture, and thus becomes overtly apparent to some of its 
subjects for the first time. In Disgrace, the violence caused by the sovereign power of the 
Apartheid South African state has been technically disolved, and yet, its residual influences 
and legacies continue to influence the dynamics between the characters. Both iterations of 
sovereign violence provided in these texts provide a basis upon which the eternal quality of 
sovereign power can be glimpsed, and moreover, argue that powerful individuals who inflict 
physical pain onto less powerful individuals become articulations of the sovereign power 
they live within. The last section of this chapter compares both protagonists’ experiences of 
temporal and spatial fluctuations to argue how sovereign power, which partially rests on the 
fiction of its perpetual progress and futurity, implicates every individual it claims to protect 
through its infliction of violence. For these arguments to emerge, I use theoretical 
engagements from Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben.  
The last chapter, which deals with the violence of citizenship and statelessness, 
begins with an explication of the fictional division between bare life and political life 
sovereign power espouses in order to perpetuate itself. Individual characters, and particularly 
the protagonists in each text continually face their own complicity in the continuation of 
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sovereign violence precisely because of how they understand the divisions between bare life 
and political life. The novels both work to uncover these illusory binarisms between bare life 
and political life, and human and non-human life, through proliferating parallels between the 
plight of disempowered human characters and the abuses of non-human characters. In the 
chapter’s next section, the criteria used to indicate belonging to either political life or bare 
life is compared; both texts use a criteria of citizenship attached to ethnic or racial origin, or 
birth in the territory of the nation. The last section of the chapter compares the space of the 
camp present in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace in order to argue the fundamental 
connection between physical violence, sovereign violence, and the violence of citizenship 
and statelessness.  
Comparing these modes of violence in Coetzee’s texts ultimately reveals how the 
sovereign apparatus of nation or empire uses the criteria of citizenship and statelessness to 
justify the infliction of physical violence onto bodies whose differences threaten the illusion 
of absolute control and efficacy that is necessary for the conservation of sovereign power. 
This dynamic indicates that all three mechanisms necessarily engender each other, and that 
when one attempts to uncover the illusory character of political violence, one cannot exist 
without the other two. Comparing these modes of violence between Coetzee’s novels also 
serves to illustrate what Claudia Bernardi writes about the creation of art in the aftermath of 
atrocity: “Art is a tender caress of remembrance, fatigue, loss, pain, and hope, finding in the 
proposition of beauty its vindication. Art may not necessarily mean an improvement, but art 
will assist in the recapitulation of the suffering endured, transformed, and finally rebirthed as 
a communal proposition” (179). In other words, this comparative project aims to uncover 
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how the representation of violence in Coetzee’s novels works to simultaneously ensure that 
the violence of Apartheid will never be erased, and also proposes that confrontation with the 
past, with its far-reaching consequences, may gesture toward a reconceptualized future.       
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Chapter One 
 The Secret Body of the Other: Comparing Representations of Physical Violence in J.M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians  
 The first mechanism of violence this inquiry will examine in Coetzee’s fiction is that 
of the infliction and experience of physical pain. Before examining physical pain in each 
narrative specifically, however, it is crucial to depart from an understanding that physical 
pain resists representation. As Elaine Scarry writes in The Body in Pain (1985), “[...] pain 
comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which 
cannot be confirmed” (4). Ironically, this resistance to representation, this unspeakable or 
secret quality of physical pain, is an important aspect of the mechanisms of violence at work 
in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) and Disgrace (2000). Though the 
instances where physical pain is illustrated are perhaps the most blatant examples of violence 
in these novels, they still carry a mysterious or evasive quality. Accessing them, however, is 
vital in the process of accessing the other two modes of sovereign violence and the violence 
of citizenship and statelessness. Inflictions and experiences of physical violence permeate 
both novels, and act as catalysts for much of their progression; moreover, the physical 
violence in both texts also engender, intersect, and inform the violence at work in the other 
categories of violence present in these texts.  
 In spite of the particularities of the representations of physical pain—both in its 
infliction and the experience of it—I argue that, when read comparatively, Disgrace and 
Waiting for the Barbarians reveal that the perpetration of violence occurs when certain 
bodies have been disempowered by being marked as outside the norms of hegemonic 
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systems of power. The exclusions which lead to the justification of physical violence serve 
the civilizing mission embedded within the settler-colonial dynamics present in both novels. 
The contexts that engender the sexually motivated violence inflicted on and experienced by 
Lucy Lurie in Disgrace and the Barbarian Girl in Waiting for the Barbarians and the racially 
motivated violence inflicted on and experienced by Pollux and the Barbarian prisoners in the 
novels highlight this necessary connection between physical violence and a condition of 
disempowerment. The novels also share a crucial other characteristic that influences their 
representations of physical violence. Both David Lurie and the Magistrate, the protagonists 
of Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians respectively, begin their trajectories from the 
positions of power their race and gender afford them. However, they both experience extreme 
physical violence that reconfigures their subject position into ones of powerlessness. Though 
both of these men witness other moments of brutal violence inflicted on gendered or racial 
Others prior to their own experience, they do not intervene in any significant way. This 
inaction indicates the centrality given to complicity that spans both texts—passivity in the 
face of physical violence by powerful  individuals is a part of what eventually renders them 7
vulnerable to the same physical violence carried out on disempowered individuals.  
There are two events in these texts that can be understood as catalysts for the central 
acts of physical violence under consideration later in the narratives. Lucy Lurie’s rape and 
the Barbarian Girl’s torture lead David Lurie and the Magistrate to respond in ways that 
perpetuate the initial violence of these events— their attempts to understand the womens’ 
 I am using the terminology of powerful/disempowered to describe the characters’ identities as they figure into 7
the hegemonic schema within the texts. Disempowered bodies are bodies marked by racial and/or gendered 
difference that render them inferior (and less worthy of protection) when compared to the bodies of 
hegemonically dominant white men.  
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trauma lead to a cyclical re-traumatazation. Moreover, the protagonists’ responses to these 
two events lead them to directly and indirectly extend physical violence to the bodies of 
racially disempowered individuals, which eventually lead to the infliction of physical 
violence onto the protagonists themselves. The first two considerations in this chapter—the 
physical violence inflicted on disempowered individuals made so through discernable 
external differences of gender and race—intersect, beget one another, and culminate in the 
extension of violence to powerful bodies. In other words, once the infliction of physical 
violence on a certain body or bodies is excused, there is little (or perhaps, nothing) standing 
in the way of that violence being inflicted on any body. In this capacity, Coetzee’s fiction, 
through its representation of the complexity and all-permeating quality of physical violence, 
may gesture toward a particular way to think through the ethics of action and accountability 
in a hegemonic culture that condones and perpetrates the infliction of physical violence. The 
texts force the reader to confront uncomfortable questions about the politics of complicity 
and consideration; for example, is it possible to advocate for the lives of others if the 
violence threatening them does not threaten the self as well? What responsibility does a 
single individual have when confronted with the political apparatuses that justify the 
infliction of violence onto some while punishing the infliction of violence onto others?  
“How natural a mistake, to believe that you can burn or tear or hack your way into the 
secret body of the other!”: Gendered Violence in Waiting for the Barbarians and 
Disgrace 
The rape of Lucy Lurie and the torture of the Barbarian Girl are catalytic events in 
these texts that instigate later physical violence in each of Coetzee’s narratives. Waiting for 
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the Barbarians centers on an ambiguous outpost on the fringes of an unnamed Empire, where 
the Magistrate of the township witnesses the systematic rounding up, imprisonment, and 
torture of barbarian populations in the name of securing the Empire from barbarian invasion. 
These populations are referred to only by names like “the barbarians” and “the river people,” 
terms that intentionally withhold national or ethnic markers, and thus gesture toward part of 
what makes the difference between how the subjects of the Empire are treated and how these 
populations are treated. Colonel Joll, the head of the Third Bureau of the Civil Guard and one 
of the only named characters in the novel, stands as the primary instigator of these practices, 
and as such, is the only individual present for all instances of torture in the narrative. Though 
initially disturbed by the Bureau’s “interrogation” tactics, the Magistrate only becomes 
directly opposed to them because of his relationship with an unnamed barbarian woman, who 
in light of the injuries sustained during the torture inflicted on her, is left behind by her 
community when Colonel Joll decides to release them. The Magistrate finds himself 
simultaneously fascinated and repulsed by the horrors the Barbarian Girl has lived through. 
Subsequently, uncovering the details about what transpired between Colonel Joll and the Girl 
primarily dictate the events that unfold for the first half of the novel. The Magistrate 
confesses, “It has been growing more and more clear to me that until the marks on this girl’s 
body are deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her” (36). What ensues is a 
relationship fraught with ethical tangles.  
The Girl and the Magistrate live together throughout the winter, during which he 
relentlessly attempts to discover the truth of what has happened to her. By design, the reader 
is never privy to the intricacies of what occurs in the hours when the Barbarian Girl is 
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tortured  in real-time—like the Magistrate, we can only guess as to what actually happened 8
in the torture chamber. The first description we have of the Girl comes almost immediately 
after her encounter with Colonel Joll, and is so subtle that it can be easily overlooked. While 
surveying the yard of the barracks-turned-prison, the Magistrate notices that “One of the 
women has to be helped. She shakes all the time like an old person, though she is 
young” (27). Though the text never directly identifies this woman as the Barbarian Girl, the 
specificity with which this observation is foregrounded heavily implies this connection. 
Moreover, if we can posit that this woman is the Barbarian Girl, this moment illustrates that 
even in this early point in the narrative, she has already been marked by her trauma, and yet 
the specificities of her torture have already happened, away from the eyes of the Magistrate, 
and by extension, the reader.  
The implications of this initial vague introduction to the Barbarian Girl can perhaps 
be better understood through Judith Butler’s theory of the necessary conditions that frame the 
difference between “valuable” and “expendable” lives in Frames of War: When is Life 
Grievable? (2009). For Butler, at a most basic ontological level, all life, due to its 
precariousness or vulnerability, theoretically carries inherent value and mandates protection 
(3). However, that inherent value is obscured because of the ways in which that life is framed 
in hegemonic systems: “The ‘being’ of the body [...] is one that is always given over to 
others, to norms, to social and political organizations that have developed historically in 
order to maximize precariousness for some and minimize precariousness for others” (Butler 
3). For Butler, this creation of ontological fields conditions the difference between the 
 For more about Coetzee’s understanding of the ethics of representing torture, see his essay “Into the Dark 8
Chamber: The Novelist and South Africa” (1986).
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cognitive process of apprehending a life (or registering without full cognition) and 
recognizing a life (or reciprocally registering with full cognition) (4).  She continues to 9
describe a condition given to life recognizable as such: its grievability. Butler writes that 
“The apprehension of grievability precedes and makes possible the apprehension of 
precarious life” because the element of grievability indicates that the life in question is 
capable of being missed, or mourned, and therefore is a life meant to be lived (14). When life 
does not contain this element of grievability, “there is no life, or rather, there is something 
living that is other than life” (14). When life lacks grievability, there is a latent understanding 
that the life lost must not have been meant to exist in the first place.    
From the first time he sees her, the Magistrate cannot recognize the Barbarian Girl’s 
life as grievable, and therefore, as a life that matters. The first description of her indicates that 
he apprehends her as little more than a spectral figure, a status given to her precisely because 
of the way she is framed within the settler-colonial dynamics between the Empire and the 
barbarians. She cannot conform to the hegemonically dominant norms of the Empire, which 
give bodies the condition of being either grievable, and worthy of protection, or ungrievable, 
and unworthy of that protection. In other words, the fact that her introduction in the text 
amounts to little more than a passing image of an ambiguous barbarian woman illustrates the 
same discourse of inherent ontological difference that made the violence inflicted on her 
justifiable by her torturers— her life is merely apprehended by the Magistrate, who regards it 
as mattering less, and therefore as less worthy (or completely unworthy) of any protection 
 For Butler, apprehension is less precise than the cognitive stage of recognition— it is possible to apprehend 9
that something lies beyond recognition, but apprehension itself is a form of knowing that resists conceptual 
forms of knowledge whereas recognition does not. (4). 
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offered by the juridical power that simultaneously and paradoxically justifies the persecution 
of certain bodies in order to protect others.     
Their first interaction, which takes place in the privacy of the Magistrate’s residence, 
can be understood as the moment where her body, and therefore her life, become 
recognizable to the Magistrate. Of course, the connection here between her physical form and 
her recognizability is loaded with gendered implications—her feminine body becomes the 
site where the violence of the Empire finds articulation for the Magistrate, and his obsession 
with the evidence he believes it presents perhaps unintentionally interacts with a highly 
gendered process of dehumanization. Additionally,  it is only through direct contact with him 
that she finally comes into full relief, and it is this interaction that becomes the necessary 
condition that allows her pain to move from apprehension to recognition. This implies that 
less grievable life only becomes recognizable through proximity to more grievable life— the 
Magistrate becomes invested in the Barbarian Girl only when she has a direct connection to 
him and not when she stood in the prison yard with other expendable bodies. Moreover, this 
first encounter also cements her inherent difference from the citizens of the Empire (and from 
the women the Magistrate has known in the past) which he locates in her experience of 
torture. She tells the Magistrate in their initial conversation, “‘You do not understand. You do 
not want someone like me. [...] I am …’ she holds up her forefinger, grips it, twists it. I have 
no idea what the gesture means” (31). The gesture implies what the Girl’s linguistic barrier 
barrs her from articulating: “You do not want someone like me. I am broken.” Though she 
attempts to convey this to the Magistrate, he cannot recognize what she means by it— he 
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understands it only as a failure to communicate her experience, thus broadening the barrier 
between them.  
This moment foregrounds an understanding of the phenomenology of pain that Scarry 
delineates. She writes: “Thus, when one speaks about ‘one’s own physical pain’ and about 
‘another person’s physical pain,’ one might also appear to be speaking about two wholly 
distinct orders of events. For the person whose pain it is, it is ‘effortlessly’ grasped [...] while 
for the person outside the sufferer’s body, what is ‘effortless’ is not grasping it” (Scarry 4). 
This is the basis of the incommunicability of physical pain: to have pain is to have certainty, 
and to hear about pain is to have doubt (4). The Magistrate, though earnestly invested in 
understanding the truth of the Barbarian Girl’s pain, can only do so through the mediation of 
a necessary doubt. By continuously asking her to give her testimony, to declare the truth of 
her torture, he cannot apprehend that such an exchange has been made impossible by the 
incommunicability of physical pain itself. Their relationship unfolds through a series of 
exchanges like this: “‘Nothing is worse than what we can imagine,’ [...] She gives no sign 
that she has even heard me. [...] ‘Tell me,’ I want to say, ‘don’t make a mystery of it, pain is 
only pain’; but the words elude me” (36). Ironically, by requesting her disclosure in this 
respect, the Magistrate not only indirectly rubs up against the difficulty in communicating 
physical pain through his own elusive words, but simultaneously renders the possibility of 
her relating her testimony even more remote by essentializing the fact that her reality can 
never be as severe or as painful as his imagining.  
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The Magistrate’s interrogation of the Girl, his attempt to find the truth of what has 
happened to her, places him close to performing the same function as her torturer, a 
proximity which grows clearer to him the longer he spends with her. He ruminates:  
“But with this woman it is as if there is no interior, only a surface across which to 
hunt back and forth seeking entry. Is this how her torturers felt hunting their secret? 
[...] How natural a mistake to believe that you can burn or tear or hack your way into 
the secret body of another! [...] I might equally well tie her to a chair and beat her, it 
would be no less intimate. (49)  
For Scarry, torture draws justification from the interrogation— this is how it cements 
its disguise as a practice meant to gather information, or to establish truth, and 
simultaneously elicits a response from its victim, usually coded as a form of betrayal, either 
against family, friends, or nation (28). The structure of the interrogation becomes a crucial 
formulation in the overall understanding of the infliction of extreme physical pain. For 
Scarry, it consists of two parts, the question and the answer. She writes that the question, 
always understood as the motive behind the infliction of the torture, “credits the torturer, 
providing him with justification, his cruelty with an explanation” and that the answer, often 
understood as a betrayal, “discredits the prisoner, making him rather than the torturer, his 
voice rather than his pain, the cause of his loss and self and world” (35). In forcing the 
tortured individual to use their voice in this way, the torturer negates it, and through 
repeatedly inflicting intense physical pain, reduces the victim of torture to their body alone. 
At the same time, in the interrogation, the torturer ceases to be experienced as anything other 
than a voice. The Magistrate, then, through performing a similar mode of interrogation, 
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except replacing the infliction of physical pain with the caresses of intimacy, still reduces the 
Girl to her body alone, placing himself in dangerous adjacency to Colonel Joll. While 
hunting for evidence of her torture on her body, he deprioritizes her voice, the words she 
actually speaks to him, and thus makes her testimony completely inaccessible.  
In order to begin piecing together the Girl’s suffering, the Magistrate turns to 
members of the Empire’s army that may have witnessed the encounter first-hand. Confronted 
with the Magistrate’s tireless questions, the soldier conversing with him cries out, “‘I do not 
know sir! [...] Sometimes there was screaming. I think they beat her, but I was not 
there” (40-41). This reliance on second-hand accounts to confirm the Girl’s experience of 
torture correlates with a claim Idelbar Avelar makes in The Letter of Violence (2004): “This 
confirmation [the validity of the experience of the tortured subeject] only emerges, however, 
with the torturer’s confession, and is only valid inasmuch as it comes out of his mouth” (43). 
Through attempting to confirm or deny the truth of an experience of torture he necessarily 
cannot fully access by relying on its potential perpetrators, the Magistrate unwittingly 
prioritizes the testimony of the men who carried it out over the testimony of the individual on 
whom it was inflicted. Eventually, after this pattern of interrogation and reliance on external 
indications of the truth is established by the Magistrate, the Girl discloses the following 
account of her torture:  
‘They said they would burn my eyes out, but they did not. The man brought it [the 
instrument] very close to my face and made me look at it. They held my eyelids open. 
But I had nothing to tell them. That was all. That was when the damage came. After 
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that I could not see properly anymore. There was a blur in the middle of everything I 
looked at; I could see only around the edges. It is difficult to explain.’ (47)  
In this singular account of the details of her torture, at least one vital implication is 
emphasized. After being subjected to the infliction of extreme physical pain, the Girl is now 
mostly blinded, and thus her visual access to the world around her is permanently impaired. 
This correlates with another one of Scarry’s formulations about the phenomenology of 
physical pain; physical pain is necessarily a process that destroys an individual’s world,  a 10
“destruction experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe down to the 
immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire universe” (35). In 
physical, linguistic, and psychological capacities, the Girl can no longer encounter the 
external world as it was before her experience of torture—in retelling that destruction to the 
Magistrate, she is forced to re-confront her trauma, and again finds linguistic articulation of 
little to no use.  
 In Disgrace, the same particular complexities of physical pain emerge in the 
aftermath of the focal event of the narrative: Lucy Lurie’s rape by three black South African 
men. The narrative centers on David Lurie, an aging professor who, after engaging in an 
coercive sexual relationship with one of his university students, quits his position and moves 
in with his daughter Lucy on the outskirts of Cape Town, alongside her black neighbor and 
employee Petrus. Their lives are changed forever when, upon returning to their home, they 
find three black South African men waiting for them. After beating David and leaving him 
locked in the bathroom, they bring Lucy into her bedroom and they take turns raping her for 
 By “world,” Scarry means everything that makes one’s subject-position their own— their beliefs, 10
perspective, physical body, etc.
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an unspecified amount of time. David attempts to free himself, thinking, “His child in the 
hands of strangers. In a minute, in an hour, it will be too late: whatever is happening to her 
will be set in stone, will belong to the past” (94).  
A note that must be addressed before expanding upon any shared characteristics 
between the violence experienced by the Barbarian Girl and Lucy Lurie, however, resides at 
the point of distinction between the former’s torture and the latter’s rape. Physical violence 
that takes on a sexual dimension must be understood as necessarily different than physical 
violence that does not— moreover, rape’s only necessary function is a lack of consent and 
though it is often physically painful, it is not always physically painful. Torture, on the other 
hand, is necessarily painful— the infliction of physical pain is the very instrument through 
which torture is articulated. Through reading the experiences of the women in these novels in 
a comparative way, I am not attempting to erase the differences between torture and rape. 
Instead, I am attempting to follow a point made by Butler: “[...] we have to include both of 
these views [of sexual violence and torture] within a larger framework if we are to 
understand how these scenes of sexual debasement and physical torture are part of the 
civilizing mission’s efforts to seize absolute control over the construction of the subject 
[being violated]” (128). In both cases, the subject in question is a feminine subject— though 
this seems obvious, it is this gendered difference that gives these characters a distinct framing 
of expendability and disempowerment, which is part of how their violators justify their 
actions. Though the torturers in Waiting for the Barbarians do not limit their interrogations 
based on gender, the treatment the Girl receives from the Magistrate and other men in the 
town after she is tortured connects her experience to Lucy in a highly gendered capacity. 
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Both women’s bodies become the site on which the violent political dynamics of settler/
colonialism occur. Though their experience of physical pain is different, just as the 
experience of torture and rape is different, the way their bodies are examined and used by the 
men around them after their trauma indicates the similiar consequences of the disempowered 
state they occupy because of their gender.  
What underlies both of these representations of violence is this compulsion on the 
part of the violator to exercise absolute control over the bodies they are violating. 
Additionally, given the colonial dynamics at work in both novels, both women’s experiences 
correspond to broader considerations of how feminine bodies are framed within those 
dynamics. For example, the colonial impulse to control, to possess, and to conquer land 
intersects with the impulse of patriarchal systems regarding the feminine individuals living 
within them. Precisely because femininity is normatively considered to be closer to a state of 
nature, patriarchal hegemonic discourses reduce feminine individuals to their bodies alone. 
When they are reduced to their bodies, these individuals become exponentially more 
vulnerable to the same impulses of possession and domination that inform colonial 
enterprises. Of course, the Girl is made inherently more vulnerable in this construction: both 
her gender and her ethnic origin make her vulnerable to the patriarchal and colonial impulses 
of domination, control, and possession. However, to varying degrees of severity, both Lucy 
and the Barbarian Girl are reduced to their feminine bodies during their encounters with their 
violators. That dehumanizing process then occurs again and again when the men in their lives 
attempt to understand what has happened to them through prioritizing their bodies and the 
means to arrive at some kind of truth.    
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If both the experience of torture and rape are informed, at least in part, by the 
discourse surrounding any ‘civilizing mission,’ then they are then intimately connected with 
the framing that creates the ontological distinctions between the grievability of ‘civilized’ 
bodies and ungrievable ‘barbaric’ bodies. The justification of the Barbarian Girl’s torture, and 
the torture of other unnamed barbarians is articulated in this way: “The barbarian tribes were 
arming, the rumour went; the Empire should take precautionary measures, for there would 
certainly be war” (9). Torture, then, becomes justified because of the curated division 
between civilization and barbarity— under the guise of security, of the importance in 
protecting the lives recognized as such by the juridical power in place. Though torture is 
never technically legal, in this way, it becomes the legal illegality Coetzee describes in “Into 
the Dark Chamber: The Novelist and South Africa”: “In the torture room, unlimited force is 
exerted upon the physical being of an individual in a twilight of legal illegality, with the 
purpose, if not of destroying him, then at least of destroying the kernel of resistance within 
him.” This construction follows Butler’s understanding that the security and freedom 
promised by such practices attached to civilizing missions, “[...] is an extension of the logic 
that establishes state power— and its mechanisms of violence— as beyond the law” (129).  
Lucy Lurie’s rape is also intimately involved with the dynamics between civilization 
and barbarity in light of her identity as a white South African woman and her violaters’ 
identities as black South African men. However, her perspective comes at least in part from 
the historic oppressor because of the privilege she receives as a white woman, whereas the 
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Girl’s perspective comes from a unilaterally oppressed position.  The text’s representation of 11
Lucy’s violation contains an further element of complexity. In post-Apartheid South Africa, 
the formally upheld hegemonic structure has officially been disrupted; the legal code 
enforcing discrimination along racial lines has, at least in all appearances, been dissolved. 
This leaves both black and white populations in a position that necessitates an individual 
struggle to mediate the radically different socio-political dynamics of this “new” South 
Africa. Lucy’s violation thus becomes fraught with enormously difficult implications. What 
emerges for some characters is the belief that her rape is retaliatory violence inflicted on 
Lucy by individuals whose lives have continually been regarded as beyond the scope of 
complete recognition, and therefore, as unworthy of juridical protection and subjectable to 
extreme violence. This becomes difficult to process in light of the horrific intimacy involved 
in Lucy’s rape—though she has never met her rapists prior to their encounter outside of her 
home, three complete strangers still feel compelled to violate her in the most personal way 
imaginable. Though the connection between Lucy’s rape and the broader legacy of racial 
discrimination in South Africa relies on speculation on the part of David Lurie, the 
possibilities it presents lead to questions about the ethics of turning her body into a metaphor 
for the racial trauma of the Apartheid system.   
Ileana Rogobete articulates in Reconstructing Trauma and Meaning: Life Narratives 
of Survivors of Political Violence During Apartheid in South Africa (2015), “The helpless and 
depersonalization of rape victims was also experienced by apartheid sufferers through 
 The position occupied by the Girl may lend itself to the description of subalternity given by Gayatri Spivak, 11
in which she articulates how white feminism’s claims of some sort of shared oppression only along gendered 
lines works to efface the experience of individuals who are oppressed on multiple levels. 
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mutiliations and cruelty, in which victim’s sexual organs were part of the torture practices in 
solitary confinement” (107). When considering this element of sexual violation that took 
place during the torture inflicted on political prisoners during Apartheid, Disgrace’s 
representation of Lucy’s rape can be further understood as representing the fragility and 
confusion following the legal dissolution of the normative perpetrator/victim dynamics of 
South Africa. This confusion begins in this episode of sexual violence, continues throughout 
the novel, and appears to be an intentional way of demonstrating the prolific anxiety felt by 
characters attempting to navigate through tumultuous and shifting social dynamics. In other 
words, the white characters in the novel experience anxiety about possibility becoming the 
victims of the violence they themselves unleashed. Sexual violence, then, becomes especially 
egregious, in part because of the way feminine bodies are framed in patriarchal systems as 
able to be owned, and in part because of the racist fear of contamination presented by the 
possibility of white women being raped by black men. Moreover, this inversion of the typical 
dynamics of violence between white and black South African bodies could indicate a strategy 
that highlights the ethical implications of Coetzee’s own privileged position as a white South 
African man— he does not attempt to write the novel from any perspective he does not have 
access to, and thus, both of his protagonists are aging white men witnessing a reality where, 
as Mamphela Rhampele describes, “Violence has become as a festering sore in the body of 
South African society [...] it bursts forth, pouring pus and blood just as we begin to have hope 
that temporary calm will become a true harbinger of peace” (104).   
  The main connection between Lucy and the Barbarian Girl’s experience of violence 
manifests in the aftermath of both events. It is Lucy herself who frees David from his 
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confinement after the men have left: the first question he asks her is “‘What on earth did they 
do to you?’” (97). At this point, the question is only answered when Lucy refuses to report 
her assault to the police: she tells David, “‘You tell what happened to you, I tell what 
happened to me,’” (99). In spite of her refusal, David continues to pressure Lucy to bring her 
story to the police, and thus positions himself in the same place as the Magistrate— both 
men, after not witnessing the physical violence inflicted on the women in their lives, cannot 
accept not knowing, and trt to force these women into recounting what has happened to them. 
In this way, though no verbal interrogation took place during Lucy’s rape, David Lurie comes 
precariously close to assuming the same function as her violators through deprioritizing her 
voice and reducing her to her body alone, or to the experience of rape alone. In his 
questioning, David also disregards Lucy’s reluctance to talk about her assault, and therefore 
does not consider her consent to be more important than his answers.  Moreover, through 12
obsession over Lucy’s sexual violation, and using it as evidence to justify his own racist 
attitudes, David behaves in a way that parallels the liberal ideology described by Butler: “[...] 
when women’s sexual freedom [...] is invoked instrumentally to wage a cultural assault [...] 
that reaffirms [...] [national] sovereignty and violence” (105). At issue is David’s failure to 
grasp the broader implications of what Lucy’s assault may affirm for a juridical body that 
only recently abolished legal Apartheid; namely, the affirmation of the “essential” or 
 Again, I am not intimating that David and Lucy’s rapists are the same— I am suggesting that they share 12
certain characteristics that prove potent enough to lead to re-traumatization.
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“natural” barbarity of the black South African population upon which an entire system of 
legalized discrimination rested.      13
 The incommunicability of Lucy’s rape becomes a major source of conflict throughout 
the rest of the novel; David, in attempting to understand the motivations behind her silence, 
thinks, “She would rather hide her face, and he knows why. Because of the disgrace. Because 
of the shame” (115). When he brings this point up with Lucy, she doubles-down on her 
refusal to disclose her experience of sexual violence with state officials. In so doing, Lucy 
draws attention to the way that David’s intellectualization of her rape de-prioritizes her voice 
and her particular experience. According to Avelar, “For all survivors this war against 
metaphorization is particularly urgent and gives rise to the sensation of powerlessness 
common in memoirs of survivors. The traumatized subject perceives that the experience 
stained language irreversibly and made narrative an impossible endeavor” (47). David’s 
instinct to “read into” the implications of Lucy’s rape performs this metaphorization of 
physical violence. In abstracting her lived experience by extrapolating it to signify feelings of 
shame and disgrace, David continues the process of alienating Lucy from her voice, and thus 
her narrative agency, and has compounded the fundamental incommunicability of her 
experience of physical pain.  
David, like the Magistrate, cannot think of anything but the violence he has 
encountered; the protagonists’ shared obsessions with that violence become traumatic in 
themselves. David cannot accept Lucy’s decision not to report her rape to the state 
 Additionally, hypersexualized stereotypes commonly attributed to black men and the hysteria surrounding the 13
violation of a white woman by black men described in Patrick Wolfe’s “Land, Labor, and Difference” could also 
be affirmed in this scenario. 
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authorities: “That is what their visitors have achieved [...] Not her story to spread but theirs; 
they are its owners. How they put her in her place, how they showed her what a woman is 
for” (15). Scarry’s configuration of the structure of voice and body in the act of inflicting 
physical violence correlates with David’s rumination. Through making the body present in its 
own destruction while simultaneously rendering the voice absent “makes [...] any experience 
of great physical pain mimetic of death; for in death the body is emphatically present while 
that more elusive part represented by the voice is [...] absent” (49). Both physical pain and 
death destroy an individual’s world, or at least, fundamentally alter it and forbid any return to 
what it previously was.  
This is particularly clear when Lucy, after being pressured by David once again to 
give her testimony to the police, tells him, “‘Dear David. You have not been listening to me. I 
am not the person you know. I am a dead person and I do not know yet what will bring me 
back to life’” (161). Both Lucy and the Barbarian Girl have experienced physical pain so 
extreme that return to normal life in its aftermath becomes impossible. There are literal 
reminders of this, since both women carry permanent physical reminders of their experience 
(the Barbarian Girl’s near-blindness and impaired movement and Lucy’s pregnancy) as well 
as apparent psychological reminders.  
Lucy, in articulating that rape has killed her, demonstrates the proximity of the 
experience of physical pain and the experience death; in both cases, one is made into a body 
merely— the entirety of the universe condenses onto the site of one’s physical form. She 
makes this connection more explicit earlier in the narrative, when she tells David, “When you 
have sex with someone strange [...] isn’t it a bit like killing? Pushing the knife in; exiting 
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afterwards; leaving the body behind covered in blood— doesn’t it feel like murder, like 
getting away with murder?” (158). Clearly, in this moment, Lucy is, for one of the first times, 
attempting to discuss what has happened to her with another individual. She abstracts herself 
from the content of that discussion, however, in using the phrase “the body” instead of “my 
body.” Though Lucy does not divulge the particularities of the pain she most likely 
experienced during her violation (she refrains from answering when David initially asks her 
if she is hurt), formulating the proximity of “strange” sex to murder implies the explicit 
physical and latent psychological pain she experiences. Her linguistic construction here 
indicates what Scarry describes as: “The ceaseless, self-announcing signal of the body in 
pain, at once so empty and undifferentiated and so full of blaring adversity, contains not only 
the feeling ‘my body hurts’ but the feeling ‘my body hurts me’” (47). Lucy can only divulge 
her experience through evacuating her subjectivity from it; her body becomes the body, 
“when you have sex” is the locution used to describe the feeling of being killed, instead of an 
explicit use of the statement “when I was raped.” The bodies of her violators and even her 
own body become weaponized, and by extension, she becomes almost completely alienated 
from her body. She can articulate her trauma only through this language of abstraction. In 
that abstraction, however, Lucy seems to also address a specific type of toxic masculinity that 
rapes in the first place—it is not a coincidence, for example, that she addresses this “you” to 
her own father, who ended his career in disgrace after being accused of raping Melanie 
Isaacs.  
Lucy’s rape and the Barbarian Girl’s torture share certain characteristics that connect 
them to one another— though they emerge in the drastically different contexts of torture and 
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rape, these two events rupture the narrative arcs in both texts and either directly or indirectly 
beget later iterations of physical violence in the novels. First, both women experience the 
destruction of their previous world, both physically and psychologically, in the aftermath of 
these events. Second, in order to understand what has happened to the women they love, the 
men in the novel continually attempt to force Lucy and the Girl to re-encounter their trauma, 
to disclose the specificities of their experience of pain, and in so doing, diminish their agency 
by reducing them to their violated bodies and thus perpetuate their violent experiences. 
However, a crucial difference emerges in this last point. The reasons behind both women’s 
silences about their experiences diverge dramatically, and this divergence can be attributed 
specifically to the particular settings of both novels. The next section of this chapter 
examines the reasons for Lucy Lurie’s silence and uses it as a point of departure to explore 
another mode of physical violence at work in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace: the 
infliction and experience of physical violence motivated by racial difference.  
“In another time, in another place it might be held to be a public matter. But in this 
place, at this time, it is not”: Racial Violence in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
A major source of conflict in Disgrace centers on Lucy’s refusal to disclose her 
sexual violation. She attempts to explain her reasons for remaining silent about her rape 
several times in the narrative:  
You want to know why I have laid no particular charge with the police. I will tell you, 
as long as you agree not to raise the subject again. The reason is that, as far as I am 
concerned, what happened to me is a purely private matter. In another time, in another 
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place, it might be held to be a public matter. But in this place, at this time, it is not. It 
is my business, mine alone. (112)  
What Lucy refers to here is the context in which her narrative unfolds, a context that haunts 
the text and much of Coetzee’s fiction: the legacy of Apartheid in South Africa. Disgrace 
takes place specifically in the aftermath of the legal dissolution of Apartheid in South Africa 
in 1994. In light of this context, the complexities posed by the racial identities of her 
perpetrators emerge; the problem Lucy, a white South African woman, finds in disclosing her 
rape by black South African men stems from her awareness of the implications of doing so. 
In this explanation, Lucy gestures toward the reasoning behind her silence; she does not wish 
to involve the police because doing so may reinforce the legacy of the South African state’s 
brutality against the black South African population during Apartheid.  This reasoning 14
becomes more overt as the exchange continues. David begins to pick up on the implications 
attached to her vague language and asks, “Do you hope you can expiate the crimes of the past 
by suffering in the present?” (112). Lucy replies, “No. You keep misreading me. Guilt and 
salvation are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions. Until you make an effort to see 
that, I can’t help you” (112).  
Here, two conflicting views of the trauma of Apartheid emerge. David, a white South 
African man residing in the city, and an academic specializing in English Romantic poetry, 
understands the reality of the racism involved in Apartheid in exceedingly abstracted terms— 
the only direct interface he has with the black population is with a sex worker named Soraya, 
an interaction which only serves to reinforce the position of power his whiteness gives him. 
 From Rogobete: “The breaking of the law [by the black population] attracted repressive actions from the 14
apartheid state in the form of arrests, shootings, detentions, and even killings” (109). 
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Lucy, though a white South African woman, lives in the relative isolation of her small 
township, and works in close proximity to Petrus and his family. In light of her position in 
this regard, Lucy is concerned only with the material realities of the racial dynamics she 
encounters on a day-to-day basis. David’s lofty academic conclusions about the purposes 
behind her refusal to disclose her trauma to state officials, which draw from universalisms 
and make no account of the particularities attached to her specific experience or any 
individual experiences of the remnants of the Apartheid system, miss the mark.  
 Because he is both unable to understand his daughter’s violation and fails to convince 
her to report that violation, David grows increasingly racist toward the black South Africans 
he encounters. He focuses most of his emerging prejudice onto their neighbor, Petrus. This 
cycle begins with a simple question: “Does Petrus know who the strangers were? Was it 
because of some word Petrus let drop that they made Lucy their target?” (116). This 
momentary accusation soon spirals and engenders pronounced and disturbing fantasies in 
David’s imagination. Not much later in the text, David thinks, “In the old days one could 
have had it out with Petrus. In the old days one could have had it out to the extent of losing 
one’s temper [....] [but] it is a new world they live in, he and Lucy and Petrus. Petrus knows 
it, and he knows it, and Petrus knows that he knows it” (116-117). In toying with the idea of 
inflicting physical violence on Petrus, David not only presents a disturbingly wistful picture 
of the Apartheid-era years, but simultaneously exposes the innate social disempowerment 
attached to Petrus’ identity as a black South African that persists even if his legal 
disempowerment does not. 
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 David’s fantasies of inflicting violence on Petrus indicate an aspect of Butler’s 
understanding of how the perpetration of violence on disempowered bodies becomes 
justifiable by the powerful. She writes: 
Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of preception tend to produce iconic 
versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is not 
loss, and who remain ungrievable [...] [this] has implications for why and when we 
feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous 
sadism, loss, and indifference. (24)  
Though Petrus has done nothing to warrant David’s vengeful musings, he is nevertheless 
figured as deserving of them. Petrus as an individual is obscured in David’s mind due to how 
the hegemonically dominant white population frames the black South African population as 
eminently un-grievable— Petrus exists in David’s mind as constitutive of the “iconic,” 
monolithic, and dangerous black population. Because the overdetermination provided by 
something as visually recognizable as the color of one’s skin, it is all the more probable that 
every black body is registered as the same from David’s point of view. 
The equating of individual black South Africans  with the entire population of black 
South Africans is made more apparent in one of David and Lucy’s discussions. She notes that 
one of the most shocking elements of her rape was the personal nature of it: “‘It was so 
personal,’ she says. ‘It was done with such personal hatred. That was what stunned me more 
than anything [...] I had never set eyes on them’” (156). David replies in a way that reinforces 
his understanding of the division between black and white South Africans, and exacerbates 
his willingness to inflict violence on racially Othered individuals. He tells Lucy that “‘It was 
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history speaking through them [...] A history of wrong’” (156). This connection David 
perceives between the particular violence of Lucy’s rape and the more broad violence of 
racial hierarchies in the Apartheid system is part of what makes Disgrace so difficult to read. 
In light of Coetzee’s refusal to represent perspectives he has no access to in reality, we can 
really only interrogate the implications of David’s speculations. Though he may have touched 
on part of what informed Lucy’s rapists, David’s line of thought works to abstract specificity 
in favor of a universalizing historical narrative, one that serves to justify endless and violent 
acts of vengeance. Instead of using this point as an opportunity to explore the ethical 
considerations at work in their situation, David instead finds that this realization only 
compounds his growing resentment. 
 This resentment culminates in David’s impulsive, yet severe, beating of Pollux, 
Petrus’ nephew, who witnessed and may have participated in Lucy’s rape. When he catches 
Pollux spying on Lucy as she showers, David beats Pollux, sicks one of their dogs on him, 
and chases him until he collapses. A fit of rage ensues:  
Swine! Never has he [David] felt such elemental rage. He would like to give the boy 
what he deserves: a sound thrashing. Phrases that all his life he has avoided seem 
suddenly just and right. Teach him a lesson. Show him his place. So this is what it is 
like, he thinks! This is what it is like to be a savage! He gives the boy a good solid 
kick, so that he sprawls sideways. (206-207) 
David’s beating of Pollux serves as an explosion of the tension that has mounted internally 
since their encounters earlier in the narrative. Though in the moment he understands this 
beating as indicative of an archaic savagery, it may actually serve to destabilize ontological 
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categories of civilization and barbarism often used to justify the violence perpetrated against 
colonized populations (in this context, black populations) by conquering populations (white 
populations). Though David, as a white, educated man, seemingly embodies the epitome of 
European colonial “civilization,” his violent actions here indicate his capacity to easily step 
into the archetype normatively ascribed to a “savage.” David justifies his “savage” actions 
because he views himself as defending the already-violated Lucy, who, as a white woman 
and as his daughter, he understands as inherently closer to the “civilized” end of the binary. 
Moreover, it is Lucy’s rape that causes David to begin viewing black South Africans as more 
barbaric than civilized, and though he views his vengeance on her behalf as working in 
opposition to that barbarism, the reciprocal violence only proves that the cateogies of 
“civilization,” “barbarism,” “white,” and “black” are not mutually exclusive.  
Butler writes “that violence in the name of civilization reveals its own barbarism, 
even as it ‘justifies’ its own violence by presuming the barbaric subhumanity of the other 
against whom that violence is waged” (93). What actually emerges when David beats Pollux 
is evidence that the infliction of physical violence obscures any understanding of a concrete 
or inherent division between the supposedly savage black population and the supposedly 
civilized white population of South Africa. In mercilessly beating Pollux, in stepping into the 
role of the “savage,” David, overturns the division between himself and the victim of his 
beating. The violence inflicted on Pollux in this moment renders the categories of civilization 
and barbarism undifferentiated— their location no longer resides in the purported “certainty” 
of racial difference. What is foregrounded in David’s beating of Pollux, through his own 
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twisted recognition of the “savagery” involved in the act, is the notion that the logic of racial 
superiority based on innately “savage” or “civilized” behaviors begins to break down.  
 This instability becomes apparent in consideration of physical violence perpetrated 
because of racial difference in Waiting for the Barbarians. After delivering the Girl back to 
barbarian territory, the Magistrate returns to his town and is immediately imprisoned by 
Colonel Joll for fraternizing with the enemy. In what could be the most brutal representation 
of physical violence in the entire novel, the Magistrate witnesses the collective beating of a 
group of captured barbarians by the armed forces of the Bureau and the population of the 
town he used to preside over. The Magistrate, though technically in the midst of attempting 
to escape, finds he cannot move away from the spectacle before him. He describes that “The 
Colonel steps forward. Stooping over each prisoner in turn he rubs a handful of dust into his 
naked back and writes a word with a stick of charcoal. I read the words upside down: 
ENEMY… ENEMY… ENEMY… ENEMY. He steps back and folds his hands” (121). The 
crowd, composed of state officials and civilians alike, then begin to beat the prisoners until 
“The black charcoal and ochre dust begin to run with sweat and blood. The game, I see, is to 
beat them till their backs are washed clean” (121).  
This violent scene takes place in a town supposedly attached to a “civilized” Empire, 
which is able to form its identity as such in opposition to the savagery of the barbarians. Even 
in its exhibition, the text makes the reliance on this dichotomy readily apparent.  This can be 15
seen in a moment examined in the earlier section, where Magistrate narrates, “But last year 
 Perhaps, even, in its title, based on the poem by C.P. Cavafy whose final lines read, “And some of our men 15
just in from the border say/ there are no barbarians any longer./ Now what’s going to happen to us without the 
barbarians?/ Those people were a kind of solution” 
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stories began to reach us from the capital of unrest among the barbarians” and then later on, 
“Of this unrest I myself saw nothing. In private I observed that once in every generation, 
without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians” (9, emphasis added). 
Important in these lines is a subtle implication that the “savagery” of the barbarian population 
seems to paradoxically come from the direction of the Empire’s capital instead of from its 
frontier; logically, any reports of barbarian uprisings should come from the frontier town the 
Magistrate presides over because of its proximity to barbarian territory. This seemingly 
contradictory directional movement can be analyzed alongside sociologist Patrick Wolfe in 
“Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race” (2001) when he writes, “The 
primary issue [that perpetuates racial prejudice] is [...] the maintenance of social divisions, an 
imperative that requires difference to be configured and reconfigured in highly contextual 
manners” (904). In other words, the prejudice engendered by racial difference must be 
curated, orchestrated, and adjusted to support the rhetoric of inherent superiority of 
conquering populations over conquered populations. For Wolfe, this curation accounts for the 
fact that though racism has certain structural similarities, it manifests differently in settler-
colonial dynamics in separate spatial and temporal contexts.  
The ambiguous reports of barbarian unrest and uprisings come not from the barbarian 
territory but from the capital of the Empire and seem to indicate that this complex 
maintenance Wolfe describes is at work in the text. The Empire must represent the barbarians 
as a constant threat in order to simultaneously reify its own superiority over the barbarians, 
which renders any atrocity perpetrated against the barbarians part of a civilizing mission, 
while also ensuring the continuation of its sovereign power. The barbarians are framed as 
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dangerous in order to solidify the “civilized” position of the conquering population, and this 
framing allows for the justification of violence against them based on claims of state security.  
The Magistrate begins to grasp the frailty of this supposedly inherent separation, and 
exposing himself to the crowd, attempts to intervene: “‘Look!’ I shout. We are the great 
miracle of creation! But from some blows this miraculous body cannot repair itself [...] Look 
at these men! Men!’” (123-124). Through witnessing the infliction of physical violence onto 
racial Others by citizens and protectors of the Empire, the Magistrate apprehends the fiction 
of civilization that the Empire has attempted to make into truth. He tries to make it readily 
apparent to the rest of the crowd by forcing them to not only apprehend the lives of the 
barbarian prisoners as equally precarious to their own, but to recognize their shared fragility
— of course, his imperative ultimately falls on deaf ears. 
The Magistrate’s failure to convince his fellow residents of the barbarian’s humanity 
stems from the Empire’s ability to render the captured barbarians as inherently Other. This 
process begins with the instilling of mass-hysteria from ambiguous reports and culminates 
with the Colonel literally writing the word “enemy” on their backs. Though they are clearly 
disempowered and vulnerable due to their captive, violated state, the crowd still finds 
justification in making and participating in the spectacle of the barbarians’ pain: “There is a 
word from the Colonel: all four of them [the soldiers] cease their labour and come forward 
offering their canes to the spectators” (122). Instead of recognizing the fragility of the 
barbarian lives at stake in this episode of extreme racially motivated violence, the crowd 
becomes directly involved in the perpetuation of it. This point in the narrative resonates with 
this description from Butler’s Frames of War:  
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Yet, precisely because each body finds itself potentially threatened by others who are, 
by definition, precarious as well, forms of domination follow [...] the shared condition 
of precariousness leads not to reciprocal recognition, but to a specific exploitation of 
targeted populations, of lives that are not quite lives, cast as ‘destructible’ and 
‘ungrievable.’ [...] they are cast as threats to human life as we know it rather than as 
living populations in need of protection. (31) 
Though arising in disparate contexts, the infliction of physical violence onto racial Others in 
both Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians relies on this structure outlined by Butler. Due 
to the intentional exploitation of conquered populations by conquering powers based on 
perceived racial difference, the barbarians in Waiting for the Barbarians are framed as 
ungrievable and therefore as expendable, become undifferentiated “savages.” Inflicting 
physical violence onto them, regardless of any viable charge, becomes not only justifiable, 
but commendable. In Disgrace, Petrus and Pollux’s individual actions and identities are 
subsumed into a monolithic black South African population, which in his mind, is capable of 
“savage” acts of violence and must be put back in its place. The point, of course, is not that 
black South African men are not capable of violence, but that everyone, regardless of 
constructed difference, is capable of violence.  
Both of these moments also situate a fundamental connection between the physical 
violence exerted on gendered and racial Others in these texts— the protagonists respond 
passively to the violence they witness perpetrated against disempowered bodies, and because 
they do not care enough to meaningfully intervene, they become victims in return. The 
Magistrate never attempts to directly intervene in the first iteration of torture inflicted by 
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Colonel Joll onto the barbarian father and son, and he moreover never thinks to convince his 
constituients of the inexcusability of torture in any context, actions which could theoretically 
have prevented the events in the town square from occurring in the first place. Instead, he 
resides in a place of relative power, comfort, and privilege, preferring to bury himself in 
other pursuits. Likewise, David Lurie’s relative position of isolation from the realities of 
Apartheid violence, and even his participation in exploiting racialized feminine bodies for his 
own pleasure, renders him unequipped to even begin to access the complexities surrounding 
the violence inflicted on Lucy and on himself. Instead, he cannot fully comprehend the 
violence he experiences and bears witness to, and thus recedes into the racist mentality he 
initially believed himself incapable of.  Both of these protagonists’ actions or inactions serve 
to directly or indirectly allow for the extension of the infliction of violence onto 
disempowered bodies, making them complicit in the mechanisms they seek to oppose. 
However, it is worth contemplating whether or not the systems of violence they find 
themselves engulfed in are systems that can be disrupted or broken by the actions of a single 
individual, even if that individual acts in a far more radical capacity than either the 
Magistrate or David Lurie. Moreover, how much responsibility can be placed on a single 
individual faced with an entire historical, political, and cultural legacy of natural and 
justifiable domination? The questions of complicity and accountability, then, are central to 
the physical violence represented in both of these texts. 
“Why should it be inconceivable that the behemoth that trampled them will trample me 
too?”: Violence and Complicity in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace   
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 In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate becomes increasingly uncomfortable 
with his passivity in the face of the Bureau’s “investigation tactics.”  As Colonel Joll begins 
to interrogate and torture the first groups of barbarians, the Magistrate, though morbidly 
curious about the content of the interrogations, instead confines himself to “sit in my rooms 
with the windows shut, in the stifling warmth of a windless evening, trying to read, straining 
my ears to hear or not hear the sounds of violence” (24). Later, the Magistrate, while 
explaining the reasons for insomnia, asks, “But what can I possibly say? ‘Terrible things go 
on in the night while you and I are asleep?’ The jackal rips out the hare’s bowels, but the 
world rolls on” (24). In both of these instances, the Magistrate can apprehend that the torture 
perpetrated by the Bureau is ethically reprehensible, evinced by his inability to sleep at night, 
and yet he naturalizes these practices through drawing a parallel between the Bureau’s 
violation of the barbarians and a jackal pursuing a hare. This comparison implies the 
Magistrate’s reluctance to interrogate the framing through which the barbarians are presented 
to the population of the Empire— as naturally subordinate, difficult to catch, but whose 
capture and killing ensures the survival of their predators. He seems to naturalize the 
dynamics between the Empire and the barbarians in an attempt to justify his passivity—if the 
Empire is the predator and the barbarians are the prey, then regardless of the Magistrate’s 
individual feelings about torture, attempting to convince others of its ethical reprehensibility 
would prove daunting, and potentially impossible.   
This way of understanding the dynamics between the barbarian prisoners and Colonel 
Jolls’ Bureau conditions the Magistrate’s refusal to act against the torture he sees occurring 
before his eyes in this early yet crucial point in the narrative. The Magistrate, however, in 
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spite of his best efforts, remains unable to completely convince himself of any truth in the 
Empire’s justifications. This emerging disbelief begins to take shape when he takes an 
interest in the first person to endure the Colonel’s torture and survive: the unnamed and 
injured barbarian boy arrested in the first few pages of the narrative. Upon visiting the boy 
after one of the Colonel’s more severe sessions with him, the Magistrate attempts to uncover 
the specifics of his experience and realizes, “I cannot pretend to be any better than a mother 
comforting a child between his father’s spells of wrath. It has not escaped me that an 
interrogator can wear two masks, speak with two voices, one harsh, one seductive” (8). At 
this point, the Magistrate occupies a liminal space; he has apprehended the implications of 
his complicity in the Empire’s cruelty but does not yet fully recognize those implications.   
This anxiety about the proximity he feels between himself and the torturers of the 
Bureau escalates, however, while engaging with the Girl after the first series of tortures have 
been conducted. He struggles against his instinct to not act, however, even after he has 
delivered the Girl to barbarian territory and has been subsequently arrested. In a critical 
moment, while reflecting on the opportunities he had to intervene, the Magistrate realizes this 
point: 
Deliberately I bring to mind images of innocents I have known: the boy lying naked 
in the lamplight with his hands pressed to his groins, the barbarian prisoners squatting 
in the dust, shading their eyes, waiting for whatever is to come next. Why should it be 
inconceivable that the behemoth that trampled them will trample me too? (109)   
Through reflecting on how the Bureau’s torture practices have escalated from the individual 
body of one innocent barbarian to an entire population of barbarians all in the pursuit of 
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unearthing the truth of their iminent threat, the Magistrate apprehends that his passive mode 
of complicity has allowed for the possibility of their violence to extend to himself as well. 
Torture has ceased to retain any justification from the Empire’s deliberate framing of the 
barbarians as savage, threatening Others that must be neutralized to ensure the safety of its 
subjects— the Magistrate, through asking this crucial question, at last recognizes the 
inconsistent logic that excuses the infliction of physical violence in service of the Empire’s 
security. This questioning resonates with Butler’s theoretical construction about the 
instability of the attempt to frame any individual or population as necessarily outside or 
inside the norms of the dominant and powerful:  
To call the frame into question is to show that the frame never quite contained the 
scene it was meant to limn, that something was already outside, which made the very 
sense of the inside possible, recognizable. The frame never quite determined precisely 
what it is we see, think, recognize, apprehend. Something exceeds the frame that 
troubles our sense of reality; in other words, something occurs that does not conform 
to our established understanding of things. (9) 
Through recognizing the impermanence of the dominant framing that justifies the torturing of 
the barbarians, the Magistrate simultaneously grasps that this instability also implies 
something crucial about the Empire. Namely, that this mode of justification can easily shift to 
excuse perpetrating torture against any subject, “civilized” or “savage.” When the framing of 
the barbarians is called into question, the Magistrate glimpses the innate precariousness 
attached to all life, the vulnerability of all individuals.  
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At this point, the Magistrate ceases to reside in the space between passive suspicion 
and active intervention, which culminates in his public outcry during the beating of the 
barbarian prisoners. Even still, while being escorted back to his cell, he wonders, “What, 
after all, do I stand for besides an archaic code of gentlemanly behaviour towards captured 
foes, and what do I stand against except the new science of degradation that kills people on 
their knees” (124). Even when he attempts to act in direct opposition to the violence inflicted 
on Othered individuals, to break with his complicity, the Magistrate finds that he cannot 
separate himself from a moral code formerly prescribed by those who have now turned away 
from it. He cannot separate himself from the code he has learned through his position as an 
Imperial official— he is stuck in a part of the same logic that has evolved to justify the 
torture of enemies. He realizes that complicity with that violent “behemoth” cannot be 
eradicated through action alone—it is ingrained in his very subject-position as the 
Magistrate. An additional point, which may be obvious, but still important to consider, is the 
immediate repression of his outcry by state officials.   
 What eventually serves to disrupt this underlying participation in the ideology that 
leads to the willful infliction of physical violence is the transformation of that subject-
position. This occurs in his transition from a passive perpetrator to victim after he is tortured. 
The Magistrate realizes “They were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to 
live in a body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is 
whole and well” (132). As Scarry explains, “The goal of the torturer is to make the one, the 
body, emphatically and crushingly present by destroying it, and to make the other the voice, 
absent by destroying it” (49). The Magistrate experiences the destruction of his beliefs, his 
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perspective—his world—as a result of experiencing the physical pain of torture. He is made 
into a disempowered body in spite of his powerful subject-position as a white state official 
and begins to grasp that his fate is tied to the growing hostility felt against the barbarians: 
“The higher feeling runs against the barbarians, the tighter I huddle in my corner, hoping I 
will not be remembered” (142).  Here, the text makes a critical gesture about the 
consequences of tolerating the infliction of physical violence onto the Other through 
illustrating how tenuous invulnerability can be: complicity in the infliction of violence onto 
bodies marked by difference allows for the possibility of that violence being extended to 
those who tolerate it. Ideally, the threat of violence extending to the self would not be 
necessary in order to advocate for the value of the lives of Others. If nothing else, this 
construction works to effect individuals who would resist the accountability their privilege 
affords them in hegemonic systems of oppression.  
 In Disgrace, before moving in with Lucy, David proves that he is complicit with 
hegemonic violence of patriarchal society through almost all of his interactions with women. 
The first moment in the narrative where this is described is in his pursuit of a black sex 
worker named Soraya. He invades her privacy through uncovering her personal information, 
including her address and her telephone number, and after she spurns his advances, he mildly 
observes “But then, what should a predator expect when he intrudes into the vixen’s nest, 
into the home of her cubs?” (10). The complicity at work in this moment is manifold: he, as 
an affluent white man, transgresses the boundaries of an economically disadvantaged black 
woman. He describes himself as a predator, and indeed, can prey on Soraya because of her 
disempowered position in Cape Town society. 
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The next scenario in which David actively participates in the infliction of gendered 
violence occurs when he forces himself onto one of his students, Melanie: “Not rape, not 
quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core. As though she had decided to go 
slack, die within herself for the duration” (25). The description here resonates most uncannily 
with the correlation Lucy makes later about the experiencing sexual violence as death. 
Though this encounter with Melanie eventually forces David to withdraw from his position at 
the university, he refuses to recognize the fact that he has done anything violent or even 
reprehensible. He observes that “his mind has become a refuge for old thoughts, idle, 
indigent, with nowhere else to go. He ought to chase them out, sweep the premises clean. But 
he does not care to do so, or does not care enough” (72). Like the Magistrate, David Lurie 
almost recognizes his complicity in a social schema that disempowers certain bodies and 
makes their subjection to violence less abhorrent, and yet chooses to continue residing in the 
comfort of his privilege.  
 David’s infliction of violence onto disempowered individuals, which is only possible 
because of his powerful subject-position as a white man, shifts when he is physically 
assaulted by the men who rape Lucy. After he tries to intervene on Lucy’s behalf, the men 
beat him, splash him with methylated spirits, and set him on fire. While ablaze, he realizes 
that “He and his daughter are not being let off lightly after all! He can burn, he can die; and if 
he can die, then so can Lucy” (96). Like the Magistrate realizing that the sovereign apparatus 
of the Empire can turn against him as well as the barbarians, David can also glimpse, even in 
this frenzied state, the innate precariousness attached to life. It is no accident that this almost-
recognition occurs as he is on fire. As the flames inflict severe physical pain, they also 
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transform his appearance: “His eyes are stinging, one eyelid is already closing. He runs a 
hand over his head and [...] save for a patch over one ear, he seems to have no hair; his whole 
scalp is tender. Everything is tender, everything is burned, Burned, burnt” (97). This 
description indicates his literal transformation from a powerful subject to a disempowered 
subject. He becomes physically marked by the violence which disrupted his comfortable 
position in South Africa. Crucially, however, though he can apprehend the shared 
precariousness of life in this moment, he cannot completely recognize it. As Butler describes, 
“precariousness [...] can be apprehended, taken in, encountered, and it can be presupposed by 
certain norms of recognition just as it can be refused by such norms” but “it cannot be 
properly recognized” (13). This inability for mutual precariousness to assume full cognitive 
recognition is part of what allows David to move past this apprehension of ubiquitous human 
fragility after this violent encounter. He apprehends the precariousness of life when his own 
precariousness is exposed, but this later serves to reinforce the mentality that justifies 
violence based on the fact that it is the Other who has exposed the self’s fragility.  
“‘And I did nothing. I did not save you.’ That is his own confession”: Complicity and 
the Behemoth in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
After explicating some of the complexities attached to the problem of the 
protagonists’ complicity in the perpetration of physical violence in Waiting for the 
Barbarians and Disgrace, I would like to highlight two final moments in each text. 
Unable to intervene in his daughter’s violation, David encounters an iteration of the 
specific form of physical violence he perpetrated during his time in Cape Town. The text 
implies this acknowledgment when David tells Lucy, “‘And I did nothing. I did not save 
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you.’ That it is his own confession” (157). Whether David literally means that he could do 
nothing to save Lucy from her attackers, or whether he refers to his willful participation in 
the social and political mechanisms that made her violation possible in a more abstracted 
sense, this confession is one of the only moments in the text where the ambivalence of 
accountability, of who or what to hold responsible for physical violence comes into focus.  
The ambivalent character of accountability also surfaces in this moment in Waiting 
for the Barbarians, where the Magistrate ponders that the cell he now occupies was once the 
site of the Barbarian Girl’s torture: “they hurt her and he [her father] could not stop them (on 
a day I spent occupied with the ledgers in my office). Thereafter she was no longer fully 
human, sister to all of us” (94). Not only does the Magistrate’s speculation on the dynamics 
between the Barbarian Girl and her father parallel the dynamics between David and Lucy 
Lurie, but it also calls into question the identity of who (or what) can be identified as 
accountable for her torture. Though he allows for the joint failures of her father and himself 
as a solution to the problem of identifying who is accountable, both characters arguably 
lacked the means to meaningfully intervene in that particular moment. Indeed, as illustrated 
later, once the Magistrate makes the choice to act on behalf of the barbarians, he finds 
himself crushed by the same “behemoth” that crushes the barbarian captives. One possible 
answer, it seems, resides in the last sentence of this reflection, which may offer a 
characteristic of who or what must be held accountable.  
Whoever or whatever made torture possible, made it permissible, stripped her of her 
humanity and simultaneously divulged the inherent fragility shared by all life, a fragility that 
binds every subject together, but which has resided in obscurity up until this point. This 
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description resonates with Rogobete’s account of testimonies collected from survivors of 
political violence during Apartheid: “Trauma was not only experienced individually or 
privately [...] Even in situations in which the perpetrators could be identified, all participants 
found it difficult to distinguish individual perpetrators responsible for causing their 
pain” (114-115, added emphasis). Why does the identity of a perpetrator continually evade 
these fictional and non-fictional accounts of the experience and trauma of living through the 
infliction of severe physical pain? If no singular person or thing can be held accountable, 
what can possibly be done to redress the injustice of the atrocities that have been carried out? 
Or at least, what can be done to allow the beginning of any collective healing? This line of 
questioning begins to grasp at an insidious, liminal, and fleeting presence that permeates both 
the fictional settings and cultural context of Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace— one 
that at certain points I have brushed up against, almost addressed, but have never fleshed out 
fully. This presence, this behemoth, this violent mechanism that makes the conditions for the 
infliction of physical violence a reality, is what I will identify and explicate in the next 
chapter of this project.  
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Chapter Two 
The Logic and Time of the Behemoth: Comparing Sovereign Violence in J.M. Coetzee’s 
Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
 The second mechanism of violence in both Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians 
pertains to two separate (but perhaps intimately connected) moments of recognition in the 
novels. In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate feels despair when he begins to inquire 
into the larger forces behind the torture he knows agents of the Third Bureau are perpetrating: 
“I know somewhat too much; and from this knowledge, once one has been infected, there 
seems to be no recovering. [...] The knot loops in upon itself; I cannot find the end” (23). A 
shameful confession in Disgrace that correlates with the Magistrate’s hopelessness occurs 
when David Lurie first attempts to explain why his and Lucy’s violation happened: “That is 
the theory [...] just a vast circulatory system, to whose workings pity and terror are irrelevant. 
That is how one must see life in this country: in its schematic aspect. Otherwise one could go 
mad” (98, added emphasis). These two examples have several crucial similarities. Both 
illustrate the protagonists grasping at the larger forces at work behind the physical violence 
they experience or witness and then simultaneously retreating from them. More significantly, 
however, each character, in responding to either the Empire or the South African State, begin 
to apprehend, but do not quite fully recognize,  the identity of the mechanism itself, the 16
behemoth that circulates endlessly and evades outright explication: the violence of sovereign 
power.  
 In this chapter, as in the previous one, I am using Butler’s understanding of the terms “apprehension” and 16
“recognition” in order to articulate different levels of cognition. The protagonists in both novels apprehend the 
sovereign violence surrounding them at various points, but full recognition does not come, indeed if it ever 
does, until much later. 
!60
Both characters, when confronted with the reality that their experience of extreme 
physical violence has been perpetrated by the sovereign powers of the Imperial system and 
the South African state, find themselves overwhelmed and wishing they had not apprehended 
it at all. Instead of seizing the knowledge this realization affords and attempting to trace the 
complexities surrounding it, David clings to it only in abstraction, the method through which 
he claims he can preserve his sanity. The Magistrate also retreats from the initial 
apprehension of the violent sovereignty, and adamantly repeats a pattern of wishing he had 
never investigated the techniques employed by the Empire’s agents against innocent people. 
Of course, this tension between approaching and retreating from the behemoth that is 
sovereign power brings other considerations into relief. What action can be expected from a 
singular person when they confront the terrifying enormity of sovereign power? Can one 
person effectively work against this kind of violence when it appears in almost every level of 
any social structure? 
Though David and the Magistrate’s apprehension of the sovereign violence in their 
respective contexts both incur continual denials and retreats, their similar description of the 
cyclicality of sovereignty imply that the sovereign violence at work in both novels does not 
end— that it continues to permeate all aspects of life, effectively haunting each text. 
Crucially, however, the sovereign violence in both texts is rendered at a different point; 
Waiting for the Barbarians centers on the violence of sovereign power through describing the 
effects of the state of emergency implemented by the Empire, and Disgrace depicts the 
violence of sovereign power after it has technically or legally diminished, but maintains its 
influence and continues to operate in the lives of individual South African subjects. Though 
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depicting a different point in the eternal cycle of sovereign power, each text demonstrates a 
crucial characteristic of sovereign violence: the exceptional state of emergency is, actually, 
not exceptional at all, but has become the norm through which sovereign power finds its 
articulation. The men’s shared experience of temporal instability resulting from sovereign 
violence in both novels will then be foregrounded, and that mutual fluctuation they 
experience may prove to show the intimate connection between sovereign violence and the 
final mechanism of violence I will examine in this project: the violence that informs the 
criteria of statelessness and citizenship.    
Though inquiries into the function and characteristics of sovereign power is a legacy 
fraught with epistemological difficulty, I argue that analyzing Coetzee’s novels alongside the 
theoretical interventions of Giorgio Agamben and Judith Butler may allow for a method to 
think through its logic and temporality that accounts for the particular sovereign violence 
present in each novel, while also producing potential patterns of sovereign violence that are 
represented in both novels. Moreover, through conducting this analysis, the difficulties each 
protagonist has in identifying a singular perpetrator— evidenced by the patterns of who and 
what they blame at certain points in each narrative— may become more comprehensible and 
also provide a way to understand that many individuals are involved in the perpetuation of 
sovereign violence and the violence of citizenship and statelessness, which ultimately lead to 
the infliction of physical violence.  
“Now people just pick and choose the laws they want to obey. It’s anarchy”: The 
Liminality of Sovereign Violence in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
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 In the initial chapter of Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998), 
Agamben offers the following description of the paradoxical structure of sovereign power:  
The paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, 
outside and inside the juridical order. [...]  the sovereign, having the legal power to 
suspend the validity of the law, legally places himself outside the law. This means the 
paradox can also be formulated this way: ‘the law is outside itself,’ or: ‘I, the 
sovereign, who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing outside the law. (15) 
This description of the sovereign paradox foregrounds the liminal quality of sovereign power
— it resides both inside and outside the juridical order at the same time, which makes any 
question of its exact location an attempt to locate liminal space itself, which seems to be an 
epistemological impossibility. This is why the Magistrate and David Lurie both find it 
enormously difficult to locate a singular perpetrator on whom to place the blame of the 
atrocities they experience and witness.  
According to Agamben, the liminal characteristic of sovereignty is what makes it 
resistant to any efforts to effectively “pin down” its specific locations or functions. 
Agamben’s description carries another vital component with which to think through the 
paradoxical structure of sovereign power— because the sovereign power has the ability to 
decide when the law either applies or does not apply to any given situation, to either suspend 
or resume its own legality, the sovereign can reside both inside of the law (because of the 
ability to make this decision) and outside of the law (because that decision does not apply to 
the sovereign power itself). This ability for the sovereign to decide what is inside or outside 
the legal system is a concept Agamben develops from Carl Schmitt’s understanding of the 
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sovereign decision. When the sovereign exercises its ability to decide the terms of inside and 
outside, while residing in the threshold between the two, this decision creates what Agamben 
calls the state of exception.  
 In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate begins to apprehend sovereign violence 
as it is embodied through one of the only named characters in the text: Colonel Joll. The 
particularity given to Colonel Joll through the act of naming him already gestures to a 
significant mode of sovereign violence. As a high-ranking member of the Third Bureau of the 
Civil Guard, Joll is the character that most explicitly wields the violence of the Empire. By 
giving Colonel Joll one of the only singular names in the novel, the text demonstrates a 
connection between a militant imperial apparatus and the sovereign violence it is meant to 
uphold. It also allows for the population of the town, the Magistrate, and the reader to attach 
Imperial sovereign violence to a singular character, made memorable because of the fact that 
he is named in a text where almost no other character is. Colonel Joll’s name draws attention 
to his specific character, and allows the reader to identify how the enormity of sovereign 
violence can be embodied and practiced through a single individual. In the first few chapters, 
the Magistrate and the reader are continually led to believe that Colonel Joll is the perpetrator 
on whom to attach the blame of the atrocities that occur.  
In addition to naming Colonel Joll, the text also draws attention to him through highly 
individualized physical descriptions.The novel opens with a description of Joll’s eyeglasses, 
which emphasizes that “The disks are dark, they look opaque from the outside, but he can see 
through them” (1). Already, the narrative implies that Colonel Joll is fundamentally different 
from the ambiguously signified townsfolk of the frontier— because of his shaded lenses, he 
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can maintain constant surveillance but that surveillance remains undetected. At the least, his 
darkened glasses can be understood as a literal division between Colonel Joll, an operative of 
the Empire, the civilian population of the town, and most importantly, the victims of the 
torture he inflicts. Moreover, the text describes the fact that the Colonel constantly wears 
these lenses, in spite of the weather or the time of day, and even in spite of being inside. The 
significance of this decision to wear the lenses at all times certainly works to make the 
Colonel individual and therefore more memorable, as noticed by the Magistrate when he 
wonders, “Whom will that other girl with the blind face remember: me [...] or that other cold 
man with the mask over his eyes who gave the orders and pondered the sounds of her 
intimate pain” (155). In this reflection, the Magistrate compares Joll’s lenses to a mask 
covering his face, and connects this “mask” to Joll’s ability to destroy the Girl’s world 
through torturing her. This implies another possibility—if we can conclude that wearing 
sunglasses indoors or at night actually makes the faculty of sight weaker, or that wearing a 
mask over one’s face similarly obstructs vision, Colonel Joll may intentionally be obscuring 
his ability to see the extent of his violence, and thus experience any amount of kinship 
between his victims and himself.  
This point correlates with the last glimpse we receive of Joll when he returns from his 
campaign into barbarian territory: “His face is naked, washed clean [...]  Memories of his 
mother’s soft breast, of the tug in his hand of the first kite he ever flew, as well as those 
intimate cruelties for which I abhor him, shelter in that beehive. He looks out at me, his eyes 
searching my face. The dark lenses are gone” (170). The intention of obscuring any similarity 
between the Colonel and his victims has dissipated with the disappearance of his dark lenses, 
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and by extension, the Magistrate and Colonel Joll are each confronted with the humanity of 
the other. Colonel Joll, a character who presents the discrepancy between the benevolent 
form of humanity and the form of humanity that perpetrates atrocity, is finally revealed here 
to be just a man.  When he resolutely recognizes Joll’s humanity, the Magistrate’s attempt to 17
locate the whole of sovereign imperial violence in the man through which it is wielded can 
no longer be valid. He realizes that Joll is undeniably a person, and thus demonstrates the 
ethically dubious— and misdirected— attempt to blame the perpetuation of sovereign 
violence on any one individual.  
Unlike in Waiting for the Barbarians, which uses the figure of Colonel Joll to mark 
the supposed beginning of the infliction of the sovereign violence of the Empire, Disgrace 
begins from an understanding that in post-Apartheid South Africa, the sovereign violence 
that formerly perpetuated legally sanctioned violence against the black South African 
population has ended. If the novel took place in the midst of apartheid, the violence of the 
sovereign nation state of South Africa would perhaps be more explicit. However, Disgrace 
takes place when the dynamics of that sovereignty have shifted. The sovereign violence in 
Disgrace is illustrated in divergent, individual iterations of the residual violence of the 
modern South African state apparatus, which includes the legacies of Apartheid that have 
shaped it for decades. In its ability to create and suspend the law, the state apparatus of South 
Africa resides inside and outside of the juridical order simultaneously, and therefore, after the 
 This realization correlates particularly with Hannah Arendt’s understanding of the banality of evil in 17
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), in which she emphasizes the importance of 
understanding atrocity as a human faculty, and condemns the apparent ease with which egregious violence can 
be abstracted as monstrous or inhuman. 
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legal suspension of Apartheid policy, the source of the violence it continues to inflict on its 
subjects becomes extremely difficult to locate. 
This difficulty can be seen in an observation made by David’s secretary, Dawn: “I 
mean whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation [Apartheid], at least you knew where 
you were [...] Now people just pick and choose which laws they want to obey. It’s 
anarchy” (9). In other words, the text suggests that after the South African state has officially 
ended the overt violence of Apartheid, its subjects are now faced with a complete 
restructuring of the law they have been embedded in for decades. This means that those who 
benefited from Apartheid (the white South African population) supposedly no longer retain 
the same privileges, and those victimized by Apartheid (the black South African population) 
supposedly are no longer violated by official representatives of state authority. The figures 
who would ordinarily act as a conduit through which state violence is exercised (i.e. the 
South African police) no longer retain the authority to officially perpetuate the violence of 
Apartheid policy. As Ettinger, Lucy’s neighbor and a thoroughgoing racist, advises after the 
Lurie’s home invasion, “‘The best is, you save yourself, because the police are not going to 
save you, not any more, you can be sure’” (100). His advice to the Luries is to make 
somewhat of a fortress out of their farm, and not to hesitate to protect themselves with 
reciprocal violence if the situation calls for it. 
“I am trying to understand the zone in which you live. I am trying to imagine how you 
breathe and eat and live from day to day. But I cannot! That is what troubles me!”: The 
Violence of Sovereignty in Waiting for the Barbarians  
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Though both Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace illustrate the liminal 
characteristic of the paradox of sovereignty, the sovereign violence that is perpetuated 
through sovereignty’s paradoxical structure appears to differ substantially in each text. This is 
in light of the fact that the sovereign violence inflicted in Waiting for the Barbarians is 
presumed to be beginning, and the sovereign violence in Disgrace is presumed to be ending. 
However, examination of sovereign violence as it manifests differently in each novel will 
serve to actually connect both representations as examples of the cyclicality of sovereign 
violence. Therefore, through comparing the structure at work in these different stages, any 
understanding of a certifiable “beginning” and “ending” of sovereign violence will be both 
undesirable and potentially impossible to reach. 
  After the Magistrate first encounters Colonel Joll, he describes, “We do not discuss 
the reason for his being here. He is here under the emergency powers, that is enough” (1). 
The reasons behind Colonel Joll’s visit to the frontier town, then, are almost completely 
obscured— the Magistrate knows only that Joll is presently operating under “emergency 
powers” put into place after a barbarian raid near the border of the Empire. The reasons for 
his visit emerge however, once the Magistrate informs him of the state of their prison 
facilities, and mentions that two barbarians have been arrested under suspicion of 
participating in a raid against the frontier town. The pair are still detained even after the 
barbarian father and son inform the Magistrate that, “‘The soldiers stopped us and tied us up. 
For nothing. We were on the road, coming here to see the doctor’” (4). When Colonel Joll 
hears this, he tells the Magistrate that, “‘Nevertheless [...] I ought to question them. This 
evening, if that is convenient’” (5). Joll’s refusal to listen to the Magistrate demonstrates an 
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element of what can be expected when living under “emergency powers.” Joll does not 
accept what the Magistrate would consider to be normal juridical proceeding— that is, 
releasing prisoners when there is no evidence supporting their arrest (or a version of 
“innocent until proven guilty”). Colonel Joll, based on the authority derived from the vague 
title “emergency powers,” is at liberty to modify these proceedings, and indeed, does so. At 
this point, the Magistrate also becomes aware of the meaning behind Colonel Joll’s use of the 
term “question,” and makes several more failed attempts in convincing him of the validity of 
the barbarians’ story. In spite of these protestations, Colonel Joll proceedes in his 
“questioning,” and begins the process of torture that leads to the death of the barbarian father 
and the mutilation of the barbarian son. This exchange between Joll and the Magistrate 
effectively illustrates that the normative juridical proceeding the Magistrate believes to be 
benevolent and attempts to perpetuate has been suspended. The Colonel, as acting sovereign, 
decides that the normative juridical order does not apply to the barbarian father and son. Joll 
alters the validity of the normative process of law in this situation— which the law itself tells 
us is an impossibility— and draws his authority to do so based solely on the “emergency 
powers” the frontier town is under. However, underlying this suspension of the law, a 
situation assumed to be exceptional, is the fact that in its ability to suspend its own 
proceeding, the sovereign power of the Empire proves that this emergency state is actually 
part of its normal functioning.   
Agamben explicates the structure in place that enables the sovereign to decide what 
or who is inside or outside the juridical sphere by defining two of its components: the rule 
and the exception. For Carl Schmitt, what is created when the rule is suspended is its 
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exception— the relationship between the rule and the exception are considered to be 
diametrically opposed concepts, thought as either “inside” or “outside” in mutually exclusive 
sense. Though Agamben confers with the understanding that the suspension of the rule 
creates the exception, he finds the relation between the two to be significantly more complex. 
Instead of the rule and the exception, or the inside and the outside, being mutually exclusive  
[t]he rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The 
state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that 
results from its suspension [....] The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; 
rather, the rule suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in 
relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule.” (18, original emphasis)   
The exception must, therefore, be thought of as a necessary constituent of the rule itself. In 
practice, it is not exceptional at all. The sovereign decision to suspend juridical rule creates 
the exception and includes the exception within the rule precisely because it is through this 
creation of the exception that it can constitute itself as the rule. This relation between the rule 
and the exception, in its most extreme form, is a “relation of exception,” a situation through 
which, “something is included solely through its exclusion” (18). 
In the case of sovereign violence in Waiting for the Barbarians, this “emergency 
state” of the township directly reflects the characteristics of Agamben’s perpetual state of 
exception. The emergency powers in place in the frontier town give the Colonel the ability to 
suspend the normal proceedings of the juridical order. He does so, and through the decision 
to suspend the juridical order, he creates the relation between the rule (the subjects of the 
Empire, for whom the normative juridical process still applies) and the exception (the 
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barbarians, for whom the normative juridical process is suspended). In other words, he 
suspends the validity of the law for the barbarian father and son, and in so doing, renders 
them exceptional to the law that pretends to offer protection from the violence he inflicts on 
them. However, Coetzee’s decision to withhold the specifics of the Empire’s “normal” legal 
proceeding invite the reader to question their own relationship with the laws in place in their 
context. Believing that the law itself should protect those living under it leads to a humanist 
understanding of how sovereign power operates, and is demonstrably not how sovereign 
power seems to work in the context of Waiting for the Barbarians. Through maintaining 
itself in relation to the exception, the rule has the ability to constitute itself as such in the first 
place. The population of the town, and the population of the “civilized” Empire more 
broadly, constitute themselves as inside juridical rule precisely because they place the 
barbarians outside of that juridical rule, as exceptions. In order to claim their validity as the 
rule, they require that there be the exception, the outside. What goes unrecognized, however, 
is the reliance of the rule on the exception— the exception is what gives the rule its validity 
and is therefore always included through its exclusion. The boundaries between what is 
included and excluded, or what is inside and outside the juridical rule, prove less stable than 
previously supposed. This disrupts any claim that attempts to naturalize or essentialize the 
identity of who is inside of the law and who is outside of the law. Moreover, and as we see in 
both novels, this inability to essentialize this criteria of rule/exception means that individuals 
who believe themselves to be the rule can easily become the exception. 
 The instability of divisions between inside/outside, rule/exception, then, reflect how 
Agamben previously defines the state of exception as that situation that can occur only once 
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the sovereign power has suspended the validity of the law: “What emerges in this limit figure 
[in the relation of exception] is the radical crisis of every possibility of clearly distinguishing 
between membership and inclusion, between what is outside and what is inside, between 
exception and rule” (25). This leads to the crucial point, which will prove instrumental in 
application to Coetzee’s texts; once the procedure of the juridical sphere has been suspended 
for a certain group of people, the divisions between the protected and unprotected, or the 
inside and outside, cannot be distinguished. In order to demonstrate this inability to 
distinguish between supposedly rigid ontological categories, Agamben uses the figure of the 
homo sacer in Roman law. The homo sacer, or the sacred man, refers to the individual that 
may not be sacrificed, but may be killed without consequences (71). This figure represents 
part of the enigmatic character of sovereign power: how can a person be simultaneously 
killed with impunity and nevertheless be prohibited from execution according to ritual 
practice? The sacred man is simultaneously excluded from both the realm of the political and 
the realm of the religious—he cannot find protection in either sphere. Agamben describes the 
significance of the homo sacer’s double exclusion in the following description: “The 
sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide 
and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life— that is, life that may be killed but not 
sacrificed— is the life that has been captured in this sphere (83). The life within the 
sovereign sphere is sacred life, or bare life, and reveals that life itself is the original referent 
of sovereign power. The crux of Agamben’s use of this concept resides in this relationship 
between life and sovereign power. In its ability to suspend normative juridical proceeding, 
and therefore to make the purported differences between the rule and the exception 
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indistinguishable, sovereign power renders everyone vulnerable to its violence. In the figure 
of the sacred man, we glimpse the fictional element of sovereign power’s supposed 
benevolence. Though it pretends to perpetrate violence only against certain individuals who 
are excluded from its sphere, it actually has the ability to perpetrate violence against anyone 
at any time.    
This can be seen throughout Waiting for the Barbarians specifically through the 
juridical process the Magistrate is subjected to after returning from delivering the Barbarian 
Girl back to her people, when Colonel Joll accuses him of “treasonously consorting” with the 
enemy. Through his association with the Girl, then, the Magistrate is placed outside of 
consideration of the sovereign protection. He ceases to become the rule and instead is forced 
closer to a position of the exception: “They will use the law against them as far as it serves 
them, then they will turn to other methods. That is the Bureau’s way. To people who do not 
operate under statue, the legal process is simply one instrument among many” (97). The 
Magistrate describes the law as an instrument of the sovereign violence that creates it. In so 
doing, he shatters the conception of the law as a monolithic, detached, or non-human entity, 
which sovereign power usually claims. He also demonstrates that the law only pretends to 
operate justly—instead of being used as a tool of justice, it is actually used as a tool of power. 
The law itself is like any weapon used in the torture perpetrated in its name, and as such, 
must be understood as an intimately human creation that is susceptible to being manipulated 
by those in power. Thus, the sovereign violence represented in the novel disrupts the 
understanding that law can ever be thought separately from life, or as naturally benevolent. 
When it is understood as an instrument of sovereign violence, the justice that the law claims 
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to uphold or secure ceases to assume any sort of higher, divinely ordained status. The 
violence of the sovereign state of exception is rendered in this moment most explicitly— 
when the law is exposed as an articulation of the interests of sovereign power, its protection 
no longer applies, and torture can and is considered justifiable.  
Torture becomes justifiable, and indeed, necessary for the protection of the Empire. 
As Agamben notes, “the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the 
threshold on which violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence” (32). 
The perpetual sovereign state of exception makes the distinction between inside and outside 
difficult to ascertain, and it extends this function to the muddling of violence and law. This 
fluidity between violence and law manifests, perhaps, as sanctioned violence and 
unsanctioned violence. Though the Magistrate used to reside inside the legal protection of the 
Empire, the emergency powers in place now reveal the malleability of those divisions 
between inside and outside, and he transgresses into a position that is outside of that 
normative legal protection, which allows for the justification of his torture.  
The indistinction between violence and law becomes especially clear when the 
Magistrate reflects on the reasons why he has not been given a trial: “they will never bring a 
man to trial while he is healthy and strong enough to confound them. They will shut me away 
in the dark till I am a muttering idiot, a ghost of myself; then they will haul me before a 
closed court and in five minutes dispose of the legalities they find so tiresome” (130). Here, 
the legal proceeding is responding to the Magistrate in an extreme state of exception, in a 
way that Agamben describes as, “the pure form in which law affirms itself with the greatest 
force precisely at the point in which it no longer prescribes anything” (50). When the 
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Magistrate and the barbarians are both subjected to torture in the novel, the mechanism of 
sovereign violence directly highlights the instrumental structure of the law, emptied of the 
fiction of any content, and has exposed it for what it is: pure form. The law is the mode 
through which sovereign violence asserts itself. It does not respond to any particular 
transgression; in fact, the question of transgression or compliance is no longer necessary. In 
its full force, law under the state of exception singles out individuals and populations that 
oppose the sovereign power in spite of any specific violation of any specific law. As 
Agamben puts it, “life under a law that is in force without signifying resembles life in the 
state of exception, in which the most innocent gesture or the smallest forgetfulness can have 
the most extreme consequences” (53). Sovereignty ceases to respond to realities of innocence 
and guilt while the township is under the “emergency powers” of the Third Bureau. 
Therefore, the sovereign violence at work in Coetzee’s text enacts the law in its full force, 
exposes it as pure form without any necessary content or signification, and collapses the 
distinction between violence and law. It suspends normative juridical proceeding, placing 
itself simultaneously inside and outside of the law, and therefore, embodies the 
characteristics of the paradoxical mechanism of sovereignty described by Agamben.    
Under this sovereign state of exception, the abhorrent practices of the Third Bureau 
are permitted to begin, continue, and as the Magistrate notes, are even celebrated: “A 
scapegoat is named, a festival is declared, the laws are suspended: who would not flock to 
see the entertainment?” (137).  This liminality of sovereignty in the text, this ability for 
sovereign power to destabilize oppositional mechanisms, is finally recognized by the 
Magistrate when he asks his torturer, Mandel— one of the only other named characters in the 
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novel, “I know that the workings of justice are often obscure. I am only trying to understand. 
I am trying to understand the zone in which you live. I am trying to imagine how you breathe 
and eat and live from day to day. But I cannot! That is what troubles me!” (145-146). Though 
he technically addresses his torturer Mandel in this moment, his line of questioning can be 
extrapolated to the entire Imperial enterprise at work in his society, and to society as a whole. 
The questions can also be applied to the Magistrate himself, and thus, implications of 
individual accountability or complicity in the perpetuation of sovereign violence emerge once 
again. This impenetrable location, this zone of indistinction, this liminal residence is 
precisely what characterizes sovereign violence. Combined with its ability to make the state 
of exception permanent, which makes distinguishing between law and violence, between rule 
and exception, and between inside and outside impossible, that sovereignty engenders 
egregious violence.  
“That is not how vengeance works. Vengeance is like fire. The more it devours, the 
hungrier it gets.”: Sovereign Violence in Disgrace 
The instability of epistemological categories brought about by the sovereign state of 
exception can be seen in Disgrace, but crucially, the novel takes place at the moment when 
Apartheid has been “officially” disavowed by the mechanism of the South African state. 
Unlike in Waiting for the Barbarians, which is intentionally set in an ambiguous context 
where the dynamics of violent sovereignty play out openly, Disgrace is set in a state that has 
only just attempted to dissolve the legality of Apartheid.  
What Disgrace illuminates are the complexities that arise when those usually 
considered outside of the juridical proceedings move inside of them (when black South 
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African populations suddenly carry as many juridical protections as white South African 
populations).  In short, it explores what occurs after certain legislation has been exposed as 18
nothing more than an articulation of sovereign power. Agamben offers the following 
description of sovereign violence:  
Law is made of nothing but what it manages to capture inside itself through the 
inclusive exclusion of the exceptio: it nourishes itself on this exception and is a dead 
letter without it. In this sense, the law truly has ‘no existence in itself, but rather has 
its being in the very life of men.’ The sovereign decision traces and from time to time 
renews this threshold of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and 
inclusion, in which life is originally expected in law. (27, first emphasis original, 
second emphasis added) 
If the law has no inherent materiality or function other than what it manages to constitute 
inside of its own structure through the exception, we can tentatively say that in practice, 
through relinquishing the exception it has captured inside of itself in the form of the black 
South African population, the law in Disgrace’s South Africa is a “dead letter.” The 
ideologies and racial prejudices that informed the system of Apartheid have not disappeared 
altogether. Believing they have is an extension of the same logic that claims racism 
disappeared when legalized slavery was abolished in the United States. When discrimination 
against populations is disavowed, the law is exposed as nothing other than an articulation of 
the interests of the hegemonically dominant population, the interests of whom are always 
  I am drawing from the homogenous national identity prescribed by the state of South Africa itself that has 18
then been internally divided along monolithic racial differences between ‘white’ and ‘black’ populations. There 
are, of course, many ethnic divisions in both the black and white populations in South Africa that adhere to 
more complex and nuanced internal hierarchies. 
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served and protected by the sovereign power of the state. Those who usually benefit from 
that discrmination— in this context, white South African citizens— can either attempt to 
adjust to the new South African state appratus or choose to perpetuate the old state of 
Apartheid through their individual actions and beliefs.  
David’s way of understanding the violence he experiences and witnesses during the 
Lurie’s home invasion correlates with what Agamben’s description. When the exception is 
relinquished by the law, and the law is reduced to a “dead letter,” it proves that the law is in 
the very lives of men and has no inherent existence or form without reference to human life. 
For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Lurie’s violation, David begins to suspect 
Petrus’ complicity. He tells Lucy, “I find it hard to believe they arrived out of nowhere, and 
did what they did, and disappeared afterwards like ghosts. And I find it hard to believe that 
the reason they picked us was simply that we were the first white folk they met that 
day” (118). These kinds of suspicions work their way into David’s understanding of the 
situation, and escalate the racial predjudices within him, which eventually inform his violent 
actions against Petrus and Pollux. This has at least one implication in the context of 
Disgrace, magnifying Agamben’s questions about the connections between law, life, and 
politics. The first is that if the law’s reliance on the exception is what engenders its existence, 
then when the state relinquishes the laws that enforce that exception, it does not necessarily 
indicate that the sovereign power that made that exception possible has dissipated entirely. 
Indeed, as is implied in many moments in Disgrace, what is more likely is the residual 
extension of the sovereign violence of the Apartheid system to individual lives through the 
white characters’ resurgence of racist ideology and action.  
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The characters in Disgrace are constantly responding to the dissolution of the 
sovereign power of the Apartheid system. However, these responses to their changing 
juridical processes seem to center on various notions of vengeance. When David first realizes 
their violators took the time to shoot the dogs Lucy and David had been caring for, David 
reflects, “Contemptible, yet exhilarating, probably, in a country where dogs are bred to snarl 
at the mere smell of a black man. A satisfying afternoon’s work, heady, like all 
revenge” (110). This sentiment repeats when David reacts to Lucy’s refusal to disclose her 
assault to the police: “Do you think that by meekly accepting what happened to you, you can 
set yourself apart from farmers like Ettinger? [...] That is not how vengeance works, Lucy, 
Vengeance is like fire. The more it devours, the hungrier it gets” (112). At least in David’s 
estimation, which could account for his later beating of Pollux, post-Apartheid South Africa 
has emerged as a landscape riddled with exchanges of vengeance, responses to a process of 
discrimination and violence begun hundreds of years earlier.  
In “Potentiality and Law,” Agamben begins to explicate the relation between 
constituting and constituted power in the juridical realm which will illuminate a way to 
understand the structure of the residual sovereign violence at work in Disgrace. Following 
Benjamin, he defines constituted power as the power which exerts violence to preserve law 
and constituting power as the power which exerts violence to posit law (40). For example, in 
a typical liberal revolution, the constituted power involved may be understood as the 
tyrannical government or monarchy, while the constituting power would be thought of as the 
insurgent force. However, he complicates this relation, and describes that it is impossible and 
actually harmful to think of the two as mutually exclusive. In light of the fact that most 
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juridical systems allow for the possibility of revision through the mechanism of a constitution 
or a legislative body, what follows any overhaul of the previous system is that, “the sovereign 
power divides itself into constituting and constituted power and maintains itself in relation to 
both, positioning itself at their point of indistinction” (41). Sovereign violence divides itself 
between constituted and constituting power— because it contains both— and makes it 
difficult for the constituting power, once it has successfully posited new laws and overthrown 
the constituted power, to “legitimate something other than law-preserving violence and even 
maintains an ambiguous and ineradicable relation with constituted power” (41). In other 
words, in order to maintain the law that it has posited, the constituting power must wield the 
law-preserving violence of the constituted power it has just overthrown, and it is able to do 
this precisely because of the sovereign power that has divided itself between the two. This 
structure of and relation between constituting and constituted power is part of the reason 
why, for Agamben, revolutions often result in the institution of an even more oppressive 
sovereign regime.  
To be clear, Agamben’s conclusion about insurrections against sovereign violence 
usually eliciting the foundations for a more violent sovereign mechanism is not what I am 
arguing is occurring in the South African state. However, certain aspects of his structure can 
apply to the dynamics occurring internally and externally in the text and can help explicate 
the sovereign violence at work in these cyclical acts of revenge. Agamben’s model can 
provide an explanation for a legacy of violence in South Africa. We can posit that while the 
Apartheid system was in full effect, the constituting power would be the anti-Apartheid 
movement, or those attempting to overthrow the violence of Apartheid legislation, and the 
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constituted power would be the system of Apartheid and its supporters/sympathizers, or those 
attempting to maintain the legality of Apartheid. Even if the sovereign violence of the South 
African Apartheid system has been dissolved, the relationship between sovereignty, 
constituted, and constituting power entails that the sovereign violence of that system has not 
actually disappeared. It has only divided itself between the constituted and constituting 
powers it already contained within itself. The relations between the constituting and 
constituted powers of the sovereign Apartheid system are still at work in the actions and 
beliefs of individual characters in Disgrace, emerging as violent exchanges justified through 
claims of revenge. To put this more succinctly, the legality of sovereign violence in Disgrace 
has been prohibited. However, the ideology of the sovereign violence of Apartheid continues 
to operate in the relations between those who either benefited from that violence or suffered 
under it.  
It is possible to glean this particular dynamic throughout the progression of the novel, 
in both subtle and overt ways, but perhaps most tellingly when Petrus decides to throw a 
party to celebrate the acquisition of his land. He invites the Luries to this gathering, and they 
are the only white South Africans present. Before the celebration ensues, however, David and 
Petrus share an exchange, where David asks Petrus, “‘I want those men to be caught and 
brought before the law and punished. Am I wrong? Am I wrong to want justice?’” to which 
Petrus replies, “‘No, you are not wrong’” (119). The question David poses to Petrus about the 
importance of seeking justice mirrors the feeling permeating the country more broadly. All 
individuals that suffered under the violence of Apartheid have been seeking retribution and 
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some form of justice for the violence that has been inflicted on them for generations— this 
could be why Petrus responds in such a clear, yet detached manner.  
Yet, an important clarification that must be made at this point is the difference 
between justice and revenge; I am working from the understanding of that difference 
provided by Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals. Justice operates primarily through the 
establishment and enforcement of a legal code by those in power. It focuses on training the 
individuals involved in any legal matter—both the victim and the violator—to depersonalize 
the crime under scrutiny. Revenge, therefore, is the quest for reparation that occurs outside a 
codified legal system, and that intentionally emphasizes the personal element attached to any 
violation (51). However, when sovereign power collapses law into violence, the difference 
between the impartially coded legal code and the individually invested act of personal 
revenge become more difficult to distinguish. The perpetuation of sovereign violence 
actually serves to invalidate the law it constitutes as a means to secure the perpetuation of its 
own validity. Therefore, though this description of the difference of justice and revenge is 
what Nietzsche identifies as the normative understanding of these terms, he adds that “states 
of legality can never be anything but exceptional states, as partial restrictions of the true will 
to life, that seeks power and to whose overall purpose they subordinate themselves [...] as a 
means of creating greater units of power” (52).  The ability of sovereign power to efface 
supposedly undeniable distinctions between seemingly oppositional concepts also comes 
through when interrogating this understanding of justice versus revenge.   
 Ironically, when David asks Petrus if it is wrong to want justice for Lucy, he effaces 
any distinction between justice and vengeance (and acts in a way that is reminiscent of 
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sovereign power), and moreover, does not apprehend the possibility that Petrus, as part of the 
population most affected by the violence of Apartheid, may in fact be more keenly aware of 
the importance of retribution than any white South African individual. Instead, when he and 
Lucy attend the celebration and realize that one of Lucy’s violators— Pollux— is in 
attendance, David unabashedly declares, “‘I am going to telephone the police’ [...] There is a 
disapproving murmur from the onlookers. ‘I am going to telephone the police,’ he repeats to 
Petrus. Petrus is stony-faced” (132). Here, although the sovereign violence of Apartheid is 
technically dissolved, it extends and is enforced through David Lurie himself, when he 
invokes residual dynamics between black indivduals, white individuals, and the apparatus of 
the state police. 
When he and Lucy return to their home, and Lucy chastizes David for threatening 
Petrus and his guests, he further extends the sovereign violence of the Apartheid system, 
albeit in a manner which he considers justified in light of Lucy’s rape, and tells her, “I fail to 
understand why you did not lay real charges against them, and now I fail to understand why 
you are protecting Petrus. Petrus is not an innocent party, Petrus is with them” (133). Here, 
the remnants of the state of exception embedded within the sovereign violence of Apartheid 
comes into partial relief. Petrus, who has done nothing wrong and has no direct involvement 
in the violence inflicted by the black South African men against the Luries, is still thought to 
be necessarily connected to those who did. David is responding in a way that is consistent 
with the constituted sovereign violence of the Apartheid system, refusing to discriminate 
between the guilty and the innocent, and thereby viewing the entire black South African 
community in their region as exempt from the due process of the juridical system. He 
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continues to reify the formerly constituted power of the Apartheid system when, after he and 
Lucy leave Petrus’ house, he thinks, “he does not mind the attention. Let them know I am 
still here, he thinks, let them know I am not skulking in the big house. And if that spoils their 
get-together, so be it” (135).  
David’s mentality carries traces of the sovereign violence described by Agamben; 
specifically, in the way it seems seems to legitimize his violent actions in seeking revenge or 
“justice” through the apparatus of the law. Because he views Lucy’s sexual violation as 
occurring outside of the legal mechanism of “justice,” he characterizes it as an act of 
“revenge.” In attempting to involve the state, David believes that he is not acting out of 
revenge, but acts instead out of an attempt to secure justice for his daughter. After the party, 
he demands that Petrus reveal the identity and location of Pollux and the other two 
perpetrators, stating that after he does, “‘Then we can leave it to the police to investigate and 
bring him and his friends to justice. You will not be involved. I will not be involved, it will be 
a matter for the law’” (137). However, the apparatus of South African law is, and has been, 
designed to secure “justice” for white individuals through overtly discriminating against 
black individuals. Therefore, David’s claim that neither Petrus nor the Luries would have any 
involvement reveals his reliance on the abstract, “just” operation of law, a conception of law 
that does not correlate with the law in practice. Only once that reliance is taken away from 
him, when Lucy prohibits him from involving the state in any capacity, does he perpetuate 
violence in the name of revenge.  
Important to note is the fact that these dynamics of vengeance, which re-engage the 
dynamics between the constituted and constituting relations of the Apartheid system, are 
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actively worked against by two characters in the novel: Lucy and Petrus. In response to the 
demands David places on him to disclose Pollux’s identity to the police, Petrus says, “‘But 
you will not get your car back from this boy. He cannot give you your car. He does not know 
where your car is. Your car is gone. The best is, you can buy another car with the insurance, 
then you have a car again’” (138). Here, Petrus attempts to frame the Luries’ situation in a 
way that dismantles the cyclical exchange of violent acts of revenge by using the car as a 
metaphorical way to engage with the dynamics of post-Apartheid South Africa. Namely, he 
points out that the “justice” David seeks will not undo what has already been done. Instead, it 
will reify the sovereign power that forms the base of the systems of legal racial 
discrimination, like that of Apartheid. However, Petrus’ remarks also serve to inflict an 
iteration of the gendered violence which made Lucy’s rape possible. By making the reality of 
her experience equivalent to the loss of a material object of David’s car, he, though perhaps 
unwittingly, reinforces the objectification of women in patriarchal society.   
Lucy also attempts to work against David’s actions through her refusal to disclose her 
assault, or the identity of her assailants, to the police. Of course, Lucy’s position as a survivor 
of rape also complicates this refusal—patriarchal systems are never designed to protect 
victims of sexual assault, which could also contribute to Lucy’s reluctance to involve the 
nation’s legal system.  Toward the end of Disgrace, Lucy tells Daivd, “But perhaps that is a 
good point to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground 
level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, 
no rights, no dignity’” (205). Lucy’s words gesture toward the crux of the ethical dilemmas 
posed by Disgrace. In the post-Apartheid social schema, in which the sovereign violence of 
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Apartheid has extended to individual dynamics, Lucy could respond to her violation in the 
same capacity that David does— to reify the sovereign violence of the constituted power of 
the dissolved Apartheid state through involving the police, inflicting violence against her 
perpetrators herself, or supporting David’s inclination to do so. However, she adamantly 
refuses to approach the situation in this way. Instead, upon finding herself in this particular 
situation, she realizes that if she wishes to live in a way that corresponds with her political 
and ideological views (which are fundamentally opposed to Apartheid) she can no longer rely 
on the protection of the South African state, or even of her father. She chooses to insert 
herself into a position that recalls the way Agamben describes those living under the 
sovereign state of exception as the exception— stripped of rights, property, protection, and 
ultimately, as an individual with nothing. She implies this decision earlier in the narrative 
when she asks David, “What if… what if that is the price one has to pay for staying on? 
Perhaps that is how they look at it; perhaps that is how I should look at it too. They see me as 
owing something. [...] Why should I be allowed to live here without paying?’” (158). This 
question, this way of formulating her situation, stands as one of the most ethically difficult 
moments in the entire novel. In thinking of herself as owing something to the black South 
African men who violated her, Lucy attempts to enact justice at an individual level. 
Nevertheless, though she attempts to reconcile the history of violence and trauma enacted by 
the sovereignty of the Apartheid South African state, she still unwittingly reifies the 
individualized relations between constitued and constituting powers at work in the novel.  
In justifying the violence perpetrated against her by her rapists in light of a history of 
discrimination, Lucy implies that the history of Apartheid becomes a kind of unshakable, 
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binding mechanism (like the normative understanding of law itself) which excuses the most 
intimate, personal physical violation imaginable. In this capacity, if in a muddled way, Lucy’s 
mentality mirrors the sovereign’s prerogative to dissolve the distinction between violence and 
law. Additionally, in framing the violence perpetrated against her as a necessity, she 
potentially opens up an opportunity for the constituting power of the newly Apartheid-free 
South African state to resemble the constituted power it has theoretically overthrown. 
Vengeance, in other words, as it is understood by both David and Lucy, becomes that very 
method through which the constituting power and constituted power still relate to each other 
through the mechanism of sovereign violence. An act of vengeance dissolves the difference 
between violence and law, and essentializes the condition of the exception in relation to the 
rule. Lucy’s understanding of vengeance simply inverts the same understanding purported by 
David. Perhaps this is what can be gleaned from David when he tells her that, “‘It is not 
finished. Don’t pretend you don’t know what I mean. It is not finished. On the contrary, it is 
just beginning. It will go on long after I am dead and you are dead’” (202). Though they 
conceptualize them differently, David and Lucy navigate the dynamics of their post-
Apartheid state through essentializing acts of revenge, on individual and universal levels, that 
perpetuate the sovereign violence at the heart of Apartheid itself. David’s warning also notes 
another ability of the violence of sovereignty that emerges in post-Apartheid South Africa: its 
capacity to break with normative temporal boundaries.  
“I am the same man I always was: but time has broken, something has fallen in upon 
me from the sky, at random, from nowhere”: Sovereignty and Temporality in Waiting 
for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
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 Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace both hinge on a preoccupation with the 
disruption of the movement of time and the location of space. Sovereign violence gains its 
justification through implementing a juridical system designed to protect those who most 
closely resemble the sovereign in power (the hegemonically dominant population) and 
punishes those who diverge from the sovereign in power (any subject or population that 
diverges from the hegemonically dominant population). This mechanism becomes evident 
when the characters in Coetzee’s novels attempt to reconcile their location in time and space 
while beginning to apprehend the sovereign violence of the Empire and the Aprtheid system.  
For the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians, temporal experience shifts 
according to his proximity to either Imperial territory or barbarian territory, or to Imperial 
subjects or barbarian subjects. For example, in the singular instance where the narrative 
depicts an actual encounter with the barbarians outside of the Empire’s territory, when the 
Magistrate returns the Girl to her people, he thinks, “And here I am patching up relations 
between the men of the future and the men of the past, returning, with apologies, a body we 
have sucked dry— a go-between, a jackal of Empire in sheep’s clothing!” (82). This moment 
indicates a fundamental relationship between spatial considerations and temporal 
considerations; the further the Magistrate travels from territory controlled by the Empire, (the 
further he ventures into the “unknown” territory of the barbarians), his feeling of traveling 
into the past becomes stronger. Moreover, this moment also draws attention to the way the 
Magistrate formulates temporality and “civilization.” He and his men exist, in his mind, as 
men of the future, while the barbarian men he delivers the Girl to exist as men of the past. 
Therefore, his anxiety upon confronting them stems from this innate contradiction; if he and 
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the rest of the Empire’s subjects are progressive, forward-moving people of the future, and 
the barbarians are archaic, prehistoric subjects, then this, and any other, interaction should 
not be possible. This impossibility proving possible unsettles and destabilizes the 
Magistrate’s understanding of his position in relation to both other Imperial subjects and 
barbarians to whom they are supposedly diametrically opposed. This muddling can be 
glimpsed later in the narrative as well. After leaving the Girl with her people, the Magistrate 
ponders, “Plodding across the salt I catch myself in a moment of astonishment that I could 
have loved someone from so remote a kingdom” (86). Here the Magistrate’s descriptions of 
the barbarian territory as remote or cut off from the present moment of the Empire and his 
surprise at his connection with a subject from so “remote” a place undercut the ideology 
espoused by the sovereignty of the Empire, which hinges on maintaining protection for the 
hegemonically dominant while justifying a lack of protection for those who are not.   
A similar relationship between temporal experience, spatial movement, and the 
sovereign violence of the state occurs in Disgrace. For example, David becomes almost 
painstakingly aware of the innate differences both spatially and temporally between Cape 
Town and the frontier where Lucy lives, and additionally between those who reside in the 
city and those who reside in the country. David observes, “Curious that he and her mother, 
cityfolk, intellectuals, should have produced this throwback, this sturdy young settler.” Later, 
he thinks,“So: a new adventure. His daughter [...] is taking him on an outing, showing him 
life, showing him this other, unfamiliar world” (61, 71). Not only does David view himself 
and his former wife as the opposite of Lucy’s “throwback,” antiquated farmer, which relies 
on a perceived difference in the location of the subjects in question, but he also understands 
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the location itself to belong to either the past or the present world. Another crucial 
consideration this observation brings into relief is the fact that before arriving in this rural 
space, David did not anticipate life itself existing in any conjunction with life in the confines 
of the progressive “intellectual” city. Even though Lucy is his daughter, he finds 
contradictions between them that hinge on her decision to live in the “other” or “unfamiliar” 
world of “throwback” settlers. Ironically, this may inform David’s view of Lucy as the 
reactionary member of their family. Interfacing with Lucy in this particular place destabilizes 
his sense of familial belonging, and moreover, decenters his sense of place and time in 
relation to the country he has lived in his entire life.  
For Judith Butler, the relationship between time, space, and sovereign violence has a 
crucial and undeniable attachment to politics informed by a specific iteration of Eurocentrism 
(and more generally, a specific iteration of hegemonically constructed social relations). In 
Frames of War, Butler begins to discuss her understanding of the structure of sovereign 
violence: “To be protected from violence by the nation-state is to be exposed to the violence 
wielded by the nation-state, so to rely on the nation-state for protection from violence is 
precisely to exchange one potential violence for another” (26). This description aligns with 
the structure of sovereign power explicated by Agamben in Homo Sacer; namely, that the 
sovereign in question wields violence solely in order to maintain its powerful and dominant 
position.  Butler then writes, “The problem, rather, is that certain notions of relevant 19
geopolitical space— including the spatial boundedness of minority communities— are 
circumscribed by this story of a progressive modernity; certainly notions of what ‘this time’ 
 This can be seen particularly in Agamben’s discussion of “Potentiality and Law,” and in his understanding of 19
the sovereign relation of exception in the first volume of Homo Sacer. 
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can and must be are similarly construed on the basis of circumscribing the ‘where’ of its 
happening” (103). The space, and by extension the subjects residing within that space, that 
can be recognized as “relevant,” and therefore as worthy of protection from sovereign 
violence, has an intimate connection with the fiction of progressive modernity and to an 
exclusively linear conception of history built around the development of European powers. 
Spaces considered “outside” of the modern, European progress—such as those spaces we 
refer to as “developing” nations, or the more antiquated term of “third-world” nations—are 
also considered to be “behind,” or to be “backwards.”  Therefore, Butler gives us an 20
important element to consider when thinking through the mechanism of sovereign violence: 
when certain places are considered to diverge from, or to exist outside of, both the time and 
space of the sovereign power in question— whether that sovereign be the Empire in Waiting 
for the Barbarians or the mechanism of Apartheid in Disgrace— the infliction of violence 
draws a crucial element of its justification.  
 If we can use Butler’s understanding of what considerations of time and space have to 
do with the infliction of sovereign violence in particular areas and onto particular people, we 
can begin to see how these dynamics in both of Coetzee’s novels partially lead to the 
protagonists’ fluctuation between almost apprehending the presence of sovereign violence 
and then retreating from that apprehension. In other words, both David Lurie and the 
Magistrate are conditioned to be unaware of the presence of sovereign violence in most every 
aspect of their society, and one of the most important places where their disillusionment with 
 In Butler’s third chapter, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Time,” she notes that this is often how Imperial 20
practice continues in a “post” colonial world: the necessity of humanitarian intervention in order to “rescue” 
certain populations from the dangers of their fellow citizens’ backwards policies and perspectives.   
!91
and encroaching recognition of sovereign violence— on both systemic and individual levels
— can be seen is in their experience of the destabilization of normative time and space.  
 For David, who views Lucy’s frontier town as part of another, more primitive South 
Africa, this destabilization of time and space begins to occur after the Luries’ home invasion: 
“He is helpless, an Aunt Sally, a figure from a cartoon, a missionary in cassock and topi 
waiting with clasped hands and upcast eyes while the savages jaw away in their own lingo 
preparatory to plunging him into their boiling cauldron” (95). In the immediate aftermath of 
his direct exposure to the violence of post-Apartheid South Africa, David experiences 
himself moving backwards, becoming part of the dynamics between the colonizer and the 
colonized before the development of the South African nation-state itself. Crucially, instead 
of this disruption of time forcing him to confront the idea that the dynamics in the post-
Apartheid schema differ from the dynamics of the Apartheid schema in legal terms only, he 
instead concludes that his experience is directly attached to the overall “backwardness” of 
this part of the country. This assumption emerges continually in the rest of the novel when 
David makes observations such as “Country life has always been a matter of neighbours 
scheming against each other, wishing on each other pests, poor crops and financial ruin” and 
“As a woman alone on a farm, she [Lucy] has no future, that is clear” (118, 134). The more 
evidence that accumulates in conflict with David’s understanding of the progression of the 
South African state, and of himself as a white man, the more he doubles-down on his 
pejorative understanding that rural places are the actual source of the violence he witnesses 
and experiences. He frames the violence he encounters as a direct product of the fact that 
Lucy resides in a part of the country that is fundamentally backwards, emblematic of a 
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bygone era of racially motivated prejudice and violence. Lucy pushes back against this 
response from David, and continually attempts to force him to engage with the pervasive 
presence of residual sovereign violence from the Apartheid system. This dynamic can be seen 
in a particularly heated exchange, when David attempts to convince Lucy to abandon her 
home and lifestyle. Lucy tells him,  
“We can’t just pick up where we left off,” 
“Why not?” 
“Because it’s not a good idea. Because it’s not safe.”  
“It was never safe, and it’s not an idea, good or bad.” (105)  
Here, Lucy attempts to force David to consider that what happened to them was not an 
anomaly produced by an inherently archaic countryside. She implies that exchanges of 
violence based on the racial dynamics and discrimination of Apartheid is still a perpetual 
possibility, one that the legal dissolution of Apartheid never actually effaced, but only 
pretened to efface. Here again, Lucy reacts against David’s tendency to extrapolate reality 
into ideas alone—the continuation of her livelihood and position in society it is not merely an 
idea. It simply is.  
Ironically, the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians begins with an observation 
about time that parallels David’s tendency to blur the boundaries between perceivable reality 
and idealistic abstraction: “The space about us here is merely space, no meaner or grander 
than the space above the shacks and tenements and temples and offices of the capital. Space 
is space, life is life, everywhere the same” (18). The Magistrate makes this observation after 
immersing himself in the ruins of a previous civilization residing just outside of the limits of 
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his township. He catches himself waiting for them to yield some sort of essence of what they 
once were, and chides himself for expecting the realm of ideas and reality to suddenly lose 
their differentiation. However, the Magistrate’s initial belief in the agency of the past 
continues to emerge in the first part of the novel: “The new men of Empire are the ones who 
believe in fresh starts, new chapters, clean pages; I struggle on with the old story, hoping that 
before it is finished it will reveal to me why it was that I thought it worth the trouble” (27). 
This is his general attitude toward the past. He believes that examination of the past 
inevitably connects with the progression of the past from the present and the present to the 
future. This understanding of temporality, though somewhat deviant from the unstoppable 
progress and obsession with the future that characterize the Empire’s conception of time, still 
works within a normative, linear understanding of history. At this point in the novel, because 
the Magistrate has not fully begun to apprehend the extent of the sovereign violence 
surrounding him, his conception of time lacks what Butler describes as “the critique of state 
violence and the elaboration of its coercive mechanisms” that may lead to “an alternative 
political framework, one that implies another sense not only of modernity, but also of the 
time, the ‘now,’ in which we live” (110). The observations he makes about the structure of 
time may slightly disrupt the Empire’s emphasis on eternal progression and futurity. 
However, his inability to fully recognize and critique sovereign violence’s pervasiveness 
renders him unable to formulate an understanding of temporal movement that could 
ultimately lead him to an alternative perspective of time that opposes the violence of the 
Empire.  
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David Lurie’s experience of the instability of time only seems to project him into the 
past. The Magistrate’s experience of the instability of time actually dislodges him from the 
categories of past, present, and future entirely. What ultimately serves as the catalyst for this 
destabilization and subsequent removal from the boundaries of normative temporality is his 
relationship with the Barbarian Girl. By examining and interacting with the Girl’s brutalized 
body, the Magistrate experiences a dislocation of himself in relation to the time in which he 
resides. While initially washing the Girl’s legs and broken feet, for example, he observes, “I 
lose myself in the rhythm of what I am doing. I lose awareness of the girl herself. There is a 
space of time which is blank to me: perhaps I am not even present” (32). Here, the Magistrate 
loses his sense of time and place almost completely, but still retains a modicum of awareness 
regarding this disruption. That awareness eventually disappears entirely, when he describes, 
“But more often in the very act of caressing her I am overcome with sleep as if poleaxed, fall 
into oblivion sprawled upon her body, and wake an hour or two later dizzy, confused, thirsty. 
These dreamless spells are like death to me, or enchantment, blank, outside of time” (35, 
added emphasis). Interaction with the Girl’s maimed body produces this destabilizing effect 
on the Magistrate’s relationship with the time and space around him.  
This connection indicates several important considerations that extend to the relations 
between time, space, and sovereign violence. Through washing the Girl’s body, the 
Magistrate attempts to piece together what has happened to her, to find the evidence of what 
the sovereign violence behind Colonel Joll’s Third Bureau has inscribed on her body. For the 
first time, he attempts to fully recognize the extent of the sovereign violence of the Empire 
and therefore comes closer to recognizing the omni-presence of sovereign power in his own 
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life. More significantly still, however, is the fact that this recognition is attempted through 
careful consideration of a body from “so remote a kingdom,” or from a population thought to 
embody the archaic characteristics of humanity that Imperial rule and control brings into the 
unceasing progress of its own futurity. In other words, the Magistrate finds himself dislodged 
from all considerations and movements of time and space when he washes the Barbarian Girl 
because interacting with her forces him to directly confront the pervasive quality of 
sovereign violence, and simultaneously disrupts the narrative espoused by the Empire that 
places itself in the future and the barbarians in the past. In this interaction, the Girl and the 
Magistrate exist in the same time and in the same place, and that, according to the ideologies 
purported by the sovereign imperial power, should be an impossibility.  
As a result of this experience, the Magistrate reifies the violence inflicted on the Girl 
by her torturers; again, she is reduced to her body alone, and the Magistrate cannot interact 
with her as he would with an Imperial subject, or rather, with a living subject that is 
recognizable as such. This becomes especially clear when, after engaging with her in these 
terms for the duration of several weeks, the Magistrate reflects, “I am the same man I always 
was; but time has broken, something has fallen in upon me from the sky, at random, from 
nowhere: this body in my bed, for which I am responsible, or so it seems, otherwise why do I 
keep it?” (49, added emphasis). Linguistically, this reflection indicates the Magistrate’s 
dehumanization of the Girl, and thus his complicity with the sovereign power that began that 
process in the first place. He only begins to confront this complicity when he returns to the 
township and is imprisoned by the same agents of sovereign power that tortured her: 
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Have I truly enjoyed the unbounded freedom of this past year in which more than 
ever before my life has been mine to make up as I go along? For example: my 
freedom to make of the girl whatever I felt like [...] at whim, because I had no duty to 
her save what it occurred to me to feel from moment to moment: from the oppression 
of such freedom who would not welcome the liberation of confinement? (91).  
Here, when forced to not only begin apprehending sovereign violence of the Empire, but also 
to be subjected to it himself, the Magistrate’s understanding of the categories and distinctions 
of freedom and imprisonment under the sovereign rule of the Empire collapse.  
For Butler, when the concept of freedom under sovereign power is interrogated, it is 
“one that is free of the law at the same time that it is coercive; it is an extension of the logic 
that establishes state power— and its mechanisms of violence— as beyond the law” (129). In 
interrogating the freedom that gave him the ability to make the Girl into a symbol of 
whatever he felt toward her, the Magistrate apprehends the connection between that freedom, 
which is only provided to him through the protection of the Empire, and the violence 
perpetrated against those for whom that freedom does not exist. The distinctions between 
freedom and imprisonment come apart— he begins to recognize that the freedom that allows 
him to treat the Girl according to his whims is a direct articulation of the same mechanism of 
sovereign violence that led to her imprisonment and torture.  
In Disgrace, David Lurie comes to a recognition of a similar sort, but it does not 
manifest in an overtly physical way, such as in the case of the Magistrate’s physical 
imprisonment. When speculating about the mentality of his daughter’s rapists, David realizes 
that, “He can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill 
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them with the ghost of himself. The question is, does he have it in him to be the 
woman?” (160). In response to this question, David returns to Cape Town and engages with 
Melanie Isaac’s parents, the student he sexually coerced in the first part of the novel. When 
speaking to her father, David says:  
In my own terms, I am being punished for what happened between myself and your 
daughter. I am sunk into a state of disgrace from which it will not be easy to lift 
myself. It is not a punishment I have refused. I do not murmur against it. On the 
contrary, I am living out from day to day, trying to accept disgrace as my state of 
being. (172) 
David, who is free to reduce Melanie to a sexually violable body, recognizes that his ability 
to do so is a different manifestation of the conditions that allowed his daughter’s rapists to 
reduce her to nothing except a sexually violatable body. Those conditions, which stem from 
the hegemonic structure of patriarchy, collapse David’s ability to differentiate his actions 
from those of Lucy’s rapists. And yet, David’s disgrace is not his alone to bear; the fact that 
he views Lucy’s rape as the method by which to atone for his own violent actions speaks 
directly to the toxic masculine self-centeredness engendered by the patriarchal hegemonic 
system. 
Like the Magistrate, David finds his punishment justified, though the stakes attached 
to David’s punishment differ from the Magistrate’s because David is not physically 
imprisoned or tortured, while the Magistrate is. David’s primarily internalized punishment of 
living in disgrace, then, possibly becomes the reason why he seems unwilling to extend the 
recognition of his complicity in the mechanisms of sovereign violence to his perpetration of 
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violence against Pollux and Petrus. This gestures toward an element of the temporality of 
sovereign violence in both novels addressed in the beginning of this chapter— its eternal 
cycle, its ability to return again and again, even after one believes that return to be 
impossible. This emphasizes the fact that sovereign violence must be understood as a process 
that does not end. This is potentially part of the reason why both the Magistrate and David 
Lurie experience a destabilization of time when they come the closest to fully recognizing the 
extent of sovereign violence. Namely, they experience the instability of time most extremely 
when they approach the possibility of their own complicity in perpetuating sovereign 
violence, and this recognition leads to the paradoxical concept of these men finding freedom 
in their disgrace and imprisonment.   
“‘There has been something staring me in the face, and still I do not see it’”: The 
Mechanism Connected to the Cyclicality of Sovereign Violence in Disgrace and Waiting 
for the Barbarians 
 Two final moments in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace provide ambiguous 
reflections on sovereign violence that gesture toward the final mechanism of violence I will 
examine in this project’s last chapter. Disgrace concludes with an interaction between David 
and Bev Shaw, the woman David has been working with in the animal shelter: “It gets harder 
all the time, Bev Shaw once said. Harder, yet easier too. One gets used to things getting 
harder; one ceases to be surprised that what used to be as hard as hard can be grows harder 
yet” (219). In the context of this conversation, Bev Shaw is speaking to the difficult process 
of killing the numerous stray dogs they harbor in the animal shelter, but the text implies that 
this way of understanding life applies specifically to post-Apartheid South Africa. Namely, 
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though the legality of the sovereign violence of Apartheid has been abolished, it persists in 
the individual dynamics of South African subjects because the hegemonic sovereign ideology 
that informed it remains. In other words, her reflection speaks to the difficulty of imagining 
that even when one iteration of the state of exception is technically suspended in the juridical 
realm, the possibility of its resurgence remains intact because the criteria through which the 
sovereign power constitutes itself (i.e. through the ability to trace a threshold between 
categories of inside/outside, rule/exception) remains embedded within even the individual 
process of establishing collective belonging or non-belonging. 
In the final moments of Waiting for the Barbarians, when the Magistrate reassumes 
his juridical position, he attempts to write a record of what has transpired. However, in light 
of his responsibility as the magistrate, finds himself unable to do so honestly. It is not 
insignificant that it is his role as the magistrate, as the civil officer in charge of administering 
the law, that makes him feel unable to create any records that may undermine the Empire. 
This leads him to engage in a few final reflective moments. He realizes, after thinking more 
seriously about his complicity in the infliction of the Empire’s sovereign violence, that in 
spite of this seemingly full recognition, he still feels unable to explain that violence to 
anyone. He thinks, “‘There has been something staring me in the face, and still I do not see 
it’” (179).  
This something staring the Magistrate in the face is precisely what I will examine in 
the final chapter of this project. The something in question may be connected to what 
continues to make the condition of life harder in Disgrace’s post-Apartheid context— one 
that is fundamentally connected to the perpetuation of sovereign violence. The tensions and 
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interactions between this mechanism and the structural apparatus of sovereignty produces 
nothing other than the infliction of physical pain. It is the process through which certain 
individuals are understood as worthy of protection or persecution: the process of determining 
an individual’s belonging or non-belonging to a collective.     
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Chapter Three 
Ugliness, Bare Life, and the Camp: Comparing the Violence of Citizenship and 
Statelessness in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace 
 The third and final chapter of this thesis project will examine the final mechanism of 
violence in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians: the violence of 
citizenship and statelessness. Both those living inside and outside of the sovereign apparatus 
in both novels find themselves in a vulnerable position— for those categories to emerge at 
all, each included and excluded individual must both directly and indirectly consent to their 
individual, private lives melding with the overarching political interests of the sovereign 
power they live under. The process of the individual’s private life becoming identical with 
their public life is part of the mechanism of biopolitical power.  Biopolitics becomes the 21
necessary component of how categories or belonging or non-belonging emerge in both of 
Coetzee’s novels.  
 Attempting to compare the criteria used to identify belonging and non-belonging in 
Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians requires an understanding of how biopolitical 
power has previously been applied to the violent process of establishing the difference 
between citizenship and statelessness. Using the political theories of Giorgio Agamben and 
Hannah Arendt, I will compare the categories of belonging and non-belonging in each of 
Coetze’s novels, and move toward a more concrete understanding pertaining to the 
relationship between physical violence, sovereign violence, and the violence of belonging or 
 “The new non-disciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to living man, to man-as-living-being; 21
ultimately, to man as species. [...] The new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of 
men [...] to the extent that they form a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, 
death, production, illness, and so on” (Foucault 1442). 
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non-belonging to the sovereign imperial or state apparatus. The physical violence articulated 
through the infliction of sovereign power can only occur once an understanding of the 
difference between those who belong and those who do not belong is reached—in both texts, 
those differences take the form of either statelessness or citizenship.  
 “It occurs to me that we crush insects beneath our feet, miracles of creation too, 
beetles, worms, cockroaches, ants, in their various ways”: Bare Life and Political Life in 
Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace  
 It is crucial to first attempt to understand what makes the difference between 
belonging and non-belonging in each text— how are these categories established, and what 
criteria is sued to support them? Parallel to the question of what is the question of how— how 
are these distinctions made, and on what criteria do they rest? Generally, in both fiction and 
reality, human life, if not all life, carries an assumed, innate, sacred quality. Because of this 
fragility and sanctity, a life that is not recognizable as such defies normative expectations. It 
presents a paradox of a particularly urgent nature— if it can be generally agreed upon that all 
life is worthy of protection because of its value, then how can wide-scale extermination of 
life occur? As Hannah Arendt puts it in “The Decline of the Nation-State and the Ends of the 
Rights of Man” (1951), “No paradox of contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant 
irony than the discrepancy between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who [...] insist on 
regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human rights [...] and the situation of the rightless 
themselves” (279).  
Characters in both Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace echo the anxiety 
surrounding this paradox— they rigidly hold to the innate value of all life, even when their 
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belief in that value opposes the realities they experience. The Magistrate touches on it when 
he speaks what he believes to be his last words when his torturer tells him that he will be 
hanged: “‘I want to say that no one deserves to die. [...] I want to live. As every man wants to 
live. To live and live and live. No matter what’” (137). Though he has witnessed total 
disregard for human life in his frontier town, when confronted with the certainty of his death, 
the Magistrate appeals to the simple fact that because all life wants to live, no life deserves to 
die. In Disgrace, when Bev Shaw and David discuss the process of euthanizing the stray 
dogs in the animal shelter, he offers that potentially, some of the dogs are ready for death. 
She replies, “‘Do you think so?’ she says. ‘I’m not sure. I don’t think we are ready to die, any 
of us, not without being escorted’” (84). Here, even when tasked with deciding whether or 
not the dogs in the shelter should live or die, Bev Shaw clings to the innate belief that 
because life only wants to continue living, it carries inherent value, regardless of whether or 
not that value is normatively recognizable.  
In both situations, then, the innate value of life is not only apprehended, but is 
actually, at moments, recognized by characters in each text. Of course, the distinction 
between human life and non-human life still exists for characters in each text—but the 
certainty of those distinctions unravels as they witness and experience the accelerated 
infliction of violence. In regards to exactly what makes the difference between recognizable 
life and unrecognizable life, the answer, ideally speaking, is nothing. Nothing should make 
the difference between life that is worthy of protection and life that is not. This is precisely 
what certain humanitarian collectives rest their praxis upon— because all life wishes to 
continue living, because most life has an instinct of self-preservation, no life inherently 
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deserves to end. And yet, wide-spread threats to and extermination of life occurs in these 
novels, even by characters that hold this understanding of the universal value of life to be 
true. Therefore, the second question becomes the only question: how is life distinguished as 
either worthy of protection and or unworthy of protection, as universally valuable or not? 
 The answer, for Giorgio Agamben, lies in the ancient distinction between life in 
essence, (zoē), and the form or manner in which life is lived in relation to other life, or life in 
relation to the public, to the political realm (bios). Sovereign power is normatively thought to 
apply only to life in relation to politics, to the public realm. This belief, however, is where the 
paradox between mass execution and universal rights rests. Agamben clarifies that “Contrary 
to our modern habit of representing the political realm in terms of citizens’ rights, free will, 
and social contracts, from the point of view of sovereignty only bare life is authentically 
possible” (106). Bare life refers to ‘real life,’ or the element of life thought to exist beyond 
any relation to any external mechanism (67). Sovereign power pretends to only affect life that 
exists in public, in the political realm, when in reality, the original relation between life and 
sovereign power is bare life, or life in essence. For Agamben, this illusory quality of the 
sovereign relation to bare life can be glimpsed, for example, when examining the Hobbesian 
political model. Instead of preserving the sovereign subjects’ natural rights, the model 
actually only reifies the sovereign’s right to do anything to anyone at any time, which 
corresponds to its right to punish (106). The incorporation of bare life into the political realm 
occurs unilaterally here— the sovereign completely resides over the lives of its subjects 
regardless of their specific relation to the public realm of politics. Therefore, Hobbes’ model 
unintentionally exposes how sovereign power upholds a distinction between political life and 
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bare life while simultaneously effacing that distinction in the very way it relates to the life it 
claims to protect. From that perspective of sovereignty, bare life is the only possible life 
because the distinction between bare life and political life is a false distinction from the 
outset.      
This indicates that in order to think through the process by which universally valuable 
life loses that inherent value, the foundational metaphysical distinction between zoē and bios 
must be exposed as an idealistic belief with no referent in reality. From the position of 
sovereign power, it does not exist, but in order for sovereign power to ensure its own 
perpetual existence, the fiction of that distinction must be in place. Agamben uses the image 
of the werewolf, the individual that metamorphosizes between human and animal, as the 
ideal image to disrupt the supposed division between zoē and bios: “The transformation into 
a werewolf corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during which [...] time the city is 
dissolved and men enter into a zone in which they are no longer distinct from beasts” (107). 
In light of the perpetual quality of the state of exception, explicated in the previous chapter, 
the image of the werewolf serves as a crucial reminder that under sovereign power, every 
individual always resides between human animal and non-human animal, between life that is 
recognized as sacred and life that is not. Those who enjoy the protections afforded by a 
sovereign power who recognizes the value of their life can just as easily find themselves 
removed from the political realm and forced into the vulnerable position of life as such, life 
without recognizable value. The image of the werewolf occurs earlier in an observation made 
by Arendt about the humanitarian groups tasked with the protection of inalienable human 
rights: “The groups they formed, the declarations they issued, showed an uncanny similarity 
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in language and composition to that of societies for the prevention of cruelty to 
animals” (292). The distinction between human and non-human life, on which the foundation 
of supposedly universal human worth rests, proves feeble even in the rhetoric of 
organizations tasking themselves with the fight against mass violence and atrocity. 
The image of the werewolf, which refers to the division between human life and non-
human life (between life worthy or protection and life unworthy of protection) under 
sovereign power, provides a potential explanation for the proliferation of references to and 
comparisons between the human realm and the non-human realm in Coetzee’s novels. In a 
seeming non-sequitur in Waiting for the Barbarians, for example, after the Magistrate has 
publicly protested against the beating of the barbarian prisoners, he thinks: “It occurs to me 
that we crush insects beneath our feet, miracles of creation too, beetles, worms, cockroaches, 
ants, in their various ways” (124). Here, the Magistrate recognizes the instability in believing 
that some life is a miraculous form of creation and some life is not. This recognition 
however, comes only after he has witnessed and participated in the dehumanization of 
barbarians. Early in the text, he describes the ways the frontier town looks in on the yard 
housing the barbarian prisoners: “There are always children with their faces pressed to the 
bars of the gate; and from my window I stare down, invisible behind the glass” (21). Here, 
the population of the frontier town regards the captured barbarian population as one would 
regard the captured inhabitants of any zoo exhibit. They become specimens of spectacle, and 
recognition of their innate human value is absent entirely. Moreover, he later ‘jokes’ with the 
Barbarian Girl that, “‘People will say I keep two wild animals in my rooms, a fox and a girl’” 
(39). In this comparison, diluted through humor, the Magistrate’s offense against the Girl is 
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two-fold; he compares her to the fox he procured for her amusement through drawing 
attention to her gender and to her foreignness. Because the barbarian populations in the novel 
are continually dehumanized, he can connect the Girl and the fox through a notion of an 
inherent ‘wildness,’ or proximity to a state of nature. Moreover, he can easily make this 
comparison due to the disempowered position the Girl occupies— not only is she barbarian, 
but she is also a woman, and can therefore more easily be compared to non-human life than 
human life identified in the criteria of a hegemonically patriarchal society. Moreover, the 
Magistrate unwittingly furthers her dehumanized state by how he justifies holding her captive 
in his rooms—in his mind, he keeps her with him in order to spare her from the cruelties of 
the townsfolk and the harshness of the winter. He tells her, “Winter is almost here. You must 
have somewhere to live. Otherwise you must go back to your own people” (30). This rhetoric 
comes from an attitude of preservation— as Arendt noticed about human rights advocates, 
the Magistrate’s language actually more so mirrors that of groups dedicated to the 
preservation of non-human lives and habitats. In these moments, the lines between human 
life, or sacred life worthy of protection, and non-human life, or life unworthy of protection, 
vulnerable to complete objectification and violence, become indistinguishable.   
In Disgrace, erosion of differences between human and non-human life plays out 
most overtly in David Lurie’s observation and understanding of the narrative’s non-human 
lives. In the beginning of the novel, David tells Lucy, “As for animals, by all means let us be 
kind to them. But let us not lose perspective. We are of a different order of creation from the 
animals [...] So if we are going to be kind, let it be out of simple generosity, not because we 
feel guilty” (74). For David, protecting non-human life, at this point, is not an ethical duty 
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that serves to protect the universal value of all life as such, but a mere moral choice.  His 22
ideas shift when he meets two sheep Petrus means to slaughter to feed his guests during the 
celebration of his acquisition of land: “‘I’m not sure I like the way he does things— bringing 
the slaughter-beasts home to acquaint them with the people who are going to eat 
them.’” (124). He admits to Lucy that he would prefer the process remain hidden, confined to 
the abstracted, cloistered space of the slaughterhouse. She replies, “‘Wake up, David. This is 
the country. This is Africa.’” (124). Here, Lucy Lurie emerges as a character who, especially 
because of her gender, sexuality, and the particular violence of rape she experienced because 
of them, recognizes that the difference between violence perpetrated against humans and 
non-humans amounts to an idea alone. By telling David to “wake up,” she points out the 
absurdity in attempting to obscure violence that surrounds them all the time. She tells David 
that his wish to maintain that barrier between violence he sees and violence he does not need 
to see has no impact on whether or not that violence occurs. She exposes the hypocrisy in 
David’s understanding of human and non-human life not to create or reify a hierarchy of 
value, but instead to subtly advocate for the protection of all forms of life.  David, on the 
other hand, uses Lucy’s violation to extend the comparison between human and non-human 
life that eventually serves to justify his feelings of prejudice and violence against the black 
South African individuals in the novel.  
After returning to Lucy’s home and discovering her pregnancy, David reflects that his 
daughter’s rapists were “Not raping, they were mating. It was not the pleasure principle that 
ran the show but the testicles, sacs bulging with seed aching to perfect itself [...] What kind of 
 I am working within a normative understanding that ethical duties refer to external systems, while moral 22
choices refer to internal decisions. 
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child can seed like that give life to, seed driven into the woman not in love but in hatred [...] 
meant to soil her, mark her, like a dog’s urine?” (199). David uses a harrowing comparison 
between human and non-human life and perhaps unintentionally reifies an already extant 
understanding that black South Africans are inherently closer to nature because of the color 
of their skin— that black individuals are closer to non-human, bestial life than human life. 
Though perhaps unaware of the racist attitude expressed through this comparison, in this 
moment David still demonstrates the ease with which a seemingly progressive individual 
falls into attitudes of racism in the South African context. In so doing, he doubles down on an 
understanding of life that makes a marked difference between human and non-human life, 
between bare life and political life, between life that needs protection and life that is exempt 
from it. Moreover, Lucy’s pregnancy, only made possible through her sexual violation, can 
only serve to underscore the ‘inhuman’ method of its conception. Her rapists, instead of 
violating her body and forcibly penetrating her (a demonstration of the power elicited by 
gendered inequality) mark her, urinate on her. David understands her decision to carry the 
pregnancy to full-term, to raise the child growing inside of her, not as a further articulation of 
Lucy’s commitment to protect and value all life, but only as the last element needed to 
complete her disgrace. Lucy commits to protecting life in practice; David commits to 
protecting life in theory. Their divergent attitudes and understandings about the relationship 
between human and non-human life cements this.     
The difference between human and non-human life, in consideration of literal human 
and non-human presences in both novels, becomes a flimsy idea at best. The point recalls 
Agamben’s understanding of how the werewolf exposes the status of all life under sovereign 
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power; life under sovereign power means that shifting between human and non-human status 
occurs continually and can occur without reference to any ontologically certifiable 
distinction, though there are certain identities (either through racial or gendered distinction) 
that are more easily violated because they are considered closer to non-human 
(disempowered) life.  The repetitive references to non-human life throughout Coetzee’s 
novels, both in literal and comparative terms, underscores Agamben’s assertion that “The 
state of nature is, in truth, a state of exception [...] The foundation is thus not an event 
achieved once and for all but is continually operative in the civil state in the form of the 
sovereign decision [...] the latter refers immediately to the life [...] of the citizens, which thus 
appears as the originary political element” (109). Bare life has actually never been excluded 
from the political realm of sovereign power— in fact, bare life has always already been 
fundamentally a part of political function.  
This understanding echoes in the Magistrate’s answer to his own question about what 
bars humans from living as non-humans do: “It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the 
time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of 
the cycle of the seasons, but in the jagged time of rise and fall, beginning and end, of 
catastrophe” (153-154). The answer the Magistrate provides here echoes Arendt’s 
observation that, “Historical rights were replaced by natural rights, ‘nature’ took the place of 
history, and it was tacitly assumed that nature was less alien than history to the essence of 
man’” (298). In other words, the sovereign apparatus intentionally curates the distinction 
between nature and culture, and does so in order to create a hierarchy of life that claims 
certain lives belong more to one category than the other. Lives that are perceived to be closer 
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to nature rather than culture, then, become lives that contain less value. Sovereign power 
legitimizes and even requires the illusion of difference between bare life and political life, 
between nature and culture, while simultaneously using the guise of that difference for its 
own benefit.    
This transformation occurs most overtly in the establishment of belonging or non-
belonging to the sovereign power in question, a process that uses the criteria of citizenship or 
statelessness. 
“So that is it. No more lies. My people. As naked of an answer as he could wish”: 
Ugliness and the Criteria of Belonging in Disgrace and Waiting for the Barbarians 
 In Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace, the status of citizenship or subjecthood 
differs because the implementation of these criteria are at different points in the process of 
distinction. In Waiting for the Barbarians, that designation occurs in an imperial context, and 
its violent implications are just beginning to be realized. This point in the process seems to 
mirror the very beginnings of the emergence of the category of citizen from the category of 
subject. According to both Arendt and Agamben, the decaying authority of the Christian 
Church initiated the necessity for sovereign power to draw alternative justification for the 
continuation of its power, and more crucially, its violence. Arendt articulates that the rise of 
the nation, and thus the category of the citizen, is “inevitable once the absolute and 
transcendent measurements of religion or the law of nature have lost their authority” (299). 
For Agamben, using the Hobbseian metaphor of the leviathan being formed out of the bodies 
of all individual subjects, modern sovereign power, which emerges after the Church loses 
some of its efficacy, covertly demonstrates for the first time the fact that its original referent 
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is nothing besides the bare life of those living under it. Agamben sketches this process 
through delineating that 
Declarations of rights must therefore be viewed as the place in which the passage 
from divinely authorized royal sovereignty to national sovereignty is accomplished 
[...] The fact that in this process the ‘subject’ is, as has been noted, transformed into a 
‘citizen’ means that birth— which is to say, bare natural life as such— here for the 
first time becomes [...] the immediate bearer of sovereignty (128). 
In other words, the transition from the subject to the citizen exposes that sovereign power 
equates citizenship with birth, and for the first time demonstrates the connection between 
sovereign power and bare life. In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Empire has yet to 
completely take on the characteristics normatively associated with that of a modern nation 
state— they still identify themselves as subjects of the Empire, not as citizens of a nation-
state. However, the transition from subject to citizen unfolds in the dynamics between the 
rightless barbarian prisoners and refugees in the novel and the residents who were born 
within the borders of the Empire.  
 In an early conversation between the Magistrate and a high-ranking military official, 
these dynamics can initially be glimpsed. In response to the officer’s descriptions of the overt 
aggression of the barbarians, the Magistrate counters, “‘How do you eradicate contempt, 
especially when that contempt is founded on nothing more substantial than differences in 
table manners, variations in the structure of the eyelid?’” (58). The officer answers, “‘Even if 
it became necessary to supply the settlement by convoy, we would not go. Because these 
border settlements are the first line of defence of the Empire’” (59). The baseless contempt 
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the Magistrate describes here is the very instrument through which the sovereign power of 
the Empire works to achieve the perpetuation of its power. Through delineating the alleged 
inherent differences between the imperial subjects and the barbarians, the sovereignty of the 
Empire solidifies its power over both those belonging to it and those outside of its borders.  
This dynamic between the subjects of the Empire and the barbarian merchants 
resembles those between the citizen and the stateless individual in Arendt’s understanding. 
After explaining how the rights of citizenship rely on natural belonging, which in itself relies 
on shared ethnic or racial origin, she writes, “The reason why highly developed political 
communities [...] so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as 
possible those natural and always present differences and differentiates [...] because they 
indicate all too clearly those spheres where men cannot act and change at will” (301). The 
Empire draws its power from bolstering belief in its absolute ability to control every aspect 
of life— it is from this understanding that it legitimates its violence as a form of protection. 
The contempt felt by the residents of the frontier town toward the stateless barbarian 
populations is an intentional strategy introduced and maintained by the sovereign power of 
the Empire. Any camaraderie between the subjects of the Empire and the barbarians 
represents a threat to the complete control and domination of the Empire because it allows 
for the possibility of that the subjects and the barbarians could recognize their shared 
oppression by the sovereign power of the Empire. That possibility, which would come from 
alliances between the imperial subjects of the township and the stateless barbarian 
individuals, must be worked against by intentionally and directly disseminating feelings of 
contempt based on otherness.  
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In working to achieve that contempt with no basis in behavior or fact, the Empire 
successfully defines those who do not belong, and simultaneously instrumentalizes its 
subjects as the very means through which it articulates its violence. This dynamic occurs in 
Waiting for the Barbarians through the perpetual rumors floating around the township 
pertaining to the barbarians, which are illustrated overtly in the first pages of the text: “There 
is no woman living along the frontier who has not dreamed of a dark barbarian hand coming 
from under the bed to grip her ankle, no man who has not frightened himself with visions of 
the barbarians carousing in his home [...] setting fire to the curtains, raping his 
daughters” (9). Arendt understands the condition of the rightless as one in which, “Privileges 
in some cases, injustices in most, blessings and doom are meted out to them according to 
accident and without any relation to what they do, did, or may do” (296). Supposedly 
essential non-belonging becomes all the justification necessary to subject an individual to the 
violence of the sovereign— that understanding occurs without reference to any individual 
action that actually transgresses sovereign law. Though there are no specific instances of 
barbarians perpetrating violence in any form, the town’s inhabitants attribute every crime that 
occurs to the barbarians.  In giving an account of a young girl who has been raped, the 
Magistrate notices, “Her friends claim a barbarian did it. They saw him running away into the 
reeds. They recognized him as a barbarian by his ugliness” (142). Though no one aside from 
the girl witnesses this moment of violence, her story is appropriated to reify the panic 
surrounding the imminent barbarian invasion. The only indication that her rapist was 
necessarily a barbarian is his apparent “ugliness,” a trait which is continually ascribed to 
barbarians specifically, though can easily be seen manifesting in imperial subjects and 
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officers alike. Beliefs like this ultimately lead to the townsfolk participating in inflicting 
physical violence against the barbarian prisoners.  
The inherent ugliness of the barbarians in the minds of the residents of the Empire 
comes through most poignantly in the Magistrate himself, as he lies next to a sex worker who 
is also a subject of the Empire. When thinking of the Barbarian Girl in this moment, of the 
woman he has spent weeks sleeping next to, whose inaccessible body and mind he has spent 
countless hours obsessing over, he finally remarks, “How ugly, I say to myself. My mouth 
forms the ugly word. I am surprised by it but I do not resist: she is ugly, ugly” (53). Even in 
the most intimate relations, this didactic conception of barbarian otherness and subsequent 
ugliness comes through. The dynamics between subjects of the Empire and the barbarian 
populations they equally fear and loathe rests on a highly specific understanding of belonging 
and non-belonging, of similarity and difference based only on the difference between where 
certain individuals are born. It penetrates even the most personal of individual relationships.  
Those divisions between belonging and non-belonging rest on the connection 
between birth and citizenship described by Agamben as the criteria used most extremely by 
Nazism’s ideology of “blood and soil.” He writes that they are “the concise expression of the 
two criteria that, already in Roman law, served to identify citizenship (that is, the primary 
inscription of life in the state order): ius soli (birth in a certain territory) and ius sanguinis 
(birth from citizen parents)” (129). In light of where they are born, the residents of the 
frontier town become the bearers of the sovereign power of the Empire instead of any other 
higher authority, and can thus be understood as burgeoning citizens of a fledgling nation. 
This formulation of citizenship can be seen in a more developed, and therefore more covert 
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capacity when the question of belonging or non-belonging is framed in the context of the 
nation-state of South Africa in Disgrace.    
In “Race and Bureaucracy,” Hannah Arendt examines the development of the South 
African national schema up until the mid-twentieth century.  She maps the colonization of 23
the native population residing in South Africa by the Boers, and later the British, in the 
nineteenth century. In this colonial schema, black South African colonial subjects, based on 
nothing besides the color of their skin, a characteristic which indicated their inherent 
difference from their white colonizers, were subverted in spite of the fact that the white Boers 
were also (though differently) oppressed by English occupiers (206). What Arendt draws 
attention to here is the fact that the South African colonial formation represents one of the 
first modern examples of innate foreignness, or non-belonging, being used to legitimize 
unilateral disempowerment. She then connects the example of South Africa to the eventual 
rise of Nazism in Germany “When the European mob discovered what a ‘lovely virtue’ a 
white skin could be in Africa [...] the stage seemed to be set for all possible horrors. Lying 
under anybody’s nose were many of the elements which gathered together could create a 
totalitarian government on the basis of racism” (221). The non-belonging attributed to black 
populations in colonial South Africa, based only on racial difference, preempted the same 
hierarchy that occurred in Europe during World War Two, which led to the most deliberate 
 It must be noted that although Arendt’s use of primary resources appears legitimate, the language she uses to 23
discuss racial relations in South Africa often (if unintentionally) reinforces the racist ideologies she seeks to 
uncover. I use her observation at this juncture only because of how she connects the racial hierarchy established 
in colonial South Africa to the development of violent totalitarian regimes. 
!117
and prolific recorded extermination of human life in the past century.  Writing in 1951, 24
Arendt examines a colonial history that would lead South Africa to implement the system of 
Apartheid, the system which differentiated between citizens with complete rights and citizens 
with only certain rights based on race, only three years before. 
The Apartheid system worked precisely through connecting civil rights with national 
rights, which are understood to imply a belonging to the same origin based on racial and 
ethnic similarities. When articulating the place of naturalized citizens in Europe between the 
world wars, Arendt writes that “the difference between a naturalized citizen and a stateless 
resident was not great enough [...] the former being frequently deprived of important civil 
rights and threatened at any moment with the fate of the latter” (285). In the context of 
Disgrace, black South African populations can be understood as akin to the naturalized 
citizens Arendt describes. Black South Africans, though technically now sharing the same 
place in society as native white citizens, are still regarded differently, and do not enjoy any 
claims of inherent belonging. Instead, their full rights have to be given to them in spite of the 
color of their skin, as opposed to white South Africans, who for generations have possessed 
those rights simply by merit of being born white. When they are marked as such, Arendt 
writes, the nation-state doubles down on the equation of human rights and civil rights, and 
those civil rights are only afforded to those belonging to the same racial or ethnic origin 
(275).  
 It should not go without saying, however, that European colonial enterprises in Africa in all likelihood 24
produced numerous genocides that exceeded the Holocaust. The difference, of course, resides in the presence or 
absence of reliable record-keeping, which in itself means that the lives of the white Jewish populations in 
Europe were, harrowingly, already understood as more valuable than any colonial population of color. 
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Arendt and Agamben both describe that citizenship in Europe at the time is equated 
with being born in that country, but also that the formula between birth and nation rests on 
categorization and subsequent hierarchization along racial lines. This status of black South 
African citizens inspires multiple moments of anxiety for the characters in Disgrace. In a 
conversation between David and Lucy, David remarks, “‘If they had been white you 
wouldn’t talk about them in this way [...] If they had been white thugs from Despatch, for 
instance’” (159). Here, David indicates his disapproval that the identity of his daughter’s 
perpetrators seems to allow them leniency in the new social order of South Africa. Because 
of their newly granted rights, he finds further justification for resenting them because the new 
social schema of their country demands that the racial legacy of Apartheid into consideration. 
David takes issue with the fact that Lucy, and by extension other South Africans, would think 
of her violation in different terms if her rapists had been white. It indirectly exposes the white 
fragility that the dissolution of Apartheid partially brings into relief— if the system itself has 
ended, white folks like David would like racial distinction to end as well. In his mind, the end 
of Apartheid should signal the end of racial discrimination or preference— white perpetrators 
should be treated the same as black perpetrators. However, because legal consideration has 
been historically based on racial and ethnic origin in South Africa, those distinctions are not 
easily unmade, and race necessarily plays a large part in how the legal system addresses 
individuals who commit crimes of any sort.   
The narrative of Disgrace unfolds once that attempt to maintain a legal connection 
between human rights and national rights (drawn along racial differences) seems to fail, and 
has resulted in the dissolution of the Apartheid system. Theoretically, post-Apartheid, all 
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South African civil rights are granted to all of its citizens, regardless of racial difference or 
ethnic origin, and therefore, all lives of South African citizens have equal value. Coetzee’s 
text, however, opposes the assumption that the violence of Apartheid can be undone through 
its formal dissolution, and satirizes art that conveys this in Disgrace’s first pages. While 
watching a performance about the reality of contemporary South Africa, David Lurie begins 
to analyze it: “Patter passes among the three of them [the characters]: jokes, insults. Catharsis 
seems to be the presiding principle: all the coarse old prejudices brought into the light of day 
and washed away in gales of laughter” (23). As the violence in the rest of the novel indicates, 
the possibility of laughing away the legacy of Apartheid, of perceiving the end of its violence 
in the end of its legality, proves to be only artiface— perhaps this is why the text 
intentionally uses the genre of the play to communicate this.  Disgrace centers on the 25
shifting dynamics and violence in a nation-state that has granted full rights to all of its 
citizens, and yet the prejudices that led to the allocation of civil rights to white citizens alone 
continue to permeate the national consciousness.  
The novel indicates how categories of citizenship function as a means to name what 
Agamben describes as “the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty, and 
therefore, literally identifies [...] les membres du souverain, ‘the members of the sovereign.’ 
Hence the centrality (and the ambiguity) of the notion of ‘citizenship’ in modern political 
thought” (129). In the context of South Africa, the members of the sovereign, those initially 
 To clarify, it seems intentional that Coetzee uses the vehicle of drama— the actors on stage literally play at 25
the kind of cathartic humor meant to dissolve the violence of Apartheid racial dynamics while individuals 
affected by that violence watch and seem unconvinced. If we consider drama as the literary genre that demands 
a complete suspension of disbelief, the fact that this play fails to elicit that in its audience comes down to how it 
presents Apartheid dynamics. 
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granted the rights and protections of citizenship before the dissolution of legalized Apartheid, 
are those who belong to the original sovereign colonial power of Europe— white individuals. 
Black individuals, who only recently received the full status of citizenship in the eyes of the 
law, and can thereby be thought of as naturalized citizens, are closer to their previous status 
of rightlessness than to the positions occupied by their white counterparts. Ironically, and 
crucially, the citizens being treated as naturalized citizens are descendants of the original 
indigenous residents, while citizens who claim birthright are descendants of European 
colonizers.  This tenuous relationship between the status of rightlessness and the status of 26
naturalized citizenship occurs due to the fact that both positions can never lay claim to an 
origin which would, in effect, prove their belonging to a sovereign power that equates human 
rights with ethnic homogeneity.  
Thus the violent dynamics in the novel still predicate on the racial difference that 
amounted to certain civil rights belonging only to the white population of the nation. For 
example, David wonders, “Against this new Petrus what chance does Lucy stand? Petrus 
arrived as the dig-man, the carry-man, the water-man. Now he is too busy for that kind of 
thing” (151). Here, David acknowledges Petrus’ changing status in regard to his economic 
mobility— now that he has been granted full civil rights, opportunities are now afforded to 
him which would have been impossible without them. However, David apprehends this with 
an overt sense of regret; he dwells on Petrus’ newfound equality with a sense of loss. This 
feeling comes up again when he reflects, “Once [Petrus] was a boy, now he is no longer. Now 
he can play at being one, as Marie Antoinette could play at being a milkmaid” (152). Here, 
 An illogical relation that, of course, mirrors the situation in modern-day Israel. 26
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the text indicates the fundamental flaw in beliving the inequalities and violence of Apartheid 
to have ended in post-Apartheid South Africa; in David’s eyes, as a white South African 
citizen and therefore as an original member of the population the sovereign power of the state 
protects and deems valuable, Petrus’ new mobility does not indicate that he (and by 
extension, other black South Africans) had the capacity to so in the first place. Instead, it 
points to the fact that the new political system of his country accomplishes little to efface the 
stringent division between those who belong and those who do not— it operates instead only 
as ‘official’ granting of equal humanity. The racism that informs David’s assumptions and 
observations has only been subverted in the most technical sense.  
In describing the operation of National Socialist divisions in twentieth century 
Germany, Agamben identifies a crucial method through which to read the role of citizenship 
in Disgrace: “The judge, the civil servant [...] no longer orients himself according to a rule or 
a situation of fact. Binding himself solely to his own community of race [...] such a person 
moves in a zone in which the distinction between life and politics, between questions of fact 
and questions of law, has literally no more meaning” (172). When civil rights are granted 
according to only perceived difference or non-belonging, the alleged relation between fact 
and law has little effect.  Disgrace demonstrates that this racially motivated violence carries 27
over even once Apartheid has officially been overturned. This can most clearly be seen in one 
interaction between David and Lucy, when David again pleads with her to disclose the 
identity of Pollux to the state police. He asks her, “Why should I be sensible? Really, Lucy, 
from beginning to end I fail to understand. I fail to understand why you did not lay real 
 That relation, of course, is the assumption that law responds only to facts, to real transgressions, and not to 27
assumptions or prejudices. 
!122
charges against them, and now I fail to understand why you are protecting Petrus. Petrus is 
not an innocent party. Petrus is with them” (133). Here, David connects law with assumption, 
not fact, and uses Petrus’ ambiguous connection to Lucy’s rapists as justification for the 
perpetuation of violence against him in the form of police involvement. Lucy recognizes this 
fallacy, and the prejudice that informs it, and retaliates: “As for Petrus, he is not some hired 
labourer whom I can sack because in my opinion he is mixed up with the wrong people. [...] 
If you want to antagonize Petrus, you had better be sure of your facts first” (133). Though she 
and David both occupy the privileged status of white South African citizens, and therefore, as 
the beneficiaries of the sovereign colonial power that established the nation in the first place, 
the differences between them make it possible for her to perceive the errors in his thinking. 
Lucy belongs to a generation that primarily witnessed the end of Apartheid, and therefore 
must adjust to the social changes that occur after its abolition. Her gender, moreover, places 
her in a social position that is caught between the privilege her whiteness affords her and the 
disempowerment her gender elicits. Her body, which is continually used by David as a site 
on which the political dynamics of the novel occur, figure her as disempowered by the same 
sovereignty that grants her power based on the color of her skin. Of course, as a white 
woman, Lucy still has the capacity to harbor racial prejudice and behave in a racist capacity. 
However, she seems able to recognize that the same hegemonic social constructions that have 
completely disempowered black South Africans also partially disempower her.     28
 This partial disempowerment, of course, also comes into play when consideration of Lucy’s sexuality is 28
foregrounded—though a complete consideration of her sexuality would benefit this analysis enormously, 
constructing a thorough interpretation of its impact lies outside the current scope of this project. 
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One of the last moments in the novel that indicate the sense of belonging or non-
belonging used in Apartheid still exists occurs in a final encounter between David and Petrus. 
Upon returning to the South African country after a brief stint in Capetown, David discusses 
the future of Lucy’s land with Petrus, who directly offers to marry Lucy in order to protect 
her from the violence she experienced previously. Reacting to the fact that Petrus already has 
not one, but two wives, David replies, “‘This is not something I want to hear. This is not how 
we do things.’ We: he is on the point of saying, We Westerners” (202). Even if he does not 
articulate this thought directly to Petrus, the implication is palpable. Polygamy, even if only 
offered to protect David’s child and grandchild, disgusts him because it seems so adverse to 
the normative customs of the white South African culture he resides in— the thought 
indicates Petrus’ inherent otherness and non-belonging to that culture, and therefore 
underscores the foreign quality that gave European powers justification to sytemically 
oppress and dominate the black populations of the South African colony. Important to note, 
of course, is that Petrus still behaves in a way that we should consider misogynistic. Though 
the color of his skin has rendered him less powerful than any white person, the privilege his 
gender still manages to afford him manifests in moments like this, where he is demonstrably 
sexist. This division occurs slightly earlier in the conversation as well, when Petrus discusses 
Pollux with David and says, “‘He [Pollux] is a child. He is my family, my people.’” Upon 
hearing this designation, David thinks, “So that is it. No more lies. My people. As naked of 
an answer as he could wish. Well, Lucy is his people” (201). The colonial divisions between 
belonging and non-belonging echo in this interaction— in spite of whatever civil or legal 
status the abolition of Apartheid provides for Petrus and for the rest of the black South 
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African population, David still extrapolates Pollux’s violent behavior to Petrus’ people as a 
whole. Accordingly, he justifies the physical violence he inflicts on Pollux because Lucy 
belongs to his people. 
The relationship between citizenship and statelessness can be glimpsed at different 
intervals when Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace are compared. A more overt 
similarity between the novels pertaining to a criterium of belonging or non-belonging, 
through inclusion or exclusion, occurs however, when consideration of Agamben and 
Arendt’s description of the paradoxical status of rightless individuals and their location in the 
political realm is foregrounded.  
“To have them dig, with their last strength, a pit large enough for all of them to lie in, 
and leaving them buried there forever and forever”: The Camp in Waiting for the 
Barbarians and Disgrace 
 Both Arendt and Agamben use the example of the refugee to outline precisely what 
the dimensions of the paradoxical status of rightless individual looks like—a paradox 
stemming from the equation of human rights with national rights. Arendt uses the example of 
survivors of the extermination camps in the Second World War to describe how 
The conception of human rights [...] broke down at the very moment when those who 
professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had 
indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships— except that they were 
human. [...] The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being 
human. (299)  
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In other words, even those individuals who professed to believe in the absolute certainty of 
universal human value found themselves unable to apply that value to the masses of stateless, 
and therefore rightless, individuals pouring into their countries after the Holocaust. Instead, 
these populations only merited consideration in the form of resentment, or total abjection. 
They completely lost their essential value once that value became the only relation they 
possessed.  
Agamben also uses the status of the refugee to remark about how this position 
signifies the fictional understanding that in modernity, human rights can be separated from 
national rights, or that private life can be distinguished from public life. He states, “If 
refugees [...] represent such a disquieting element in the order of the modern nation-state, this 
is above all because [...] they can put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis by 
[...] causing the secret presupposition of the public domain— bare life— to appear for an 
instant within that domain” (131). Here, Agamben asserts that the figure of the refugee, the 
stateless or “displaced” person, breaks the fiction purported by sovereign power. That fiction, 
again, is the idea that sovereign power only applies to the public lives of those living under it
— the refugee, precisely because of their rightless status, demonstrates how sovereign power 
impacts bare life even though it pretends to only apply to public, political life. In other 
words, he expands on Arendt’s description of refugees though specifying that refugees can be 
thought of as individuals who reside in a permanent state of exception. Refugees, outside of 
the borders of their nation, find themselves stripped of national rights, and therefore, of their 
human rights in general. They exist as examples of bare life, and reveal precisely how bare 
life, even though it is thought to be excluded from the public political realm, is included 
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within it. The state of exception, as delineated in the previous chapter, is the situation that 
results from the suspension of the normative juridical process—the rule of the juridical order 
suspends its own normative proceedings, which creates the exception and thereby creates the 
rule only through that exception. In the case of the refugee, an exception is created, but 
following Agamben’s formula, the exception it is still included because the rule constitutes 
itself as a rule through the exception.  
After discussing the figure of the refugee as the individual who resides in a permanent 
state of exception, Agamben defines the camp as what the location of the pure state of 
exception looks like. This space is “opened when the state of exception begins to become the 
rule. In the camp, the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the 
rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger, is now given a permanent spatial 
arrangement, which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order” (169). The camp 
emerges as the location of what would normatively be unlocalizable—it can only be created 
when the temporary element of the state of suspension ceases to become temporary and 
becomes permanent. The camp “is thus the structure in which the state of exception [...] is 
realized normally” (170). The state of exception becomes the rule once it is given a 
permanent location, and yet that location still does not fall under the normal juridical order. 
This of course indicates that within the space of the camp, the normal rights and protections 
afforded to those living under the consideration of the sovereign power do not apply. As the 
pure space of exception, the camp in fact becomes the location of the paradox between the 
supposedly sacred, universal value of human life, and the existence of violent processes of 
mass-execution. When residing in the space of exception, an individual ceases to possess any 
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civil or human rights that would differentiate their private, bare life from their public, 
political life. These understandings of the camp and the stateless— and therefore rightless— 
populations residing within it come into full relief when applied to Waiting for the 
Barbarians and Disgrace.      
  In Waiting for the Barbarians, the space of the camp comes into being once the first 
wave of barbarian prisoners are ushered into the open yard of the town’s barracks: “We stand 
watching them eat as though they are strange animals [...] ‘Let them stay in the yard,’ I tell 
the guards. ‘It will be inconvenient for us, but there is nowhere else’” (20). Pushed together 
in a space meant only for their containment, the barbarian prisoners are then subjected to a 
period of cyclical “interrogations,” during which they are tortured by members of the Third 
Bureau of the Empire. They are understood by the townsfolk as individuals who exist in the 
same realm as animal life— they are not considered to be part of the political realm, which 
would bestow the rights and privileges afforded to them under the juridical process. 
However, precisely in light of their exclusion from the political realm, they still find 
themselves included within it, or subjected to the full might of sovereign violence, which is 
articulated in the military apparatus of the Empire through the infliction of physical torture.  
At first, most residents of the frontier town find the barbarians to be harmless, and 
even worthy of pity. However, the longer they reside in the barrack yard, “all together, we 
lose sympathy for them. The filth, the smell, the noise of their quarrelling and coughing 
becomes too much” (22). Here, because the prisoners reside in a space that marks their 
exceptional status, included through their exclusion in the juridical schema of the Empire, 
their bare life ceases to become considered valuable, and therefore worthy of protection and 
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sympathy. Instead, as Arendt puts it, “If a tribal or other ‘backward’ community did not enjoy 
human rights, it was obviously because as a whole it had not yet reached that stage of 
civilization, the stage of popular and national sovereignty” (291). The barbarian prisoners are 
not considered to belong within the folds of the juridical imperial realm, and this lack of 
consideration stems from their very identity as barbarians— as backwards, foreign savages 
understood to be relics from a bygone era. It never occurs to the constituents of the Empire 
that the prisoners in the yard do not have access to the provisions that would allow them to 
clean themselves, or engage themselves in any activity besides waiting for their eventual turn 
in the torture chamber.  
This dynamic between individuals thought to naturally belong to a lower order of life
— to the category of bare life— and the space of the camp as the location of the pure state of 
exception is also depicted in Disgrace, though in a less overt capacity. The first wave of 
barbarian prisoners in Waiting for the Barbarians illustrate more obviously, perhaps, the 
emergence of the camp as the space in which the pure state of exception becomes permanent, 
becomes the rule. In Disgrace, any iteration of the camp is significantly more secret, and 
therefore, potentially more insidious. This correlates with Agamben’s understanding that in 
modernity, the paradigm of political life, has ceased to be the city (or the polis) and has 
instead become the camp itself: 
The state of exception, which was essentially a temporary suspension of the juridico-
political order, now becomes a new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by the 
bare life that more and more can no longer be inscribed in that order. The growing 
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dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state is the new fact of politics in our 
day, and what we call camp is this disjunction. (175)   
In modern political organization, then, the disparity between bare life and political life, which 
relies on the dissociation between bare life and the nation-state, is understood to be more 
severe than ever. In reality, however, at no other point in time has bare life been so 
completely ingrained in political life. In classical political thought, the city is the center of 
political life precisely because it signifies the division between bare life and public, political 
life. The camp, which exists perpetually in this modern political schema, indicates the 
illusory quality of this supposed division most acutely. For Agamben, “The camp as 
dislocating localization is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it 
is this structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses into the 
zones d’attentes [holding areas] of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities” (176, 
added emphasis). In other words, the camp still exists in a tangible way outside of the context 
of refugee camps or even the extermination camps first instituted in Europe during the 
Second World War.  
This new center of political life can be glimpsed in Disgrace, when the three black 
South African home invaders work their way into the Lurie’s home by asking to use their 
phone because a woman in their community is in labor. David and Lucy, after establishing 
the name of this community, “Exchange glances. Erasmuskraal, inside the forest concession, 
is a hamlet with no electricity, no telephone. The story makes sense” (92-93). This hamlet, 
residing on the outskirts of even the rural town Lucy and David live in, functionally takes on 
the status of the space of the camp in Agamben’s terms. These men belong to a 
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homogenously black South African community that in spite of the dissolution the Apartheid 
system, still does not receive the basic utilities the state should provide to all of its citizens. 
In this capacity, Erasmuskraal subtly signifies a space in which the permanent state of 
exception reveals itself in a nation that believes it has restored equitable human rights to all 
of its legal residents. This hamlet can be seen as excluded from consideration of the 
sovereign nation-state of South Africa even through something as seemingly innocuous as 
insufficient technological or infrastructural connection to the rest of the country. In that 
capacity, this community completely lacks accessibility to the country outside of itself, but is 
still considered to belong to that country. It is included through its exclusion, and the 
population living within it signify the fact that the sense of belonging or non-belonging that 
originally instituted Apartheid has not actually been dissolved in practice, but only in 
theoretical terms. Disgrace, in this sense, illustrates the permanence of this violence of 
inclusion or exclusion in the normative juridical proceeding of the sovereign nation-state, in 
spite of the attempt to undo or correct the violence of the Apartheid system. Those living 
within it, perhaps because of their lack of access to modern technologies, are assumed to 
exist closer to the realm of bare life, and their standard of living is allowed to continue, 
cementing the permanent quality of the camp Agamben describes.   
The transition of the camp as the paradigm of modern political life occurs in Waiting 
for the Barbarians as well, when the town is confronted with the formation of a permanent 
refugee settlement at its border. When an entire community of river people flee to the frontier 
town, the town’s residents, at first, allow them to seek shelter and protection within the town 
itself. This sympathy, however, dissipates when the refugees  
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Began to put up their thatched shelters against the wall on the side of the square near 
the walnut trees, and their children grew bold enough to sneak into kitchens and steal. 
[...] Feelings then turned against them [...] The soldiers took action, shooting their 
dogs on sight and [...] tearing down the entire row of shelters. For days the fisherfolk 
hid out in the reeds. Then one by one their little thatched huts began to reappear, this 
time outside the town under the north wall. (144)  
The “temporary” space of the refugee camp within the walls of the frontier town, then, has 
not actually been effaced at all. On the contrary, what has occurred is that the camp space has 
merely been moved from the center of the frontier town and resituated just outside its 
northern borders. In this way, Waiting for the Barbarians not only illustrates the creation of 
the camp space itself, but simultaneously depicts how the camp does not ever wholly 
disappear, but instead is moved to a location where it cannot be easily recognized. The same 
process can be seen in Disgrace, though the reader encounters the space of the camp only 
after that attempt to obscure the existence of the camp has already been ingrained.  
This is precisely why the camp is much more difficult to recognize in the context of 
Disgrace— the attempt to obscure the existence of such spaces, which serves the interests of 
a sovereign power that relies on the distinction between private and public life that the camp 
disrupts, has already occurred. In Waiting for the Barbarians, on the other hand, the reader 
witnesses the dual process of the creation and subsequent relocation of the refugee camp. It is 
moved from the center of town, a location which elicits revulsion and fear from the subjects 
of the Empire, to a location just “outside” of the town. Even though they are supposedly 
“outside” of the frontier town, the river folk are still permitted to participate in the 
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commercial aspects of the town’s economic system, but because “they have no experience of 
money, they are cheated outrageously, they will part with anything for a thimbleful of 
rum” (144). Here, the dimensions of the camp as the pure space of exception can be 
glimpsed; though the refugees are technically excluded from the juridical-political sphere of 
the frontier settlement, they are included through that exclusion, a dynamic illustrated by this 
new economic system that seems to allow them to participate while in reality barring them 
from participation in an equitable capacity. In this way, the new refugee settlement in Waiting 
for the Barbarians doubles the established, homogeneously black hamlet in Disgrace. Both 
populations reside in a localizable state of exception— though they are radically excluded 
from the normative processes of their respective juridical spheres, they are still included 
because those juridical systems rely on their exceptional status in order to maintain the norm. 
Additionally, both populations, in light of their exclusion from the normative sphere, are 
perceived to be close to absolute bare life, of life that does not necessarily carry any inherent 
value or rights.   
The townsfolk' perceptions of the new community of refugees in Waiting for the 
Barbarians double those of the white residents of the South African rural community toward 
the residents of the black hamlet in Disgrace. Both groups believe those within these camp 
spaces are closer to the bareness of non-human life than the position of political, public, and 
specifically human life. However, these camp spaces also indicate the fact that sovereign 
power directly refers to the bare life it pretends to have no ability to impact. The space of the 
camp, in both narratives, thus disrupts the previously understood division between life and 
politics, and emerges or already has emerged as the new center of the political schema in 
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both narrative contexts. Agamben writes, “There is no return from the camps to classical 
politics. In the camps [...] the possibility of differentiating between our biological body and 
our political body— between what is incommunicable and mute and what is communicable 
and sayable— was taken from us forever” (188). Both the residents of the hamlet and the 
prisoners in the barrack yard reside in a pure state of exception— the camp, which signifies 
the inclusion of bare life in the political realm through its supposed exclusion. They shatter 
the perception that the city offers— the absolute separate relationship between the private 
body of bare life and the public body of the political realm. The Magistrate, after observing 
the dynamics of what occurs in the barbarian prison camp, reflects that “It would cost little to 
march them out into the desert [...] to have them dig, with their last strength, a pit large 
enough for all of them to lie in, and leaving them buried there forever and forever, to come 
back to the walled town full of new intentions” (27). What the Magistrate describes here is 
genocide, and what he apprehends is the fact that once the camp emerges, return to a political 
system that existed before its creation becomes absolutely impossible. The only method he 
can find in this moment that would achieve a return to normalcy, to the separate spheres of 
the private and political, becomes nothing less than the mass-extermination of the rightless 
individuals that reside in that space of pure exception, which historical precedent has already 
proven will not work to restore the illusion of previous political organization. 
“As for recognizing it, he will leave that to the scholars of the future, if there are still 
scholars by then. For he will not hear the note himself, when it comes, if it comes”: 
Physical Violence, Sovereign Violence, and the Violence of Citizenship and Statelessness 
in J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction 
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 Throughout this project, I have examined three mechanisms of violence in Disgrace 
and Waiting for the Barbarians: physical violence, sovereign violence, and the violence of 
citizenship and statelessness. I argue that such an examination can provide a way to think 
through how fiction can demonstrate the necessary relationship between them, and to process 
that relationship when it occurs outside of the fictional realm. These mechanisms beget each 
other, work in conjunction with each other, and ultimately arise from constructed hierarchies 
between individuals that result in the differentiation between politically empowered and 
disempowered populations. Physical violence cannot occur in isolation from sovereign 
violence, and neither can it occur without relation to the violence of statelessness and 
citizenship.  
This same sense of dependency extends to the relationship between all three 
categories of violence I examine in this project. The bodies these mechanisms of violence act 
upon correlate to the supposed differences between normatively recognizable life— valuable, 
inviolable life— and life unworthy of protection, life that is able to be violated, life that is 
unrecognizable as life. Comparing these novels also offers a glimpse into how the dynamics 
of violence attached to their individual historical moments shifts across spatial and temporal 
boundaries. Both novels directly and indirectly work to represent the violence of South 
Africa’s legacy of Apartheid. Waiting for the Barbarians, written while Apartheid remained 
legal in the country, uses ambiguity and allegory to interface with the reality in South Africa 
at the time of its publication. In this capacity, the novel exemplifies a distinct ability of 
literature to represent real situations in unexpected and extraordinarily effective ways. 
Disgrace, written in the immediate years after the Apartheid system dissolved, represents 
!135
how the specific violence of that system continues to impact individual lives in South Africa, 
and the unexpected ways its residual effects work to reify the dyanmics that led to its 
implementation in the first place. Though Apartheid does not legally exist in a technical 
sense, it maintains a visceral influence that continues to operate in the lives of the South 
African population.   
I examine the physical violence that results from the difference between recognizable 
and unrecognizable life, terminology from Judith Butler I apply to both texts. When life is 
recognized as life, the infliction of physical pain becomes extremely difficult to justify. When 
life is not recognized as life, the infliction of physical pain needs little or no justification 
whatsoever. A comparative reading of these novels reveals that justified physical violence 
can only occur when certain individuals have been disempowered— this disempowerment 
occurs because they have been individually and collectively placed outside the norms of 
hegemonically organized power structures. The power structures in both novels, and in 
modern political schemas, are organized around the norms of whiteness, masculinity, 
heteronormativity, and anthropocentrism, which necessarily means that individuals who do 
not explicitly belong to those norms are more vulnerable to justified inflictions of physical 
violence.  
I examine how gendered differences disempower the Barbarian Girl and Lucy Lurie 
and how racial differences render the barbarian and black South African populations 
vulnerable to the physical violence they experience. In both examples, these external 
differences lead to the physical violence experienced by these characters needing either little 
justification or no justification whatsoever. Both the Magistrate and David Lurie experience a 
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reconfiguration of their powerful subject position to a position of disempowerment—this 
reconfiguration is signalled by their own experience of physical violence. Both characters 
witness and even contribute to the physical suffering of Othered characters in the novels, and 
their inaction indicates the significant capacity in which complicity is considered in 
Coetzee’s fiction. Namely, that when powerful individuals choose not to intervene when 
physical violence is inflicted on less powerful individuals, they unwittingly contribute to the 
possibility that the same brutality can and will be inflicted on them. In other words, Coetzee’s 
texts demonstrate that once the infliction of physical violence on particular bodies is 
permitted, there is nothing standing in the way of physical violence being inflicted on every 
body.     
However, this conclusion leads to a second vital consideration; whose interest does 
the infliction of this physical violence serve? Anxiety about identifying the perpetrator of the 
physical violence in both texts permeates the narratives. Both of the narrators in Disgrace 
and Waiting for the Barbarians simultaneously work toward recognizing the structure at 
work behind the physical violence they witness and experience, and shrink from that 
recognition. This speaks to the insidious nature of the second mechanism I examine in the 
context of Coetzee’s fiction: the violence of sovereign power. Each novel represents 
sovereign violence at a different point: Waiting for the Barbarians, written before the 
dissolution of the Apartheid system of South Africa, centers on the height of the sovereign 
violence that justifies the perpetration of physical violence; Disgrace, written after the 
dissolution of Apartheid, focuses on how the system residually impinges on individuals 
living in South Africa. Though the paradoxical logic of sovereign violence operates in both 
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novels through collapsing the ability to distinguish between categorical distinctions of 
violence and law, they individually illustrate the eternal character of sovereign violence 
through representing it at different points in its cycle.   
After focusing on the individual logic of sovereign violence in both texts, and how 
they connect with each other in the context of the Apartheid and post-Apartheid periods, I 
then move to examine how the temporal fluctuation in both texts rest on the constructed 
difference between hegemonically powerful and hegemonically disempowered populations. 
When each protagonist interfaces with disempowered populations, they experience an overt 
sense of temporal displacement. When the Magistrate and David Lurie interface with the 
barbarian and black South African populations, or travel into spaces these populations 
occupy,  they experience a sense of traveling backwards in time, of being transported into the 
past. This sense of temporal fluctuation correlates directly with how civilization, progress, 
and modernity are normatively attributed to colonizing powers, and how foreignness, 
barbarity, and backwardness are normatively attributed to the populations being colonized. In 
a sense, the effects sovereign power has on the movement of time and space gesture toward 
the last mechanism of violence examined in the final chapter: the violence of citizenship and 
statelessness.  
Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace both depict the pernicious violence of 
citizenship and statelessness, though again, from distinct perspectives. Both novels illustrate 
the violence that occurs when one group is thought to belong and another is not. Both novels 
use the division between human and non-human life to articulate how certain disempowered 
populations are rendered unrecognizable as human because of their perceived proximity to 
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non-human life, or life as such. Additionally, both texts use comparison between non-human 
lives and disempowered human lives to reveal how these categories efface any recognition of 
the universal value of all life. Disempowered characters are continually dehumanized by 
powerful characters precisely because their actions and appearances are understood to render 
them closer to the natural, non-human world. This way of understanding life centers on the 
specific fiction purported by sovereign power; in order to perpetuate itself, sovereign power 
relies on the division between bare life, or life as such, and political life, or the realm that 
separates the human and non-human. It pretends to refer only to political life, to those for 
whom it provides protection and rights, when in reality, its original referent is bare life itself. 
The subordination of disempowered populations is in part achieved through considering them 
as more reminiscent of natural, non-human life, and yet the fact that they are still 
subordinated by sovereign power reveals the illusion that this power only relates to political 
life and not to bare life.      
This division between bare life and political life informs the criteria through which 
power is applied to certain individuals and removed from others. Both novels illustrate that 
though the universal value of human life is purported by certain characters, actual value is 
only given to individuals who share the same racial or ethnic origin as the population already 
in power. In Waiting for the Barbarians, this is most overtly demonstrated through the 
dynamics between the imperial subjects of the frontier town and the barbarian population 
excluded from juridical consideration. That exclusion leads to the mass imprisonment and 
torture of the barbarian population, who assume the status of stateless individuals when 
inside the borders of the Empire. Their inherent non-belonging along ethnic and racial lines 
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results in the justification of physical violence that is perpetrated against them. Sovereign 
imperial violence, then, is articulated through the infliction of physical violence against those 
who are excluded from the protection of the Empire based on an understanding of inherent 
belonging or non-belonging. In Disgrace, the criteria used to give power to some and revoke 
it from others resembles the status of naturalized citizens in relation to native citizens. 
Though the black South African population technically possesses the same civil rights as 
their white counterparts, the very fact that they have only recently acquired these rights leads 
to the perpetuation of the residual violent dynamics of Apartheid, a system which was only 
made possible through the criteria of citizenship based on racial difference. That racial 
difference, ultimately, makes the difference between empowered and disempowered life 
because it extends to how certain populations are thought to belong and certain populations 
are thought to not belong to original European colonizers.  
Finally, the criteria of belonging and non-belonging informs how each text represents 
the new political paradigm of the camp. The camp, as the space which locates the 
unlocalizable state of exception, reveals that the division between political life and life as 
such no longer bears any connection to reality. In Waiting for the Barbarians, the space of the 
camp is exhibited in the space where barbarian prisoners and refugees are placed— they are 
put into a physical space that represents how the sovereign power of the Empire includes 
them first and foremost through excluding them. The barbarian populations are removed 
from the juridical proceeding of the Empire, and are thus stripped of any rights they may 
have as humans, but the Empire still retains its ability to inflict violence upon them. In 
Disgrace, the camp is more or less removed from view— only cursory references to the 
!140
outskirts of cities and primarily white rural communities indicate that a large portion of the 
black South African population still reside in a permanent space of exception. These 
references indicate that though the black South African population technically has the same 
civil rights as the white South African population, the physical space they occupy in the 
nation removes any accessibility they may have to the rest of the country. They are 
technically included as citizens in South Africa, and yet, are excluded from many of the same 
mechanisms of infrastructure and technology that would allow them to exercise those rights. 
In both contexts, these texts reveal that the space of the camp has become the new center of 
political life precisely because it disrupts the fiction that sovereign power does not refer 
originally to bare life itself. The politicization of life is fully realized in both the barbarian 
prison and refugee camps and in the hamlets where the black South African population is 
primarily concentrated. Thus, both novels work to reveal the connection between physical 
violence, sovereign violence, and the violence of citizenship and statelessness. The physical 
pain inflicted in Waiting for the Barbarians and Disgrace can be understood as a manifestation of the 
tension between the structural apparatus of sovereignty and the precariousness of citizenship and 
statelessness.  
Though both texts illustrate these connections, neither offers a distinct or viable 
solution to the tangles presented by the connections between these three modes of violence. 
In the final moments of Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate reflects, “To the last we 
will have learned nothing. In all of us, deep down, there seems to be something granite and 
unteachable. No one truly believes [...] that the world of tranquil certainties we were born 
into is about to be extinguished” (165). Disgrace ends on another note of apparent 
hopelessness. David Lurie, in a final point of reflection, wishes that “from amidst the welter 
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of sound there will dart up, like a bird, a single authentic note of immortal longing. As for 
recognizing it, he will leave that to the scholars of the future, if there are still scholar by then. 
For he will not hear the note himself” (214). Of course, given David Lurie’s position as a 
white man, this “authentic” note actually reifies the violence of Apartheid, and this statement 
is therefore loaded with elements of violent nostalgia. Both of these points, however, also 
seem to gesture toward the original paradox between the supposed universal value of life, 
both human and non-human, and the legacy of atrocity that invalidates that life, and any 
claims that advocate for its unconditional protection.   
Moreover, both of the reflections made by fictional protagonists uncannily speak to 
the same anxieties we experience in our reality. The twenty-first century is a moment where 
considerations of the value of human life carry unprecedented importance, when the global 
political schema continues to move recklessly in the direction of reactionary nationalism, 
which leads to the implementation of new restrictions on economic, physical, and political 
mobility, interaction, and survival. The questions posed by these novels, questions pertaining 
to the recognition of life and a commitment to preserving it, have never been more important 
to consider. Hopefully the explication of these forms of violence in their fictional 
manifestations can contribute to an understanding of how wide-spread inconsideration and 
violation of the beauty of life happens. At the very least, I hope this examination has 
demonstrated the particular power of literature to present an insightful, nuanced, and 
exquisitely devastating perspective on the darker aspects that come with being human. What 
comes next, if the conclusions this project has offered prove salient, is this hope; that 
scholars of the future, if scholars have a place in the admittedly bleak prospects we 
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collectively face, can provide a way to recognize a non-violent note of shared longing. A 
longing to live, and keep living. To envision a reality where difference does not lead to the 
violence that permeates the conditions of our mutual experience.  
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